Pravachanasara

Author(s): A N Upadhye
Publisher: Shrimad Rajchandra Ashram

Page 93

60
Pravacanasara
pradela which is capable of giving room to the atoms (in some cases pradesas) of all substances. Time which marks continuity is without extension in space; the ultimate unit of time is samaya, that much period of time required for a primary atom to traverse one space-point. That which has no space-points, not even one space-point, is to be known as void, which is something other than existence. (II, 35-52, 60, 76-77).
CRITICAL REMARKS ON JAINA AND SAMKHYA ONTOLOGY.-Jainism does not accept creation in the Nyaya-Vaiéeņika sense or emanation, whether actual or apparent, in the Vedantic sense. With it the world is existential and real. Since it is not created by any one on the analogy of a carpenter or a smith, the cosmic constituents enumerated by Jainism are such that they are capable of explaining the diverse phenomena by their mutual interaction. The ontological start is that of realistic dualism or even pluralism. The world of existence is constituted of two stubstances, life and non-life, which are not philosophical postulates but reals as spirit and matter which are pluralistic, constitutionally eternal, and not liable to lose or to interchange their nature. The substances like earth, water, fire, mind etc. enumerated by NyayaVaiścṣika are only forms of matter according to Jainism. The position is exactly the same in Jainism and Samkhya so far as the initial start is concerned, one accepting the thesis and antethesis of Jiva and Ajiva and the other of Puruşa and Prakrti; thus both are dualistic or even pluralistic in view of the plurality of spirits that essentially retain their individuality; but the immediate development of these two schools is interesting. Sämkhya dualism is undiluted, it is what Dr. Belvalkar aptly calls touch-me-not dualism; with a spirit of idealism this dualism has been maintained by the Samkhya almost to a logical fallacy; while Jainism started with the same dualism but with a plain dogma that the soul is associated with matter from times immemorial. With this dogma it was easy for Jainism to explain samsara as a remedy against which Religion was needed. That explains very well how Jainism became an institutional religion with all the necessary accessories like mythology etc. and with a philosophical background, while Samkhya remained till the end only a system of intellectual pursuit. The strong realistic tone of Jainism is the result of common-sense and analytical approach to objectivity, Dharma and Adharma respond to the definition of substance, becuase they exist as the neutral and conditional causes of motion and rest.1 The two words are never used in this sense any[p. 64:] where else; and there still remains a question why and how Jainism might have taken the liberty of using these words with this meaning. The Samkhya idea that Dharma leads upwards and Adharma downwards is merely the ethico-religious idea quite usual in Gita and other works. In Jainism they are non-corporeal and
1 The conceptions of Dharma and Adharma require a thorough study.
In early stages of oriental studies they were uniformly misunderstood. For some important exposition of these two see Jaini: Outlines of Jainism, pp. 22 etc.; Ghoshal: Davvasamgaha (SBJ I), pp. 52 etc. and appendix p. Iviii; Chakravarti: Pañcastikāyasara (SBJ III), pp. 90-8, 101 etc.; Bhattacharya: Jaina Gazette, Vol. XXII, pp. 242 etc. and XXIII, pp. 285 etc.; Becharadasa: Jaina Sahitya Samsodhaka III, pp. 35-42; and Jagadishachandra: Indian Historical Quarterly IX, 3, p. 792.
2 Samkhyakārikā 44.