________________
Dharma and Adharma on the other.*
in the light of what has been said above, let me now try to understand the theory of Jiva and Ajiva as understood traditionally by the Jain thinkers. In doing this, it will be my object to remove the contradictions or inconsistencies in the theory and present the theory in a consistent form. Thereby I might be able to show that the theory of Jiva and Ajiva is, in fact, concerned with a division of certain matter which is divided on the basis of animate and inanimate only.
First, Jain philosophers think that both Jiva and Ajiva are Dravyas.* Of course Dravya is that which has got certain characteristics. But they think that all Dravyas are spatial in character. Even time is spatial in character for them. Space seems to be the common characteristic of all Dravyas or things. They use the word Pradeśa to denote spatiality of a thing. They also think that since there are two kinds of objects, Jiva and Ajiva, Jiva and Ajiva would be a division of the universe. They bring in an important notion here. The notion of Ākāśa. They divide Ākāśa into Loka-ākāśa and Aloka-ākāśa. Loka-Akāśa is the space wherein the things exist and activity takes place. But the Loka-Akāśa is encircled by a limiting line (may be imaginary) beyond which there cannot be any activity nor can there be any existence of things. It is on this line of demarcation that Jain philosophers imagine that there are Siddhasilās and think of them as abode of freed souls. The freed souls simply cannot go beyond this line because as soon as they are free their activity comes to an end. Beyond this line there is only empty space. It is empty space not because there in nothing in it but because there cannot be anything in it. All things of different kinds therefore exist only in Loka-Akāśa. It may be remembered that the empty space in Loka-Akása is different in kind from the empty space in Aloka-ākāśa.
There is however, a difficulty which may be pointed out here. Everything which exists is Astikāya. However, Kála is not an Astikāya though it exists in Lok-Akāśa only. How to conceive of Kāla as not Astikāya and still in space is in fact a problem. Therefore, I think, it is necessary to think that the term Astikāya does not simply indicate a thing but it means as Jain philosophers rightly assert, a medium introduced like Kant's schemata to make up for the relation between concepts and things. But if we think this way, Jiva and Jivästikāya would be two notions and not one. Jiva would be the concept of Jiva and Jivāstikāya would be an actual Jiva having extension. This will not only be true of Jiva, but of all Dravyas. In ordinary language we do use the word Jiva in these two senses. This would also explain why Kāla is not Astikāya, for the concept of time does not require any other medium in order to be significant.
* At a later stage, however, he must have made a distinction between Jiva (as a
concept) and Jiva (as Astikāya). Similarly he must have made a distinction between
Dharına and Dharmāstikaya etc. * I am aware that the Jains use the word Dravya where a Vaiseșika would use
Padārtha.
- 507 -
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
