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74
Pravacanasara
a free mind and knowledge. All the Jaina implications of omniscience cannot be read in Mahayana Buddhism, especially Sünyavāda and Vijñānavāda, because both of them are idealistic as opposed to Jainism which is realistic. The soul in Jainism being the sole knower can claim omniscience as its legitimate essence, while the momentary stream of consciousness in Buddhism can never be a substantial substitute for the Jaina soul. The omniscient Tirthakara has round about him the complex object of knowledge (including his self) with manifold modifications extending over three times and infinite space: but according to Vijñānavāda there is nothing in this world besides the chain of consciousness. Thus the Vijñānavāda, if I would say like that, comes round to Upanisadic monism; and omniscience simply amounts to self-knowledge, because nothing exists beyond vijñāna. And Buddha is claimed as omniscient, because that would give infallibility to his utterances,
KUMĀRILA'S ATTACK ON OMNISCIENCE.—Kumārila has adversely [p. 78:] criticised the doctrine of omniscience; so the Pürvamimämsä view is worthy of note; and it will have to be studied in the context of some of the special tenets of that school. With the Purvamīmāmsā Vedic injunctions are of the highest authority; the performance of the sacrifice is the highest duty which when performed gives rise to some unprecedented cosmic potency (apūrva), ‘a potential after state of acts", which brings about all the fruits for the performer of the sacrifice. These tenets cannot allow any one to claim omniscience for the simple reason that if any one were to be omniscient outside the Vedic fold, his words would be looked upon as infallible and the Vedic authority would be questioned. Kumārila says that the human being might see only the general aspect of things, and hence it is not possible to believe that a man can see all things in all places and of all times. The omniscient will have to be a dirty being, because, being necessitated by the function of seeing, he will have to come into contact with so many dirty things. There is a limit to visionary or knowing ability, and it cannot be stretched beyond that; so none can be able to see things which are supersensuous. None of the five proofs can justify any one's omniscience. The so called omniscients do not agree among themselves; their words are against Vedas whose authority is unquestionable; and no omniscient is ever come across by anybody: so omniscience is an impossibility. The all-knowledge attributed to Brahman means only self-knowledge. This attack of Kumärila has twofold handicaps: first, his hands are tied down by the above tenets of his school, and secondly, he has not distinguished sense-perception from omniscience; he attacks omniscience as if it is sense-perception intensified and magnified. Kundakunda has plainly told us that senses have no part to play in omniscience; it is the spirit, being a knower by nature and essentially constituted of knowledge, that comes. face to face with the complex reality, and comprehends it immediately and simultaneously in its entirety with no effort on his part and with no effect on his spiritual constitution.
1 See E. J. Thomas: The History of Buddhist Thought, p. 148.
2 Tattvasamgraha, G. O. S. xxx, pp. 815-936, Intro. pp. 45-50, 153-6 and 62-4. 3 Slokavārtika verses 111 etc.
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