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from each other. From this if someone suggests that they are two things and they only come together by some external contact, it would be incorrect, Similarly if there is green leaf and if later on it dries up, it would be incorrect to say that green itself has gone somewhere else. When a revolving wheel stops it does not mean that the movement is taking rest somewhere, Vanishing is not equivalent to going somewhere else just as existing together of space and a thing in space is not equivalent to external contact or Sarayoga. A better explanation would be to say that (1) space and a thing in space are one phenomenon, (2) greeness and vanishing of greeness of leaf is another kind of phenomenon (3) revolution of wheel and stopping of its movement is a third kind of phenomenon and death of a living being is a fourth kind of phenomenon. One need not explain the one in terms of the other. But unconsciously one commits this mistake and fluctuates between the process of dividing (or classifying) and conceptualising. Perhaps a better explanation of Jain category would be possible if we understand Java and Ajiva as a division of existants, say matter, on the principle that one is animistic and the other is not. One has to remember that the process of dividing, enumerating, counting or sometimes even classifying things is of one kind and categorising of things is of another. You cannot divide, enumerate etc., unless things exist in their own right. Of course conceptually you can even give concepts the status of a thing and then count (as you do when you count categories). But primarily this process belongs to things which exist in their own right. On the other hand when you distinguish different qualities or characteristics, you are not seperating the independent things, you are abstracting them, and such abstractions are neither in space nor in time, they are not existing, nor living, they are just concepts.
A problem, of course, would arise about the relationship of such concepts to reality. Concepts in logic does not require a bearer of substratum but if they are to be real then they can be real only in relation to some substratum which is real, i.e., these concepts should be such that they must be capable of having a form which is a form of existence, a form of life. This form of life or existence makes it possible for us to think that the concept has an existential relevance. Take, e.g., the case of sweetness. In order for sweetness to have significance in life it will have to go with some thing and to talk of a thing we will have to talk of space, time and substance. Space, time and substance, so to say provide a medium for the concept of sweetness to be real. The process by which we concretise a concept is the process in which we supply medium for the concept to exist. And this according to me is the Jain concept of Astikāya-a body for its existence, a form of existence. This form of existence will naturally vary accordingly as the concept in its concretized form is dynamic or not and accordingly the Astikāya concept also will be modified into Dharmāstikāya and Adharmastikāya etc. But the point that I am making is that when a Jain philosopher tries to conceptualize and abstract, he rather talks of Dharma and Adharma, both of them being characteristics (Adharma is also a characteristic) and when he talks of concrete things, he talks of Jiva and Ajiva. One can easily see the distinction between Jiva and Ajiva on the one hand and
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