________________
AN EPITOME OF JAINISM.
would be of
minate cha
doubt or
being (afera) and non-being (afga) cannot, at the same time, belong to one thing.
II. And to speak of the seven predica
ments which have been determined to be as Knowledge so many and such if they really be so many as undeter- in number and such-and-such in character, racter as then they must as the Jains teach exist diffidence is in either of their modes of suchness (aura)
and unsuchness (w2169) at one and the same point of time. If it were so, it would follow that because of the indefiniteness as desiderated to be expressed in their being as such and not-being as such at the same moment of time, the knowledge of the same would be also equally indeterminate like diffidence or doubt for which reason it cannot be held as a true criterion of right knowledge.
III. If the Jains contend here that the led ge, the thing itself being instinct with multiplicity and
versatility of modes or aspects (qa 19 FHIO) knowing sub
h is really of determinate character as such and in the m- the knowledge of the thing, therefore, both Syad va da as being and non-being, cannot be non-detersource of minate and consequently non-authoritative
like that of doubtfui knowledge, Shankar
The Know
knowabilities and the
ject-a11 being inde terminate
selves, the Sy a dva da cannot be a
valid knowledge.
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