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made clear. Indeed we understand what is meant by subreption (mithy átva). But is it possible for us to put the notions of the object and its accidents into the self which is not an object of knowledge? Object of knowledge (vishaya) and Subject (vishayee i.e., nonobject) are not only two distinct substance but also the accidents of the one are radically opposed to the accidents of the other. Such being the case how are we to account for the alleged subreption of the two incommensurate entities in as much as subreption as just discussed is possible only where there is some thing common between the two factors under subreption. It is just because there is a kind of unity between one object and another that we put by subreption the notion of the one into another object. But between the body and the soul, there being no unity of any kind, the question of subreption of the two cannot come in at all, specially when, according to the Jain metaphysics, the soul or the self, from the transcendental point of view (nischaya naya) is of the nature of pure consciousness or knowledge itself (vide Atma-pravâd pūrva). Aforteriori, therefore, the self cannot be the
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