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One may indeed enquire as to what is this subreption (mithyů tva) by which they not only identify soul with karma-matter and vice versa matter with soul but their respective attributes as well.
As we remarked already, it is the putting of the notion of something observed elsewhere into something else present in the vision which is not that thing. Various schools of philosophy have defined this subreption (mithyatva) in various ways. As for instance, the Naiyayikas define it as the assumption of the possession of contrary attributes in the very thing superimposed upon another thing. The Prabhakar school of philosophy explains it as the error (bhrama) attaching to mistaken apprehension of the super-imposed thing for the thing super-imposed on. According to the Buddhist school, it is the assumption of something else's attributes to a thing; while Shankar, the pseudo-Buddhist define, it to be the appear. ance of what has been seen previously in something else (elsewhere), taking the form of recollection.
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