Aptamimansa Critique of an Authority Bhasya

Author(s): Samantbhadracharya, Akalankadev, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Jagruti Dilip Sheth Dr
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/001124/1

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SAMANTABHADRA'S APTAMIMAMSA CRITIQUE OFAN AUTHORITY I ALONG WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION NOTES AND AKALANKA'S SANSKRIT COMMENTARY ASTASATI ] Translation etc. by NAGIN J. SHAH SANSKRIT-SANSKRITI GRANTHAMALA 7 GENERAL EDITOR NAGIN J. SHAH

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SAMANTABHADRA'S APTAMIMAMSA CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY | ALONG WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION, NOTES AND AKALANKA'S SANSKRIT COMMENTARY ASTASATI) Translation etc. by NAGIN J. SHAH SANSKRIT-SANSKRITI GRANTHAMALA 7 GENERAL EDITOR NAGIN J. SHAH

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Printed by K. Bhikhalal Bhavsar Shri Swaminarayan Mudran Mandir 21 Purushottamnagar Nava Vadaj Ahmedabad-380 013 Published by Dr. Jagruti Dilip Sheth M. A., Ph.D. B-14, Dev-Darshan Flats Nehru Nagar Char Rasta Ambawadi Ahmedabed-380 015 1999 PRICE : Rs. 108 This book can be ordered from 1. Saraswati Pustak Bhandar Hathikhana, Ratan Pole, Ahmedabad-380 001 2. Parshva Prakashan Nisha Pole, Zaveri Wad, Ahmedabad-380 001

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FOREWORD 1 . The Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamala has great pleasure indeed in offering to scholars of Indian philosophy the English translation of Samantabhadra's (c. 550 A. D.) Aptamimamsa ("Critique of an Authority"). This is the seventh book in the Series. Samantabhadra laid a firm foundation of Anekanta logic and his Aptamimamsa provided a model for subsequent authors for criticising onesided philosophical views. Aptamimamsa has the good fortune of being commented upon by such stalwarts of Anekanta logic as Akalanka, Vidyananda and Yasovijaya. Akalanka's commentary called Astasati, though elaborate enough, is not too elaborate. Hence it is included in the present work. It is not a word-by-word commentary on Aptamimamsa. So it can be read as an independent work. Notes and comments added to the English translation enhance the value of the work. The introduction elucidates several points of philosophical interest. It is hoped that the publication of this work will be of great value to the scholars of Indian philosophy. Nagin J. Shah General Editor Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamala 23, Valkeshvar Society Ambawadi Ahmedabad-380 015 India December 25, 1998

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CONTENTS Foreword 3 Introduction 7-34 I Existence and Non-Existence II Oneness and Separateness III Permanence and Transience IV Difference and Identity V Dependence and Independence VI Reason and Scripture VII Pan-internalism and Pan-externalism VIII Fate and Perseverance IX 'Injury done to others a sin, pleasure given to others virtue' and 'Injury done to oneself a virtue, pleasure given to oneself a sin' 81 X 'Worldly bondage results from even slight ignorance and 'Moksa results from even slight knowledge'. 84

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INTRODUCTION Jainism is one of the important systems of Indian philosophy and Anekantavada is regarded by scholars as the central philosophy of Jainism. Anekantavada is a theory of manysidedness of reality and truth. It presupposes the theory of standpoints or partial truths (nayavada). It investigates how each of the views contains some truth. As a result, it arrives at the conclusion that different systems of philosophies are partially true, that none of them is wholly true, and if each of them would see things from the opponent's viewpoint as well as from its own, there would be perfect harmony all round. The theory is so important and interesting that we have decided to study an important Sanskrit text neatly dealing with it - the text neither too intricate nor too heavy. Such a text we found in Samantabhadra's Aptamimamsa. Before we translate and expound it, we would like to say something more about Anekantavada. Nayavada and Anekantavada According to Jaina philosophy a real thing has infinite characters (anantadharmatmaka), implying thereby that it has even opposite characters. A real thing is many-sided (anekantatmaka). Again, Jaina thinkers maintain that both the substance and mode constitute the nature of a real thing'; and further they relate permanence to substance and origination and destruction to modes. Therefore, a real thing has two opposite characters - permanence and change?. Again, they contend that a real thing is constituted of general features and unique features. Hence it has two opposite characters - universality and particularity, or similarity and dissimilarity, or the One and the Many. Thus, ontologically a real thing is a veritable confluence of opposites. A real thing is not merely a mixture of the opposites. It is not a mixture of substance and mode but something sui generis (jatyantara). Substance and mode are so blended as to present a real thing sui generis which is, therefore, not vitiated by the defects of the two taken singly and separately; at the same time they are never found outside a real thing, nor one without the other. Similar is the case with universal and particular of a real thing. Thus a real thing is a unique synthesis of opposites. 1. dravyaparyayatma arthah.../ Akalankagranthatraya, p. 3. 2. utpadavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat / Tattvarthasutra V. 30. 5 3. ayam arthah- na dravyarupam na paryayarupam nobhayarupam vastu. yena tattatpaksabhavi dosah syat, kintu sthityutpadavyayaumakam Sabalan jatyantaram eva vastu / Pramanamimamsa, Ed. Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi. Singhi Jain Granthamala, p. 29.

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY We ordinary mortals can attend to one aspect or character of a real thing at a time and consequently can have the knowledge of only one aspect or character of a real thing. And our concentration on one aspect or character is conditioned by our purpose, intention, etc. Such partial knowledge of only one aspect or character is called naya and a judgment based on such partial knowledge is also called naya. A naya is defined as a particular opinion or a viewpoint - a viewpoint which does not rule out other different viewpoints and is, thereby, expressive of partial truth about a real thing - as entertained by a knowing agent. A viewpoint (naya) can prevent itself from lapsing into dogmatic absolute assertion and becoming thereby a pseudo-viewpoint (durnaya) by qualifying itself with a word 'syat' (= 'from a particular standpoint', 'in a certain sense') expressing conditionality, thus keeping open the possibility of other different viewpoints. Thus the doctrine of naya is the doctrine of relativity of knowledge and of conditioned judgment. Our knowledge or judgment is true only in reference to the standpoint adopted and the aspect of a real thing considered. The doctrine means that Reality is conveyed to the mind differently from different viewpoints. Or, it means that mind approaches Reality differently from different viewpoints. As we look at Reality from different angles or viewpoints, our descriptions of it differ. All these descriptio'.s are partially true, none of them presents the whole truth. The various Non Jaina systems of philosophy represent aspects of Reality and hence they are partially true. These nayas (viewpoints) are not subjective but objective. They have as their objects different aspects of Reality. The doctrine of Naya analyses a real thing into different aspects from different standpoints. Jaina theoreticians have attempted to find out philosophical viewpoints and to classify them on different principles of classification. The next step is to effect synthesis of these different philosophical views or partial truths into the whole concrete truth. To assign them their proper place in the whole truth and synthesise them into the whole truth is the task of Anekantavada at epistemological and logical levels. Anekantavada integrates nayas into a consistent and compre hensive synthesis. The Jaina Anekanta philosophy emerges as the whole synthetic concrete truth from the mutual conflicts of the 4. ckadesavisisto'rtho nayasya vinayo matah/ Nyayavatara, verse 29. 5. anirak riapratipukso vastvarivsugrahi jnafurabhiprayo nayah/Prameyakamalamartanda, p. 676.

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INTRODUCTION abstract partial truths represented by the several philosophical schools. In this sense, Jaina Anekanta philosophy becomes Philosophy of philosophies. For presenting a synthesis of all possible philosophical views on a point the Jaina thinkers have devised a methodology of saptabhangi (the sevenfold predication or sevenfold judgment). Let us take the point of existence. Regarding it, the following seven views are possible. They are : (i) From a certain viewpoint, x exists. (ii) From a certain viewpoint, x does not exist. (iii) From a certain viewpoint, x exists and does not exist. (iv) From a certain viewpoint, x is inexpressible (with regard to existence-nonexistence characters). (v) From a certain viewpoint, x exists and is inexpressible. (vi) From a certain viewpoint, x does not exist and is inexpressible. (vii) From a certain viewpoint, * exists, does not exist and is inexpressible. These are the seven avayavas (constituent parts) of the whole synthetic statement (vakya) on a particular point". The first avayava (naya) means that x.exists from the viewpoint of its 'own nature.' X exists as x. The second means tha x does not exist from the viewpoint of 'foreign nature'. X does not exist as otherthan-x. The third predicates of x both existence and non-existence in succession. This avayava is a compound of the first and the second. It is not simple and primary. The fourth means that both existence and non-existence cannot be predicated of x simultaneously due to the limitation of language. But it does not mean that they are not present in x simultaneously. We may say that both the third and fourth are compounds of the first and second but in the third there is successive predication while in the fourth there is simultaneous predication. Both are sui generis (jatyantara). Vidyananda notes that the fourth is the joint and simultaneous affirmation and denial (of existence in x). The fifth is a compound one combining the first and the fourth, the sixth is a compound one combining the second and the fourth, and the seventh 6. ekatra jivadau vastuni ekaikasattvadidharmavisayaprasnavasat avirodhena prutyaksadibudhaparibarena prthagbhutayoh samuditayos ca vidhinisedhayoh paryalocanaya kitva syacchabdalanchito vaksyamanaih saptabhih prakaraih vacanavinyasah saprabhangiti giyle / Syadvadamanjart, Ed. A. B. Dhruva, pp. 142-143. 7. Astasahasri, p. 125

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY is a compound one combining the third and the fourth. These seven avayavas exhaust all the mathematical possibilities with regard to one character. When they are taken as seven constituent parts of a vakya (statement or judgment) they together present an integrated and comprehensive true description of a real thing with regard to one particular point or character (dharma). And as there are infinite characters in a real thing, there are infinite such saptabhangi vakyas (sevenfold judgments). Evolution of Anekantavada Doctrine of relative judgment (nayavada) is traceable to the Agamas. In Bhagavatisutra Lord Mahavira states that jiva (soul) and pudgala (matter) are both permanent and changing, permanent from the point of view of substance (davvatthayae) and changing from the point of view of modes (bhavatthayae). Thus here a fundamental pair of standpoints is referred to. In Anuyogadvarasutra we come across a passage referring to seven standpoints, viz. naigama etc. Again, it states that the Jifferent parts of a physical aggregate might be characterised by anupurvi, ananupurvi and avaktavya. This can very well be regarded as a mention of three primary avayavas or bhangas of saptabhangi vakya. Dr. A. N. Upadhye has found reference to the three primary avayavas in the Bhagavatisutra.' In Avasyakaniryukti the definitions of seven viewpoints (naigama etc.) are given. Again, it mentions three pairs of dravyarthika-paryayarthika, vyavahara-niscaya and jnanakriya. In Satkhandagama we find the neat employment of the doctrine of nayas. Umasvati devotes two aphorisms to the doctrine of nayas. O He speaks of traditional seven nayas and the contemporary literature is full of references to them. He does not make any explicit reference to the seven avayavas of the saptabhangi. Till the times of Umasvati, while dealing with the doctrine of nayas no explicit reference to nonJaina schools of philosophy is made, nor can it be said that such a reference is implicity present. The viewpoints are not studied with their supporting arguments, nor are they examined and criticised. With Umasvati ends the age of Agamas. And with Siddhasena Divakara the age of Logic sets in. In this age we find explicit mention of non-Jaina philosophical schools, supporting arguments of their viewpoints and 8. Bhagavatisatra, VII. 2.273 9. His Introduction to Pravacanasara (Bombay 1955) p. 83 10. Tattvarthashta, I. 34-35

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INTRODUCTION their criticism. Siddhasena says : 'Since a thing has infinite characters, it is comprehended only by the omniscient. But a thing becomes the subject-matter of a naya, when it is conceived from one particular standpoint.'" Interesting is his following statement : 'There are as many views of the form of nayas as there are the ways of speaking, while there are as many rival (non-Jaina) philosophical tenets as there are views of the form of nayas.''2 Again, he declares : 'All the standpoints (nayas) are right in their own respective spheres - but if they are taken to be refutations, each of the other, then they are wrong. But a man who knows the 'non-onesided' (anekanta) nature of reality never says that a particular view is absolutely wrong'.13 Siddhasena was probably the first in the Jaina tradition to synthesise the Sankhya view with the Buddhist view. Thus, he observes : The system of philosophy taught by Kapila is a representation of substance viewpoint, and that which is taught by the son of Suddhodana (the Buddha) is an exposition of mode viewpoint.'' Regarding Vaisesika system he remarks : 'Although the philosophical system of Kanada applies both standpoints, it is also fallacious because the standpoints are employed each independently of the other."" "The point of Siddhasena is that the Vaisesikas simply combine the two standpoints, but do not synthesise them. The Jainas, on the other hand, synthesise the two and build them into a coherent whole. Siddhasena also claims that the Vaisesikas and the Buddhists are correct in so far as they point out the faults and fallacies of the Sankhya view of causation and the Sankhya philosophers are correct in so far as they criticise the Buddhists and the Vaisisikas. But when these two views of causality (satkarya and asatkarya) are adjus together in compliance with the anekanta method, the result will be the True Insight (samyag-darsana, omniscience)."!" In its unmistakably recognizable form doctrine of saptabhangi first appears in Siddhasena's Sanmati. Next we take Jinabhadra's Visesavasyakabhasya. It does not much concern itself with the views of rival systems of philosophy, though it is not wholly bereft of occasional references to some. His treatment 11. Nyayavatara, verse 29 12. Sanmatitarka, III. 47 13. Ibid, 1. 28 14. Ibid, III. 48 15. Ibid, III. 49 16. B. K. Matilal, The Central Philosophy of Jainism, p. 33

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10 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY of seven nayas, occasional application to certain specific cases and his account of dravyastika and paryayastika are interesting." He defines jnananaya and kriyanaya. He presents three versions of niscayanayavyavaharanaya." His reference to the saptabharigi doctrine is extremely summary and fails to be informative. Kundakunda's Samayasara certainly adds a new dimension to the discussion concerning the problem of vyavaharanaya (the standpoint of worldly behaviour) vs. niscayanaya (the transcendental standpoint). His recourse to it is so massive that it startles us. From the transcendental standpoint the soul is independent, self-existent and uncontaminated by matter while from the standpoint of worldly behaviour it is involved in karma as well as in the birth and rebirth cycle. As to view the niscaya-vyavahara pair in more than one ways is possible, the procedure adopted by Kundakunda was not totally impermissible. But what was un-Jainalike was Kundakunda's declaration that standpoint of worldly behaviour is a totally false standpoint." In his Pancastikaya he mentions the fullfledged seven avayavas or bhangas of Saptabhangi. Samantabhadra laid a firm foundation of Anekantavada upon which Akalanka, Vidyananda and Yasovijaya built a grand superstructure. His Aptamimarsa which we are going to translate and study in the latter part of this book deserves a special mention in the history of Anekanta philosophy for more reasons than one. The framework worked out in Aptamimamsa for criticising onesided philosophical views proved to be a major helpful model for subsequent authors. Certainly, the task of the Jaina thinkers belonging to the later times was to command mastery over the contemporary systems of philosophy and subject them to criticism mainly in terms of the model provided by Aptamimamsa. The work has a good fortune of being commented on by Akalanka, Vidyananda and Yasovijaya. It is meritorious inasmuch as the fundamentals of Anekantavada has found in it a most clear-cut formulation. "Samantabhadra had a clear consciousness of what constitutes the central contention of the doctrine of Anekanta, viz. that a thing must be characterised by two mutually contradictory features at one and the same time. He also realised that the doctrine 17. Verses 2180-2274 and verses 414-426 18. Verses 3586-3591 19. vavaharu 'bhudattho bhudattho desido suddhanao / Samayasara, 13

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INTRODUCTION 11 . was applicable rather universally; that is to say, he felt that taking anything and any feature at random it could be shown that this thing is characterised by this feature as also by the concerned contradictory feature... Another aspect of Samantabhadra's performance also deserves notice. He apparently attaches utmost importance to the Saptabhangi doctrine and in fact makes it the starting point of his investigation (in Aptamimamsa). ""20 Again, what is noteworthy is his attributing the name 'naya' to each of the seven bhangas as also the name 'syadvada' to the totality of all the seven bhangas. Haribhadra's Anekantajayapataka is a much advanced text as compared to Aptamimarsa but for the most part it adopts the latter's model while arranging its material. It is chiefly interested in vindicating the validity of Anekantavada. As is expected, Akalanka's most crystal-like and concentrated enunciation and defence of Anekantavada occurs in his Astasati, a commentary on Aptamimamsa. Here he elaborately deals with the most fundamental philosophical views centring around the acceptance or otherwise of two contradictiry features. His discussions constitute the first most comprehensive and mature vindication of Anekantavada. This is so because in them he has taken into consiueration the rival positions as actually maintained in the contemporary works of various non-Jaina schools, particularly Buddhist, and also because by his time these schools - particularly Buddhist - had reached almost the acme of perfection. "Samantabhadra had clinched the most crucial point that the Jaina thinkers of his age had to elaborate, viz. the all-out importance of Anekantavada as the central criterion for evaluating the contemporary non-Jaina philosophical systems. He has offered valuable hints as to the lines on which the systems like Buddhist, Sankhya, NyayaVaiscsika had to be assailed. But he hardly went beyond offering mere hints. Akalanka continued what Samantabhadra had begun and so he was in a position to enter into a larger number of details than was the case with the latter.... (But) Akalanka's was not an all-round battle against possible rivals. The credit for waging such a battle goes to Vidyanada who had thoroughly mastered both the contemporary systems and the legacy left by Akalanka... His most outstanding treatment of Anekantavada is found in Astasahasri, a commentary on 20. Jaina Ontology, pp. 135-136

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12 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY Astsati. For in this work he undertook a detailed examination of certain one-sided views on certain most burning philosophical questions... Vidyananda's studies in Anekantavada is the most solid contribution to the treasure-house of philosophy. Anekantavada is a much misunderstood doctrine and its defence at the hands of incompetent persons only makes matters worse. But Vidyananda's competence was of a higher order and so his elaboration of the essentials of Anekantavada deserves serious study by those who harbour genuine misgivings against this typical Jaina philosophical doctrine,"21 In Yasovijaya's works we reach the highest pinnacle of Anekantavada. He had thoroughly mastered the rich heritage. Of his writings the most important are three texts devoted to the problems of Anekantavada, viz. Nayarahasya, Anekantavyavastha and Nayopadesa. His Astasahasrivivarana, a commentary on Vidyananda's Astasahasri is noteworthy. Like Vidyananda he was extermely well-versed in the contemporary systems of Indian philosophy. Besides, he was gifted with a brain whose sharpness and acuteness were unparallelled, this may be due to his mastery over the intricacies of Navya-nyaya. Let us see how he utilises his learning of Navya-nyaya in elucidating and defending the doctrine of Anekanta. "It was an old Jaina position that a thing exists from the standpoint of its own properties while it does not exis. from the standpoint of the alien properties... It constituted the heart of Anekantavada doctrine and so the generations of Jaina scholars defended it as best they could. But in Navya-nyaya circles a position similar to the present one began to be maintained. Thus they would speak of 'a thing's absence "limited" by a property not belonging to it' e.g. 'a jar's absence "limited" by clothness (patatvavadhikaghatabhavah)'; and it was given out that such an absence of a thing exists even at a place where the thing itself exists. Yasovijaya aptly pointed out that this amounted to endorsing the Jaina position that a thing as viewed from the standpoint of the alien properties does not exist (i.e. is absent) even at a place where it is seen to exist, it being the case that at this place it exists only as viewed from the standpoint of its own properties... Navya-naiyayikas would argue that variegated colour is a type sui generis and not just a mechanical juxtaposition of the constituent colours; Yasovijaya pointed out that in a similar fashion the unity of opposites spoken of by the Jaina is a type sui generis and 21. Ibid, pp. 148-152

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INTRODUCTION 13 not just a mechanical juxtaposition of the opposites concerned. As a matter of fact, a close observer could not fail to see that there was some sort of basic similarity between the Jaina's traditional preoccupation with the problem of 'standpoint' and the Navya-naiyayika's current preoccupation with the problem of 'avacchedakata'; both were meant to ensure that no ambiguities remained attached to what one says. Yasovijaya was as thorough a student of Navya-nyaya as that of the traditional Jaina positions and this one fact is sufficient to make his treatment of Anekantavada unique performance."22 Demands of Anekantavada on its upholders Anekantavada being the synthesis of partial truths (philosophical viewpoints) into the whole concrete truth, it requires the understanding of partial truths with their logic, otherwise whose synthesis it will effect. And Anekanta becomes richer and richer as it takes into its fold more and more partial truths to make synthesis. So, it becomes imperative on the upholders of Anekantavada to study and understand as many philosophical views as are possible. Their task is stupendous but rewarding. They should not neglect any philosophical system propounded by any thinker. Their study should not be confined to Jaina works only. The Jaina acaryas of the past realised this and hence they studied arid understood all the philosophical views prevalent in their times in India. At present the philosophical works of the thinkers of the whole world are within the reach of Jaina thinkers and students; so if they are really upholders of Anekantavada they should study them and find out whatever truth there is in them and give them due place in the synthetic concrete whole truth which Anekantavada tries to arrive at. Non-violence (Ahimsa) and Anekantavada The highest goal of all systems of Indian philosophy is liberation (moksa). For the attainment of this goal they have prescribed their respective spiritual disciplines which do not differ much from one another. In all these spiritual disciplines the practiser is necessarily 22. Ibid, pp. 162-163 23. tatrahinsa sarvatha sarvada sarvabhutanam anabhidrohah, uttare ca yamaniyamas tanmalas ratsiddhiparataya tatpratipidanaya prutipadyante, tadavadatarOpakaranayaivopadiyante / Vyasabhasya, 2.30 ahinsaya avirodhenaiva satyadayo yamaniyama anustheya iti / Yogavartika, 2.30 yatha nagapade'nyani padani padaganiinani / sarvany evapi dhiyante padajatani kaunjare // cvarii sarvam ahinsayam dharmartham api dhiyante // -Moksadharmaparva

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14 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY required to cultivate five prime virtues, viz. non-violence, truth, nontheft, celibacy and non-possession. And among these five, non-violence is supreme and fundamental. It is so fundamental that the rest depend on it and are included in it, not only that but it provides us with the sole criterion for determining as to what is truth, etc.23 That which involves violence is not truth even though it may be factually true, and conversely that which does not involve violence is truth even though it may be factually untrue. That which hurts others is never truth. So, one should not speak what hurts others and should also respect the views of others.24 One should not be stubborn to state that what one says is the only truth. Not to hurt others in presenting one's view implies one's respect for others' views. So, one should be very cautious in one's statement of one's view. One should qualify one's statement by 'this is my faith' 'this is my view' etc. implying thereby that others may have different faith or view. By thus saying one protects the truth, while making absolute statements one harms the truth.25 This spirit prevails in all the ethical systems of India. It is this spirit that has given rise to the theory of Anekantavada. Anekantavada recognises nononesidedness or manifoldness of the truth. The whole concrete truth is the synthesis of the viewpoints. Anekantavada finds some truth in each and every view. It assigns all the viewpoints their proper place to form the whole truth. It accepts all the views in its fold and effects such a synthesis of them all as would result in the whole concrete truth sui generis. It is not merely juxtaposition or mixture of the opposite views. It rejects no view. "Non-violence i.e. abstention from killing or taking the life of others, was the dominant trend in the whole sramana movement in India, particularly in Buddhism and Jainism. I think the Jainas carried the principle of non-violence to the intellectual level, and thus propounded their Anekanta doctrine. Thus the hallmark of the Anekanta doctrine was toleration. The principle embodied in the respect for the life of others was transformed by the Jaina philosophers at the intellectual level 24. esa (vag) sarvabhutopakarartharn pravstta na bhutopaghataya, yadi caivam apy abhidhiyamana bhulopaghataparaiva syat na satyam bhavet papam eva bhavet, tena punyabhasena punyapratirupakena kastatamam prapnuyat / Vyasabhasya on Yogasutra 2.30 25. saddha ce pi, Bharadvaja, purisassa hoti; 'evan me saddha' ti vadam saccan anurakkhati, na Iveva tava ekamsena nittham gacchati - 'idam eva saccam, mogham Gioiain't / Canokisula, Majjhimanikaya.

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INTRODUCTION 15 into respect for the views of others. This is, I think, a unique attempt to harmonize the persistent discord in the field of philosophy."26 "...this doctrine of Anekantavada helps us in cultivating the attitude of toleration towards the views of our adversaries. It does not stop there but takes us a step forward by making us investigate as to how and why they hold a different view and how the seeming contradictories can be reconciled to evolve harmony. It is thus an attempt towards syncretism."27 The Logical and the Historical Significance of the Jaina philosophical Tradition The Aptamimamsa of Acarya Samantabhadra is one of the earliest important texts on Jaina philosophy. Hence a general evaluation of the Jaina philosophical tradition should enable the reader to better follow the Acarya's arguments here set forth. However, a proper evaluation of the Jaina philosophical tradition necessarily requires a proper evaluation of the Indian philosophical tradition as a whole. For even a reader who has a fairly correct idea of what the Jainas have to say by way of solving the fundamental philosophical problems might underrate or overrate the Jaina performance in case he happens to be ignorant of or misinformed about the background of this performance. We, therefore, begin our treatinent of the Jaina philosophical tradition with a brief preliminary survey of the Indian philosophical scene of the times when this tradition arose and developed. By philosophy we understand a reasoned and systematic working of the fundamental nature of what constitutes reality, and as thus understood philosophy is a comparatively late product of India's otherwise hoary history. The material that has come down to us in the form of the Mantra, Brahmana or even the Aranyaka portion of the Vedas has the remotest affinity with a philosophical enquiry, but the Upanisads scem to make a break with the pre-philosophical past. However, even the Upanisadic texts are not of the form of systematic treatizes on philosophical problems; for what they do is to narrate stories that incvitably culminate in a dialogue where certain characters discuss * more or less elaborately - some stray problems whose philosophical import is doubtless obvious. The first attempt to systematize the scattered philosophical teachings of the Upanisads was 26. B. K. Matilal, The Central Philosophy of Jainism, p. 61 27. H. Kapadia, Introduction to Haribhadra's Anckantajayapataka, p. cxiv.

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16 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY made in the Brahmasutras, but even they do not seem to have influenced in any material fashion the contemporary discussions on philosophy which went on without taking any serious notice of them till at least the time of Sankara, the author of the earliest available commentary on them. In the post-Sankara period there was no doubt a spate of mutually hostile commentaries on the Brahmasutras, but the scholastic atmosphere that was the hall-mark of these commentaries - Sankara's not excluded - was substantially out of tune with the tradition of free philosophical enquiry that had matured in the country by the time Sankara appeared. It is the rise and development of this tradition that constitutes the real subject-matter of a historian of Indian philosophy; and the pre-Sankara phase of this tradition requires to be specially - studied with a view to correctly assessing the influence exerted on it by Sankara and his fellow-commentators (all hostile to him as to each other) of the Brahmasutras. The Indian tradition of a systematic treatment of philosophical problems can be broadly subdivided into two groups. One of these repudiates the reality of empirical phenomena and banks on some sort of mystic intuition as the sole means of comprehending that transempirical reality which is here declared to be 'real' reality (in contrast to 'illusory' reality that empirical phenomena alegedly are). The other group ascribes sole reality to empirical phenomena and seeks to comprehend their nature through rational means. For the sake of convenience, the former group might be designated 'transcendentalist', the latter 'empiricist'. Now the earliest powerful spokesmen of the transcendentalist trend are the authors adhering to the Buddhist schools of Sunyavada and Vijnanavada while the earliest powerful spokesmen of the empiricist trend are those adhering to the Brahmanical schools of Nyaya, Vaisesika and Mimarsa; (the Brahmanical school of Sankhya, too, was empiricist and had a considerable past, but in the period of systematic treatizes - a period which alone matters from the point of view of our present interest, it wielded meagre influence and was extremely vulnerable to criticism. From the point of view of our present interest, it is also an immaterial consideration whether the Sankhya as well as the Nyaya and Vaisesika schools had not a "pre Brahmanical' past). An empiricist trend within the Buddhist camp took some time to crystallize. For it is the followers and commentators of Dinnaga and Dharmakirti in their capacity as Sautrantika thinkers who constitute the really powerful school of Buddhist empiricism, a school

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17 INTRODUCTION whose pre-history may be traced in the philosophical investigations of the Vaibhasika and Sautrantika authors of the pre-Dinnaga period. That the followers of Dinnaga and Dharmakirti - and the Masters themselves - have to be studied sometimes in their capacity as Sautrantikas and sometimes in their capacity as Vijnanavadins is an anomaly but is the only course open to the student who wishes to appreciate the most valuable of the Buddhist contributions to the empiricist tradition of Indian philosophy. It was in this background that the Jaina entered the arena of philosophical enquiry. His affiliation to the empiricist tradition was unequivocal but his mode of arguing his case had two conspicuous tendencies. In the first place, he thought fit to cross swords with the transcendentalist whose teaching it was that 'real' reality can in no way be described through words (and that because it can in no way be comprehended through rational means). Secondly, he made it a fashion to demonstrate how a particular philosophical thesis of his was a synthesis of two onesided theses whose respective defects it managed to avoid precisely because it was such a synthesis. The first of these tendencies was responsible for the emergence of the doctrine of 'seven forms of assertion', the second left its indelible, imprint on the stand taken by the Jaina on those burning questions which the empiricist philosophers of the time were seeking to answer in their respective manners. We consider these tendencies one by one. A favourite - and basic - argument of the transcendentalist was that each and every empirical phenomenon is illusory because it is in the very nature of things impossible to describe it either as existent or as non-existent or as both existent and non-existent or as neither existent nor non-existent. In essence the argument was that an empirical phenomenon is indescribable (and hence illusory) because there is no knowing what this phenomenon is or what it is not. And a simple answer to this argument would have been that an empirical phenomenon is describable because we can know both what this phenomenon is and what it is not. But, as a matter of historical fact, the argume question was considered by the general run of Indian empiricists to be too fantastic to merit an answer. To the Jaina, this attitude of his empiricist colleagues seemed to betray complacence and he on his part came out with an elaborate rejoinder against the transcendentalist. Thus, hc maintained that an empirical phenomenon is describable in

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18 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY as many as seven ways, viz. (i) By pointing out what this phenomenon is. (ii) By pointing out what this phenomenon is not, (iii) By first pointing out what this phenomenon is and then what is not, (iv) By confessing that it is impossible to simultaneously point out what this phenomenon is and what it is not. (v) By combining the attitudes (i) and (iv), (vi) By combining the attitudes (ii) and (iv), (vii) By combining the attitudes (iii) and (iv). In this rejoinder of the Jaina against the transcendentalist, three points are noteworthy : 1. The Jaina suggests that to point out what an empirical phenomenon is is to describe it as existent while to point out what it is not is to describe it as non-existent. Thus the transcendentalist who asserts that an empirical phenomenon is describable neither as existent nor as non-existent is sought to be silenced by the Jaina by his counterassertion that it is describable both as existent and as non-existent. An impartial reader should nevertheless take note of the rather technical character of the Jaina's description of an empirical phenomenon as nonexistent (i.e. of his description of it not as something utterly non-existent but as something different from the phenomena that are other than itself). 2. The Jaina suggests that to confess that it is impossible to simultaneously point out both what an empirical phenomenon is and what it is not is to confess that this phenomenon is indescribable. This might seem to be a concession in favour of the transcendentalist who is of the view that an empirical phenomenon is utterly indescribable. As a matter of fact, the Jaina simply demonstrates to the transcendentalist the only possible sense in which (according to the Jaina) an empirical phenomenon can be said to be indescribable; he is thus forestalling the latter's extravagant claims in this connection. In any case, an impartial reader should take due note of the rather technical character of the Jaina's admission that an empirical phenomenon is also somehow indescribable.28 28. There is also another sense - not intended in the present context - in which the Jaina admits an empirical phenomenon to be indescribable. That sense is conveyed when it is argued that an empirical phenomenon is indescribable because it is possessed of an infinite number of attributes which it is impossible to describe in their entirety.

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INTRODUCTION 3. The crux of the Jaina's position lies in asserting that an empirical phenomenon is describable both as what it is and as what it is not, an assertion which was fully endorsed by the entire camp of empiricists who stood opposed to the transcentalist's rank nihilism and obscurantism. 19 The Jaina's intervention in the inner-family discussions of the Indian empiricists had its own peculiar features. These empiricists were one in maintaining that the empirical world of physical and psychological phenomena is a veritable reality and is guided in its operations by the law of causal determination; but the different schools offered different accounts of the physical and psychological phenomena and of the functioning of the law of causation. The most acute - and the most fruitful controversies were those in which the Nyaya-Vaisesika authors on the one hand and their Buddhist counterpart on the other were parties; (however, certain typical Sankhya and Mimamsa positions, too, made for a better clinching of the philosophical issues). The most important questions that gave rise to controversy were following: (i) What is permanent and what is transient in the world of empirical phenomena ? (ii) What relation holds between a composite body and its component-parts ? (iii) What is the nature of the substance-attribute relationship? (iv) What is the nature of the universal - as contrasted to the particular - features exhibited by empirical phenomena ? The Nyaya-Vaisesika authors were chiefly concerned with the last three questions, the Buddhist authors with the first; but as controversy developed the two schools defined their respective positions on each of the four questions. Briefly stated these positions are as follows: (i) On the question of permanence and transience the Buddhists maintained that the entire world of empirical phenomena is everchanging, so that nothing lasts for more than one moment. As against this, the Nyaya-Vaisesikas maintained that certain phenomena are no doubt momentary but that certain others last for a limited period of time while still others last for ever. (ii) On the question of the relation between a composite body and its component parts the Nyaya-Vaiseskas maintained that a composite body is an independent entity over and above its component-parts (the former residing in the latter by the relation technically called samavaya). As against this, the Buddhists maintained that it is merely

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20 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY conventional to say that there exists a composite body over and above its component-parts. (iii) On the question of the substance-attribute relationship the Nyaya-Vaisesikas maintained that substances constitute one group of real entities while their attributes (further subdivided into qualities and actions and residing in substances by samavaya-relation) constitute another such group. As against this, the Buddhists maintained that it is merely conventional to say that the empirical world consists of substances on the one hand and their attributes on the other. (iv) On the question of the universal features exhibited by empirical phenomena the Nyaya-Vaisesikas maintained that a universal feature is an independent (and eternal) entity that resides (by samavaya-relation) in the substances, qualities or actions of which it is the universal feature. As against this, the Buddhists maintained that it is merely conventional to say that certain empirical phenomena share a universal feature in common. Now the Jaina found something unsatisfactory - and also some thing satisfactory - about both the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Buddhist positions on the four questions here posed. Hence in each case he sought to offer a new position which was in his eyes free from the defects vitiating the two rival positions that had held the field. The following is how he proceeded : (i) On the question of permanence and transience he maintained that each and every empirical phenomenon is permanent so far as its substance-aspect is concerned while it is momentary so far as its modeaspect is concerned. (ii) On the question of the relation between a composite body and its component-parts he maintained that to assume the form of a composite body is nothing but the assuming of a particular mode by the concerned component-parts in their capacity as substances (iii) On the question of the substance-attribute relationship he maintained that a substance represents the substance-aspect of an empirical phenomenon while its attributes represent either the qualityaspect or the mode-aspect of this phenomenon.29 29. Certain Jaina scholars make no distinction between quatity-aspect and mode-aspect; on their vicw it can bc said that the attributes of a substance represent the modeaspect of an empirical phenomenon. On the other hand, those Jaina scholars who distinguish between quality-aspect and mode-aspect lend to identify quality-aspect with substance-aspect, but since an express distinction between substance-aspect and quality-aspect is necessary to their position the above formulation may be taken to represent this very position.

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INTRODUCTION 21 (iv) On the question of the universal features exhibited by empirical phenomena he maintained that a universal feature exhibited by certain particular phenomena is but the mode called 'similarity in relation to the rest' which each of these phenomena comes to assume. On closer perusal it turns out that differences among the Indian empiricists on the question of permanence and transience were more vital than those on the remaining three questions. As a matter of fact, we can even say that on these last three questions the positions adopted by the Nyaya-Vaisesika, Buddhist and Jaina schools were virtually the same and can easily be translated from one into another. The reason for it is that all these three schools seek to explain (and not to explain away - as was done by their transcendentalist rivals) the phenomenon of the composition of a body out of certain component-parts, the phenomemon of a particular feature belonging to a particular cntity, and the phenomenon of a universal feature belonging to a group of entities; in each of these cases the Nyaya-Vaisesika offered his explanation by speaking of these or those independent entities (of the form of substances, qualities, actions, universals) entering into the relationship technically called samavaya, the Buddhist by speaking of these or those conventional usages being adopted, and the Jaina by speaking of these or those substances assuming different modes. There is no denying that each of these modes of speech has its own advantages and disadvantages, but to think - as will be done by the partisar the three schools in question - that the idea sought to be conveyed by these different modes of speech is not the same seems fraught with confusion. Then we come to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, Buddhist and Jaina treatments of the question of permanence and transience. On this question the difference between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Buddhist stands was considerable, that between the Buddhist and Jaina stands virtually non-existent. The following considerations should elucidate the point. The Nyaya-Vaisesika cver remained unconvinced of the correctness of the thesis that it is impossible for an entity while occupying a particular place and time to exhibit precisely the same totality of features as it does while occupying another place and time. But it was this very thesis that the Jaina endorsed when he maintained that two empirical phenomena must differ in respect of their modeaspect even if they happen to be identical in respect of their substanceaspect. The Buddhist virtually agreed with the Jaina criticism of the

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22 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY Nyaya-Vaisesika stand, but since he made no distinction between the substance-aspect and the mode-aspect of an empirical phenomenon he expressed this agreement of his by simply maintaining that any two empirical phenomena must differ from each other. Thus the Jaina agrees with the Nyaya-Vaisesika insofar as both find it possible to somehow distinguish between an entity and its features, while he agrees with the Buddhist insofar as both hold that the totality of features exhibited at one place and time can never be precisely the same as that exhibited at another. Deeper probe, however, reveals that the Jaina's present agreement with the Nyaya-Vaisesika is well-nigh nominal while his present agreement with the Buddhist is extremely substantial. For to distinguish or not to distinguish between an entity and its features is almost a matter of adopting or not adopting a particular mode of specch; but to hold or not to hold that the totality of features exhibited at one place and time can never be precisely the same as that exhibited at another is a matter of adopting or not adopting a philosophical thesis of great importance. It is, therefore, a point of material significance that the Buddhist and Jaina agree in maintaining that the world of empirical phenomena is ever-changing, a thesis in opposition to which the Nyaya-Vaisesika maintains that the world of empirical phenomena is not ever-changing but that it just exh: bits change here and there, now and then. On the other hand, it is a point of mere formal significance that the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Jaina agree in employing a terminology that distinguishes between an entity and its features, a procedure in opposition to which the Buddhist employs a terminology that does not make this distinction. In passing, it should also be noted that the Jaina's closer agreement with the Buddhist than with the Nyaya-Vaisesika on the most crucial question of permanence and transience leads him to agree more closely with the Buddhist than with the Nyaya-Vaisesika also on the remaining three central questions of philosophical enquiry. However, as has already been pointed out, on these three questions the difference between the Buddhist and the Nyaya-Vaisesika is itself rather meagre. The Subject-matter of the Aptamimamsa We next come to the subjcct-matter of the Aptamimamsa. The text containing 114 verses is divided into ten sections, of which each secks to set forth the Jaina position on some particular problem of 30. The 15th verse seems to be an interpolation.

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INTRODUCTION philosophy (to be precise, of ontology, logic, epistemology, ethics, ethico-theology) contrasting it with two onesided positions whose synthesis it itself is declared to be; (the first eight verses of the first section touch upon certain rather non-philosophical matters while the last fourteen verses of the last section represent a general summing up of the whole discussion rather than a discussion of some particular problem of philosophy). The following sectionwise analysis of the text (leaving aside the first eight and the last fourteen verses) should make the point clear. Section 1 : Problem Is a real entity existent or non-existent by nature ? 9-11 The first alternative (i.e. a real entity is absolutely existent by nature). 12 The second alternative (i.e. a real entity is absolutely nonexistent by nature). 13 (a) Both alternatives (i.e. a real entity is both absolutely existent and absolutely non-existent by nature). (b) Neither alternative (i.e. a real entity is absolutely indescribable). 14-23 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions (i.e. a real entity is somehow existent by nature, somehow non-existent, somehow both, and somehow indescribable. Section 2 Problem Is a real entity one with every other real entity or is it different from every other real entity ? 24-27 The first alternative. 28-31 The second alternative. 32 (a) Both alternatives. (b) Neither alternative. 33-36 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions. Section 3 Problem Is a real entity permanent or momentary ? 37-40 The first alternative. 41-54 The second alternative. 23 55 (a) Both alternatives. (b) Neither alternative. 56-60 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions.

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY Section 4 Problem : Is there the relation of distinctness or non-distinctness between a composite body and its component-parts, a quality and the thing qualified by this quality, a universal and the particular possessing this universal ? 61-66 The first alternative. 67-69 The second alternative. 70 (a) Both alternatives. (b) Neither alternative. 71-72 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions. Section 5 Problem : Is there the relation of dependence or independence between an entity and its features ? 73 (first half) The first alternative. 73 (second half) The second alternative. 74 (a) Both alternatives. (b) Neither alternative. 75 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions. Section 6 Problem : Is inference or scripture the authoritative source of knowledge ? 76 (first half) The first alternative. 76 (second half) The second alternative. 77 (a) Both alternatives. (b) Neither alternative. 78 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions. Section 7 Problem : Is cognition subjective or does it have an objective reference ? 79-80 The first alternative. 81 The second alternative. 82 (a) Both alternatives. (b) Neither alternative. 83-87 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions.

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INTRODUCTION 25 Section 8 Problem : Is fate or perseverance the decisive agency in one's everyday career ? 88 The first alternative. 89 The second alternative. 90 (a) Both alternatives. (b) Neither alternative. 91 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions. Section 9 Problem : Do virtue and sin arise from respectively causing pleasure and pain to others or do they arise from respectively causing pain and pleasure to oneself ? 92 The first alternative. 93 The second alternative. 94 (a) Both alternatives. (b) Neither alternative. 95 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions. Section 10 Problem : Does worldly bondage result from even slight ignorance or does moksa (liberation) result from even slight knowledge ? 96 (first half) The first alternative. 96 (second half) The second alternative. 97 (a) Both alternatives. (b) Neither alternative. 98-100 Conditional acceptance of all the four positions. Now the single verse which sets forth the position adopting both alternatives as also the one adopting neither is the same in each section - so that the verses 13, 32, 55, 70, 74, 77, 82, 90, 94, 97 read exactly alike. Again, it is only in the first section that we are explicitly shown how the Jaina position involves a conditional acceptance of all the four concerned positions; in the remaining sections what is explicitly shown is how the Jaina position involves a conditional acceptance of the position adopting the first alternative and of the one adopting the second. The procedure is significant. For it clearly indicates that the real contribution of the Jaina philosophical tradition lies in its ability to synthesize iwo extremist rival positions on these or those questions while .

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26 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY the presentation of the Jaina's case in the form of four - nay, seven - mutually supplementary (in a way, mutually equivalent) statements is but a matter of formal embellishment. In any case, the success of Samantabhadra's arguments will be measured by the amount of plausibility characterizing his synthesis of the concerned rival positions on this or that question and not by our mechanical ability to present his findings in the form of four or seven statements of the prescribed form. In this connection the discussion recorded in the ninth and tenth sections is revealing. The ninth section discusses the problem of the causation of virtue and sin, the tenth that of the causation of worldly bondage and moksa. In both cases the two proposed alternatives are (in Samantabhadra's eyes) irrelevant to the causation concerned. And yet the formal structure of Samantabhadra's argument tends to suggest as if in both cases both the proposed alternatives have been somehow incorporated in the final Jaina position - just as in the earlier eight sections (where the two proposed alternatives were not considered to be irrelevant) both the proposed alternatives had been similarly incorporated. In order to grasp the anomaly of this structure of argument let us symbolize the two proposed alternatives as a causes x' and 'b causes x' while Samantabhadra's understanding of the matter as 'c causes x'. Now Samantabhadra's 'synthesis' amounts to saying : 'a causes x because it does cause x when c is available to it; similarly, b causes x because it does cause x when c is available to it'. Perhaps it would have been better if we were frankly told that both the proposed alternatives are irrelevant to the problem concerned. Be that as it may, let us at least note that nothing prevents the Jaina from rejecting both the proposed solutions of a problem in case he finds both of them to be unsatisfactory - this in spite of the formal structure of his argument which might tend to suggest as if he is accepting (rather than rejecting) both these solutions. In this background it will be useful for us to undertake a summary review of the precise manner in which Samantabhadra has worked out a synthesis of two rival (and to his mind onesided) positions in the different sections of his text. As has been noted, each of these sections deals with some one philosophical problem and everywhere the Jaina position has been presented in the form of a synthesis of two proposed alternatives; for the sake of convenience in our following review we will give the title 'thesis' to the first of these alternatives, the ti 'antithesis' to the second, and the title 'synthesis' to the final Jaina position. We take up these sections in their original order.

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INTRODUCTION Section 1 In this section the problem discussed is whether a real entity is existent or non-existent by nature. The thesis asserts that a real entity is absolutely existent, meaning thereby that it exists at all place and time. The antithesis asserts that a real entity is absolutely non-existent, meaning thereby that it exists at no place or time. The synthesis asserts that a real entity is somehow existent and somehow non-existent, meaning thereby that it exists at its own place and time while it does not exist at what is not its own place and time. It cannot be said with certainty as to which historically evolved schools (if any at all) Samantabhadra has in mind as the respective proponents of the thesis and the antithesis in question. For the transcendentalist schools of Indian philosophy have repudiated the reality of the empirical world that occupies space-time and they have instead posited the reality of a trans-empirical world that occupies no space-time. Hence insofar as they maintain that one changeless and differenceless trans-empirical reality exists where the spatio-temporal world seems to be existing they might be said to endorse the spirit of the thesis in question; on the other hand, insofar as they maintain that the trans-empirical reality occupies no space-time they might be said to endorse the spirit of the antithesis in question. But the difficulty is that the advocate of the thesis, inasmuch as he says that a real entity exists at all place and time, does not seem to be of the view that a real entity exists beyond space-time; on the other hand, the advocate of the antithesis, even while submitting that a real entity exists at no place or time, does not expressly say that a real entity exists beyond space-time. Maybe, Samantabhadra was simply entertaining the logical possibility of someone upholding the position that a thing exists everywhere and always as also that of someone upholding the position that a thing exists nowhere and never; for these precisely can be two rival positions whose synthesis is represented by Samantabhadra's own position that a thing exists where and when it does while it does not exist where and when it does not. But it is also likely that Samantabhadra considered the Sankhya philosopher to be the advocate of the thesis in question and the transcendentalist (of any hue) to be the advocate of the antithesis in question. For it is a Sankhya position that a thing that is produced at some place and time was already in existence at that place and time, and this position coupled with the rather plausible supposition that it 27

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28 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY is possible to produce any thing at any place or time might give rise to the opinion that a real entity exists at all place and time. Similarly, the transcendentalist repudiates the reality of the empirical world existing in space-time and posits instead the reality of a trans-empirical world existing beyond space-time; as such he can well be said to maintain that a real entity (i.e. the trans-empirical reality posited by him) exists at no place or time. Section 2 In this section the problem discussed is whether a real entity is one with every other real entity or it is different from every other real entity. The thesis asserts that a real entity is absolutely one with every other real entity, meaning thereby that there exists just one real entity and that it is devoid of all internal change or difference. The antithesis asserts that a real entity is absolutely different from every other real entity, meaning thereby that there exist a number of real entities and that they are utterly different from each other both numerically and qualitatively. The synthesis asserts that a real entity is somehow one with every other real entity and it is somehow different from every other real entity, meaning thereby that two real entities even if different from each other must also be one with each other either numerically or qualitatively; (when two entities constitute two modes of the same substance they are numerically identical, when they just exhibit some similarity they are qualitatively identical). Here the advocate of the thesis is unmistakably the transcendentalist who, while repudiating the reality of the empirical world, posits some one trans-empirical reality under the title Sunya, Vijnana, Brahman or the like. The advocate of the antithesis is the Buddhist empiricist, and Samantabhadra's trenchant criticism of this Buddhist position is worthy of as much serious attention as his powerful advocacy of the Jaina position on the question. For that way we will be enabled to form an idea of how strenously - and on substantially identical lines - two schools of Indian empiricism were grappling with the problem of identity and difference - numerical as well as qualitative. Section 3 In this section the problem discussed is whether a real entity is permanent or momentary. The thesis asserts that a real entity is absolutely permanent, the antithesis that it is absolutely momentary; as against them, the synthesis asserts that a real entity is somehow

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INTRODUCTION 29 permanent and somehow momentary. Here the advocate of the thesis is the Sankhya philosopher but he is summarily disposed of - perhaps because he is not an ideal choice; (in the immediately preceding section the transcendentalist was summarily disposed of but that was because his position does not deserve much serious scrutiny). The most valuable portion of the present section is Samantabhadra's criticism of the Buddhist empiricist who is held out as the advocate of the antithesis in question. Really speaking, this criticism is a continuation of that urged in the immediately preceding section. But in that section the problem of change was taken up as a part of the broader problem of numerical identity, which itself was in its turn a part of the still broader problem of identity in general. In the present section the problem of change has been discussed independently and in its numerous ramifications. Section 4 In this section the problem discussed is whether there is the relation of distinctness or non-distinctness between a composite body and its component-parts, a quality and the thing qualified by this quality, a universal and the particular possessing this universal. The thesis asserts that the relation in question is that of absolute distinctness, the antithesis that it is that of absolute non-distinctness; as against them, the synthesis asserts that the relation is somehow that of distinctness and somehow that of non-distinctness, The advocate of the thesis is the NyayaVai esika empiricist, that of the antithesis the Buddhist empiricist. The importance of this section lies in its comprehensive criticism of the position adopted by the Nyaya-Vaisesika school on certain vital questions of ontology; for so far as Samantabhadra's present criticism of the Buddhist is concemed it is not so illuminating as that launched by him in the preceding two sections (and it is even doubtful whether the Buddhist case - at least as understood by the school of Dinnaga and Dharmakirti - has been reported correctly). Another thing to be noted is that the problem of the relation between quality and the thing qualified has been left almost untouched in the present section - perhaps to be taken up in the next; moreover, what we have called the problem of the relation between a composite body and its component-parts has been called by Samantabhadra himself the problem of the relation between an effect and its cause, but the justification of our suggestion lies in the fact that the only case of causation considered in the present section is that of the causation of a composite body out of its component-parts.

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30 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY Section 5 In this section the problem discussed is whether the relation obtaining between an entity and its features is that of dependence or independence. The thesis asserts that the relation in question is that of absolute dependence, the antithesis that it is that of absolute independence; as against them, the synthesis asserts that the relation is somehow that of dependence and somehow that of independence. The advocate of the thesis is the Buddhist empiricist, that of the antithesis the Nyaya-Vaisesika. As hinted earlier, this discussion is in a way the left-over of that conducted in the immediately preceding section. For the problem of features may be divided into that of universal features and that of particular features, and even while Samantabhadra had somehow touched upon the problem of universal features in the preceding section he had there left almost untouched the problem of particular features. By raising in the present section the problem of features in general, scope has been provided for a comprehensive treatment of this one of the most important problems of ontology. Section 6 In this section the problem discussed is whether inference or scripture is the authoritative source of knowledge. The thesis asserts that ir ference is the only authoritative source of knowledge, the antithesis that scripture is the only authoritative source of knowledge; as against them, the synthesis asserts that under certain conditions inference is the authoritative source of knowledge while under certain other conditions scripture is the authoritative source of knowledge. This obviously is a discussion on logic and it is reasonable to presume that the advocate of the thesis here is a thoroughgoing freethinker while the advocate of the antithesis a rabid theologian. It is interesting to watch how Samantabhadra seeks to avoid the (in his eyes undesirable) company of either. Section 7 In this section the problem discussed is whether cognition is subjective or it has an objective reference. The thesis asserts that all cognition is a mere subjective manipulation, the antithesis that all cognition is true of its object; as against them, the synthesis asserts that there are cognitions that are truc of their respective objects and also those that are not thus true. This is primarily an epistemological discussion where the advocate of the thesis is the subjective-idealist

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INTRODUCTION 31 Vijnanavadin while the advocate of the antithesis the naive-realist Prabhakarite. Samantabhadra's treatment of the problem is however somehow diffused and the issues do not seem to have been clinched with as much clarity as is desirable. Section 8 In this section the problem discussed is whether fate or perseverance is the decisive agency in one's everyday career. The thesis asserts the omnipotence of fate, the antithesis that of perseverance; as against them, the synthesis asserts that there are conditions under which fate prevails over perseverance and also those under which the reverse happens. This is an ethical discussion where the advocate of the thesis ought to be the fatalist, that of the antithesis the materialist. Here too it is interesting to watch how Samantabhadra seeks to avoid the company of either. Section 9 In this section the problem discussed is whether virtue and sin arise from respectively causing pleasure and pain to others or they arise from respectively causing pain and pleasure to oneself. The thesis asserts that virtue and sin exclusively arise from respectively causing pleasure and pain to others, the antithesis that they exclusively arise from respectively causing pain and pleasure to oneself, as against them, the synthesis asserts that virtue arises when an act is performed with a clean mind while sin arises when an act is performed with an unclean mind. This too is an ethical discussion and we have already taken note of the anomalous character of its formal structure. The only new point that might be added is that Samantabhadra is here emphasising the primacy of motive over overt acts; as against him, the advocate of the thesis attaches exclusive importance to the socially oriented overt acts while the advocate of the antithesis attaches exclusive importance to the self-oriented ones. Section 10 In this section the problem discussed is whether worldly bondage results from even slight ignorance or moksa results from even slight knowledge. The thesis asserts that worldy bondage inevitably results from even slight ignorance, the antithesis that moksa inevitably results from even slight knowledge; as against them, the synthesis asserts worldly bondage results when one is under the sway of moral delusion while moksa results when one is free from the sway of moral delusion. This is an ethico-theological discussion and in its case as well we have

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32 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY already taken note of the anomalous character of its formal structure. The only new point that might be added is that Samantabhadra is here emphasizing the primacy of virtue over knowledge qua the means of realizing man's summum bonum, as against him, the advocate of the thesis urges that even slight ignorance is sufficient to prevent man from realizing his summum bonum while the advocate of the antithesis urges that even slight knowledge is sufficient to enable man to realize the same. The Aptamimarsa has the good fortune of being commented on by such stalwarts of Jaina logic as Akalanka, Vidyananda and Yasovijaya (and by a lesser figure one Vasunandin). However, Akalanka's Astasati, though elaborate enough (considering its terse style), is not a word-by-word commentary. Vidyananda, in his Astasahasri, adopts a unique technique; for he there so formulates his arguments that all the sentences of the Astasati (in their original order) become a natural part of the Astasahasri (which, as is indicated by its name, is ten times as large as the Astasati). Yasovijaya, in his Astasahasrivivarana, elucidates what he considers to be the knotty passages of the Astasahasri (which, naturally, includes the Astasati). Now while preparing the accompanying English translation of the Aptamimarsa we have derived ample benefit from these writings of Altalanka, Vidyananda, Yasovijaya and Vasunandin, but no attempt has been made by us to follow any of these authors at all cost; (however, special mention has occasionally been made of a reading and/or an interpretation that is unique to the Astasahasri - of course, as following the Astasati and as having been followed by the Astasahasrivivarana). Our own explanatory remarks are of two types, those called 'notes' and those called 'comments'. The 'notes' - rather few in number and brief in size - chiefly seek to clarify the meaning of a verse and a particular note will always be found to belong to a particular verse. The "comments', on the other hand, seek to critically amplify an argument offered by the author and in most cases a comment is appended to a group of verses; (in four places an entire section has been cons together, in four places the 'thesis', 'antithesis' and 'synthesis' have been taken up one by one, in one place the thesis' and 'antithesis' have been considered togather but the 'synthesis' taken up separately, in the first section the thesis', 'antithesis' and 'synthesis' have been dealt with separately but the 'synthesis' has been further subdivided for the convenience of treatment, the first eight verses are discussed together and so also are thirteen of the last fourteen verses).

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INTRODUCTION 33 Samantabhadra We know almost nothing about Ac. Samantabhadra's life. "Many legends attach to his life but little can be said of it with certainty. He would seem to have been a native of the Tamil land and to have belonged to a ksatriya family."131 Prof. H. L. Jaina and Prof. M. A. Dhaky32 assign him to circa A. D. 550. His authorship of Aptamimamsa, Svayambhustotra and Yuktyanusasana is beyond any doubt. They belong to the literary form called stotra (devotional poem). But they are philosophical in substance. Vidyananda has written commentaries on Yuktyanusasana and Aptamimamsa. Akalanka Akalarka3 was the father of Jaina logic. He created Jaina doctrine of pramanas and certainly spent the best part of his labour working around this problem. He was well conversant with the contemporary systems of Indian philosophy and so was in a position to evaluate them, particularly from the standpoint of Anekantavada. As is the case with other outstanding figures, the brilliant personality of Akalanka too is surrounded by legends. But it is almost certain that he flourished between 720 A. D. and 780 A. D.; that he belonged to Manyakheta; that he was a son of Purusottama, a minister of Subhatunga cf Manyakheta; that he stayed in the Buddhist Matha to study Buddhist philosophy and that he had debates with a Buddhist teacher at the court of king Himasitala of Kalinga. Akalanka composed several works on logic - Laghiyastraya34 (composed of Pramana-nayapravesa and Pravacanapravesa), Nyayaviniscaya35 Pramanasangraha and Siddhivinisacaya.36 These are his original works. On all these he himself wrote short commentaries. 31. Jaina Yoga, R. Williams, Pub. Motilal Banarsidass, Dehli, 1983, p. 19 32. 'Svami Samantabhadra-no Samaya' (Gujarati paper), Nirgrantha, Vol. 3, Ahmedabad, 1998 33. For details of Akalanka's life, date and works one may refer to Dr. M. K. Jaina's introduction to Siddhiviniscaya, published by Bharatiya Jnanapitha, Kasi. 34. Ac. Prabhacandra (late tenth century A. D.) has written an extensive and critical commentary on Laghiyastraya, called Nyayakumudacandra. It is edited by M. K. Jain and published by Manik Chandra Dig. Jain Granthamala, Bombay. Vadirajasori (late tenth century A.D.) has written an elaborate and illuminating commentary (vivarana) on Nyayaviniscaya. It is edited by M. K. Jain and published by Bharatiya Jnanapitha, Kasi. 36. Anantavirya (ninth century A. D.) commented upon Siddhiviniscaya. His commentary also is very elaborate and intensely logical. It is published with the original Siddhiviniscaya. See fn. 33. 35.

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34 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY Moreover, he wrote commentaries on the Taltvarthasutra of Vacaka Umasvati and Aptamimamsa of Ac. Samantabhadra. They are respectively named as Rajavartika and Astasati. Astasati is very important as it presents clear-cut, closely reasoned and concentrated enunciation and defence of Anekantavada. Here Akalanka finds opportunity to discuss fundamental philosophical views centring around the admission or otherwise of two contradictory features, e. g. existence and non-existence, oneness and separateness, permanence and transience, 'identity between cause and effect, substance and property, parts and whole' and 'difference between cause and effect, substance and property, parts and whole.' He loses no opportunity to criticise various one-sided ontological positions and defend the corresponding Jaina positions. He critically examines rival positions as actually maintained in the contemporary works of various non-Jaina schools, particularly Buddhist. He is very bitter against the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness and causeless destruction. He attacks Buddhist Vijnanavada and Sunyavada. Again, he strongly refutes the Buddhist logicians' theory of perception. Moreover, we find in Astasati criticism of some basic theories of Nyaya-Vaisesika, Mimarsa and Sarkhya systems. The style is compact, exact, terse and tough. I think that Akalanka's works were seriously studied by the nonJaina scholars in those days and there is all possibility that his arguments were profitably utilised by them against the common rivals. I feel that well known Nyaya logician Jayanta Bhatta (ninth century A. D.) had consulted Akalanka's works. He refers to and refutes some Jaina views in the ninth chapter of his famous Nyayamanjari. His commentator Cakradhara (10th-11th century A.D.), while commenting on Jayanta's concerned sentences, reproduces five karikas from Akalanka's Siddhiviniscaya and explains them extensively in his own words.37 This is very important and noteworthy. One more Kashmiri pandit Bhattanarayanakantha (10th-11th century A. D.) refers to Akalanka and his Granthatraya by name is his Vrtti on Mrgendratantra. His actual words are : sadasadvadinam arhatam ca matesu Akalarkatritaya-prabhrtisu...,38 This shows that Akalanka's works attracted the attention of non-Jaina scholars of even remote regions like Kashmir. - Nagin J. Shah 37. Nyayamanjari-granthibhanga by Cakradhara, Ed. Nagin J. Shah, L. D. Series No 35, 1972, pp. 212-215. 38. Mrgendratantra with Vnti, Kashmir Series No L, 1930 A. D.

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samantabhadraviracitA AptamImAMsA CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY SECTION I EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE 1-8 Verses devaagmnbhoyaancaamraadivibhuutyH| mAyAviSvapi dRzyante nAtastvamasi no mahAn // 1 // The miraculous attainments like an attendance ofered by the celestial beings, a walking in the sky, a fanservice (worked by the celestial beings), and so on and so forth are found in the possession of even jugglers; these (miraculous attainments which you certainly possess) are (therefore) not what make you great in our eyes. (1) __ akalaGkanibaddhA aSTazatI uddIpIkRtadharmatIrthamacalajyotirkhalatkevalA ''lokAlokitalokalokamakhilairindrAdibhirvanditam / vanditvA paramArhatAM samudayaM gAM saptabhaGgIvidhi syAdvAdAmRtagarbhiNI pratihataikAntAndhakArodayAm / / 1 / / tIrthaM sarvapadArthatattvaviSayasyAdvAdapuNyodadhe bhavyAnAmakalaGkabhAvakRtaye prAbhAvi kAle klau| yenAcAryasamantabhadrayatinA tasmai namaH santataM kRtvA vivriyate stavo bhagavatAM devAgamastatkRtiH // 2 //

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY - devAgametyAdimaGgalapurassarastavaviSayaparamAptaguNAtizayaparIkSAmupakSipataiva svayaM zraddhAguNajJatAlakSaNaM prayojanamAkSiptaM lkssyte| tadanyatarApAye'rthasyAnupapatteH / zAstranyAyAnusAritayA tathaivopanyAsAt / AjJApradhAnA hi tridazAgamanAdikaM parameSThinaH paramAtmacihna pratipadyeran, nAsmadAdayaH, tAdRzo mAyAviSvapi bhAvAt, ityAgamAzrayaH // 1 // adhyAtma bahirapyeSa vigrahAdimahodayaH / divyaH satyo divaukassvapyasti rAgAdimatsu sH||2|| The divine excellence of body etc. - an excellence which might be of an internal or an external sort - is a genuine possession of even the denizens of heaven who are (by nature) under the sway of the spiritual deficiencies like attachment etc. (2) Note: An illustration of the divine bodily excellence of an internal sort is utter absence of perspiration, an illustration of the divine bodily excellence of an external sort is the receiving of fragrant rainfall; the former is called 'internal' because its cause is organic to body, the latter is called 'external because its cause is not thus organic. bahirantaHzarIrAdimahodayo'pi pUraNAdiSvasambhavI vyabhicArI, svargiSu bhAvAdakSINakaSAyeSu / tato'pi na bhavAn paramAtmeti stUyate / / 2 / / tIrthakRtsamayAnAM ca prsprvirodhtH| sarveSAmAptatA nAsti kazcideva bhavedguruH // 3 // As for the preachings of the various sect-founders, they cannot be all authentic because they are mutually contradictory; (hence) of these sect-founders some one at the most can be worthy of reverence. (3) Note : The exact meaning of the statement kascid eva bhaved guruh seems to be somewhat obscure. For if some one of the non-Jaina sect-founders is worthy of reverence why not try to find out as to who is that ? Maybe the statement means '(hence) there ought to be some one sect-founder who is worthy of reverence'. na hi tIrthakaratvamAptatAM sAdhayati zakrAdiSvasambhavi, sugatAdiSu darzanAt / na ca sarve sarvadarzinaH parasparaviruddhasamayAbhidhAyinaH / tato'naikAntiko hetuH / ata eva na kazcit sarvajJa ityayuktam, zruteravizeSAdapramANatApatteH / tatheSTatvAdadoSa ityekeSAmaprAmANikaiveSTiH /

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EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE nakhalu pratyakSaM sarvajJapramANAntarAbhAvaviSayam, atiprsnggaat| nAnumAnam, asiddheH / pramANata: siddhaM nA'nAtmasiddhaM nAma, anyathA parasyApi na siddhayet / tadime svayamekena pramANena sarvaM sarvajJarahitaM puruSasamUhaM saMvidanta evAtmAnaM nirasyantIti vyAhatametat / tIrthacchedasampradAyAnAM tathA sarvamavagatamicchatAmAptatA nAsti, parasparaviruddhAbhidhAnAt / ekAnekapramANavAdinAM svapramAvyAvRtteH, anyathAnakAntikatvAt / sarvapramANavinivRtteH, itarathA saMpratipatteH / vAgakSabuddhIcchApuruSatvAdikaM kvacidanAvilajJAnaM nirAkaroti, na punastatpratiSedhavAdiSu tathA, iti paramagahanametat / taditthaM siddhaM sunizcitAsaMbhavadvAdhakapramANatvam / tena kaH paramAtmA ? cideva labdhyupayogasaMskArANAmAvaraNanibandhanAnAmatyaye bhavabhRtAM prabhuH / na hi sarvajJasya nirAkRteH prAk sunizcitAsaMbhavatsAdhakapramANatvaM siddhaM yena para: pratyavatiSTheta / nApi bAdhakAsaMbhavAt paraM pratyakSAderapi vishvaasnibndhnmsti| tat prakRte'pi siddham, yadi tatsattAM na sAdhayet sarvatrApyavizeSAt / tadabhAve darzanaM nAdarzanamatizete, anAzvAsAt, vibhramavat / sAdhakabAdhakapramANayornirNayAt bhAvAbhAvayoravipratipattiH, anirNayAdArekA syAt / na khalu jJasvabhAvasya kazcidagocaro'sti yanna krameta, tatsvabhAvAntapratiSedhAt / cetanasya sataH sambandhyantaraM mohodayakAraNakaM madirAdivat / tadabhAve sAkalyena viratamohaH sarvaM pazyati, pratyAsattiviprakarSayorakiJcitkaratvAt, ata evAkSAnapekSA aJjanAdisaMskRtacakSuSo yathA AlokAnapekSA // 3 // doSAvaraNayorhAnini:zeSA'styatizAyanAt / kvacid yathA svahetubhyo bhirntrmlkssyH||4|| In some person there must be a total destruction of the spiritual deficiencies and of the physical veilings (that act as the cause of these deficiencies), for there must be a case where such destruction is most complete of all; this is just as by an employment of appropriate means it is possible to bring about in a physical substance a total destruction of the extraneous as well as organic impurities which it had happened to accumulate. (4) Note: By "physical veilings' are to be understood the karmas (more correctly, karmans) which are supposed to have been accumulated by a soul as a result of its good or bad past acts and which the Jaina tradition conceives in the form of physical entities. vacanasAmarthyAt ajJAnAdirdoSaH svprprinnaamhetuH| ata eva loSTAdau niHzeSadoSAvaraNanivRtteH siddhasAdhyatetyasamIkSitAbhidhAnam, sAdhyAparijJAnAt / doSAvaraNayorhAnerati

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY zAyanAt niHzeSatAyAM sAdhyAyAM buddharapi kiM na parikSayaH syAt, vizeSAbhAvAt, ato'naikAntiko hetuH, ityazikSitalakSitam, cetanaguNavyAvRtteH sarvAtmanA pRthivyAderabhimatatvAt / adRzyAnupalambhAdabhAvAsiddhirityayuktam, paracaitanyanivRttAvArekApatteH, saMskartRNAM pAtakitvaprasaGgAt, bahulamapratyakSasyApi romAdevinivRttinirNayAt / yadi punarayaM nirbandhaH sarvatra viprakarSiNAmabhAvAsiddheH, tadA kRtakatvadhUmAdevinAzAnalAbhyAM vyApterasiddherna kazciddhetuH / tataH zauddhodaniziSyakANAmanAtmanInametat, anumaanocchedprsnggaat| tathA hi-yasya hAniratizayavatI tasya kutazcit sarvAtmanA vyAvRttiH, yathA buddhayAdiguNasyAzmanaH / tathA ca doSAderhAniratizayavatI kutazcit nivartayitumarhati sakalaMkalaGkam, iti kathamakalaGkasiddhirna bhavet ? maNermalAdervyAvRttiH kSayaH, sato'tyantavinAzAnupapatteH / tAdRgAtmano'pi karmaNo nivRttau parizuddhiH / karmaNo'pi vaikalyamAtmakaivalyamastyeva / tato nAtiprasajyate / pratipakSa evAtmanAmAgantuko malaH parikSayI svani sanimittavivardhanavazAt / / 4 // nanu nirastopadravaH san AtmA kathamakalako'pi viprakarSiNamarthaM pratyakSIkuryAt ? sUkSmAntaritadUrArthAH pratyakSAH kasyacid ythaa| anumeyatvato'gnyAdiriti sarvajJasaMsthitiH // 5 // The objects that are minute, concealed or distant must be amenable to somebody's perception, tecause they are amenable to inferential knowledge, just like fire etc. - it is this argument that establishes the existence of an omniscient personage. (5) svabhAvakAladezaviprakarSiNAmanumeyatvamasiddhamityanumAnamutsArayati, yAvAn kazcit bhAvaH sasarvaHkSaNika ityAdivyApterasiddhau prakRtopasaMhArAyogAt, aviprakarSiNAmanumiterAnarthakyAt / sattvAderanityatvAdinA vyAptimicchatAM siddhamanumeyatvamanavayaveneti na kiJcit vyAhataM pazyAmaH / te'numeyA na kasyacit pratyakSAzca syuH, kiM vyAhanyate ?, iti smaanmgnyaadiinaam| tathA cAnumAnocchedaH syaat| tadabhyupagame svasaMvedyavijJAnavyaktibhiradhyakSaM kiM lakSayet pramANatayA paramapramANatayA ? iti, na kiJcidetat tayA naitattayA vA aymbhyupgntumrhti| tadevaM prameyatvasattvAdiryatra hetulakSaNaM puSNAti taM kathaM cetanaH pratiSe marhati saMzayituM vA? dharmiNyasiddhasattAke bhAvAbhAvobhayadharmANAmasiddhaviruddhAnekAntikatvAt kathaM sakalavidi sattvasiddhi: ? iti bruvannapi devAnAMpriyaH taddharmisvabhAvaM na lakSayati / zabdAnityatvasAdhane'pi kRtakatvAdau ayaM vikalpaH kiM na syAt ? vimatyadhikaraNabhAvApannavinAzadharmidharmatve kAryatvAderasaMbhavadbhAdhakatvAderapi saMdigdhasadbhAvadharmidharmatvaM siddhaM boddhavyam /

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EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE yadi viprakRSTArthapratyakSatvamarhataH sAdhyate, pakSadoSo'prasiddhavizeSaNatvam / tata eva vyAptirna siddhyet| anarhatazcet, anissttaanussnggo'pi| kaH punaH sAmAnyAtmAtadubhayavyatirekeNa, yasya vivakSitArthapratyakSatvam ? ityetadvikalpajAlaM zabdanityatve'pi samAnam, na kevalaM sUkSmAdisAkSAtkaraNasya pratiSedhane saMzItau vA / tadayamanumAnamudrAM bhinatti / varNAnAM nityatvamakRtakatvAdinA sarvagatAnAM yadi sAdhayati syAdaprasiddhavizeSaNaH pakSaH, itarathA aniSTAnuSaGgaH / kIdRk punaH sAmAnyaM nAma yadubhayadoSaparihArAya prakalpyeta ? sarvagatatvasAdhane'pi samAnam / avivakSitavizeSasya pakSIkaraNe samaH samAdhiH, ityalamapratiSThitamithyAvikalpaughaiH / / 5 / / sa tvamevAsi nirdoSo yuktizAstrAvirodhivAk / avirodho yadiSTaM te prasiddhena na bAdhyate // 6 // And such an omniscient personage you alone are whose utterance is neither in conflict with logic nor in conflict with scripture. As for the proof of such an absence of conflict, it is the circumstance that what you seek to establish is never contradicted by what is known to be the case. (6) viprakarNyapi bhinnalakSaNasambandhitvAdinA kasyacit prtykssm| so'tra bhavAn arhanneva, anyeSAM nyAyAgamaviruddhabhASitvAt / vicitrAbhisandhitayA vyApAravyAhArAdisAGkaZNa kvacidapyatizayAnirNaye kaimarthakyAt vizeSeSTiH, jJAnavato'pi visaMvAdAt, va punarAzvAsaM labhemahi ? na caivaMvAdinaH kiJcidanumAnaM nAma, nirabhisandhInAmapi bahulaM kAryasvabhAvAniyamopalambhAt, sati kASThAdisAmagrIvizeSa kvacidupalabdhasya tadabhAve prAyazo'nupalabdhasya maNyAdikAraNakalApe'pi saMbhavAt / yajjAtIyo yataH saMprekSitaH tajjAtIyAt tAdRgiti durlabhaniyamatAyAM dhUmadhUmaketvAdInAmapi vyApyavyApakabhAvaH kathamiva nirNIyeta ? vRkSaH ziMzapAtvAt iti latAcUtAderapi kvacideva darzanAt prekSAvatAM kimiva niHzaGkaM cetaH syAt ? tadetadadRSTasaMzayaikAntavAdinAM vidagdhamarkaTAnAmiva svalAlabhakSaNam / yatnataH parIkSitaM kAryaM kAraNaM nAtivartate iti cet, stutaM prastutam / tato'yaM pratipatturaparAdho nAnumAnasyeti anukUlamAcarati / tadevaM tat sunizcitAsaMbhavadbAdhakapramANatvam arhatyeva sakalajJatvaMsAdhayati, nAnyatra, ityavirodha ityAdinA spssttyti| tatreSTaM mataMzAsanamityupacaryate, nirAkRtavAco'pi kvacidavipratiSedhAt / niyamAbhyupagame suSuptyAdAvapi nirabhiprAyapravRttirna syAt / pratisaMviditAkArecchA tadA saMbhavantI punaH smaryeta vAJchAntaravat / tataH

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY caitanyakaraNapATavayoreva sAdhakatamatvam / sahakArikAraNAntaraM na vai niyatamapekSaNIyam, naktaMcarAdeH saMskRtacakSuSo vA'napekSitAlokasanidheH rUpopalambhAt / na caivaM saMvitkaraNapATavayorapyabhAve vivakSAmAtrAt kasyacit vacanapravRttiH prasajyate, saMvitkaraNavaikalye yathAvivakSaM vAgvRtterabhAvAt / na ca doSajAtistaddhetuH yatastAM vANI nAtivarteta, tatprakarSApakarSAnuvidhAnAbhAvAt buddhayAdivat / pramANataH siddhaM prasiddham / tadeva kasyacit bAdhanaM yuktam / vizeSaNametat paramatApekSam, aprasiddhenApi anityatvAdyekAntadharmeNa baadhaa'klpnaat| nRteprmaannaatprtibndhsiddherbhyupgmaat|nkhlupressaaN pratyakSamagnidhUmayoH kSaNabhaGgasadbhAvayorvA sAkalyena vyApti prati samartham, avicArakatvAt sannihitaviSayatvAcca / na cAnumAnam, anavasthAnuSaGgAt / parokSAnta vinA naH tarkeNa sambandho vyavatiSTheta / tadapramANatve na laiGgikaM pramANam, samAropavyavacchedAvizeSAt / adhigamo'pi vyavasAyAtmaiva, tadanutpattau sato'pi darzanasya sAdhanAntarApekSayA sannidhAnAbhedAt suSuptacaitanyavat / / 6 / / tvanmatAmRtabAhyAnAM srvthaikaantvaadinaam| AptAbhimAnadagdhAnAM sveSTaM dRSTena baadhyte||7|| Those who are alien to your nectar-like doctrine, are the upholders of the utterly extre:nist theses, are the victims of their own vainglorious claims to be an authority (on the subject-matter they deal with) are the persons who seek to establish something that is contradicted by what is seen to be the case. (7) anekAntAtmakavastusAkSAtkaraNaM bahirantazca sakalajagatasAkSIbhUtaM vipakSe / pratyakSavirodhalakSaNamanena dakSayati / na hi kiJcit rUpAntaravikalaM sadasannityAnityAyekAntarUpaM saMvedanamanyadvA saMpazyAmo yathAtra pratijJAyate, citrajJAnavat kathaJcidasaGkIrNavizeSaikAtmanaH sukhAdicaitanyasya varNasaMsthAnAdyAtmanaH skandhasya ca prekSaNAt / sAmAnyavizeSaikAtmanaH saMvittirekAntasyAnupalabdhirvA sarvataH siddhA cakSurAdimatAmanArhatakalpanAm astaMgamayatIti kiMnaHpramANAntareNa ? nahi dRSTAjjyeSThaMgariSThamiSTam, tadabhAve pramANAntarApravRtteH, samAropavicche davizeSAt, anvayavyatirekayoH svbhaavbhedprdrshnaarthtvaacc| anekAntaikAntayoH upalambhAnupalambhayoH ekatvapradarzanArthaM tAvadubhayamAha mtaantrprtikssepaarthvaa| yadAha - sAdharmyavaidharmyayoranyatareNArthagatau ubhayapratipAdanaMpakSAdivacanaM vA nigrahasthAnamiti - na tat yuktam, sAdhanasAmarthyena vipakSavyAvRttilakSaNena pakSaprasAdhayataH

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EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE 7 kevalaM vacanAdhikyopAlambhacchalena parAjayAdhikaraNaprAptiH svayaM nirAkRtapakSaNa pratipakSiNA lakSaNIyeti / pratijJAnupayoge zAstrAdiSvapi nAbhidhIyeta, vizeSAbhAvAt / yat sat tat sarvaM kSaNikaM, yathA ghaTaH, saMzca zabda iti trilakSaNaM hetumabhidhAya yadi samarthayate, kathamiva sandhAmatizete ?, tAvatArthapratipattau samarthanaM vA nigamanAdikaM ?, yataH parAjayo na bhavet / sattvamAtreNa nazvaratvasiddhau utpattimattvakRtakatvAdivacanam atiriktavizeSaNopAdAnAt kRtakatvaprayatnAnantarIyakatvAdiSu ca kapratyayAtirekAt asAdhanAGgavacanaM parAjayAya prbhvet| kvacit pakSadharmatvapradarzanaM saMzca zabda ityavigAnAt, trilakSaNavacanasamarthanaM ca asAdhanAGgavacanamapajayaprAptiriti vyaahtm| tathA anyasyApiprastutetarasya vAdinoktau itarasya svapakSamasAdhayato vijayAsaMbhavAt nigrahasthAnamayuktam / sAdhanAGgasyAvacanaM - prativAdinApi adoSasyodbhAvanaMdoSasyAnudbhAvanaM vA - anena prtyuktm| vijigISuNobhayaM kartavyaM svaparapakSasAdhanadUSaNam / ato'nyatareNAsiddhAnaikAntikavacane'pi jalpAparisamAptiH / nirAkRtAvasthApitavipakSasvapakSayoreva jayetaravyavasthA, nAnyathA, iti darzayannubhayamAha // 7 // kuzalAkuzalaM karma paralokazca na kvacit / ekAntagraharakteSu nAtha ! svaparavairiSu // 8 // O Lord ! on the showing of all those who tenaciously stick to the extremist theses there is no distinction between a virtuous and a sinful act, nor any possibility of re-birth; these persons are (thus) verily the enemies of both what they seek to uphold and what they seek to refute (that is, their arguments are inconsequential). (8) karmaphalasambandhaparalokAdikam ekAntavAdinAM prAyeNeSTam, tadanekAntapratiSedhena bAdhyate / tato'nuSThAnamabhimatavyAghAtakRt, sadasannityAnityAyekAnteSu kasyacit kutazcit kadAcit kvacit prAdurbhAvAsaMbhavAt / na hi sarvAtmanA sarvasya bhUtAveva janma viruddhamapi tu sarvathA'bhAve'pi, vyalIkapratibhAsAnAmanuparamaprasaGgAt / na kevalaM svabhAvanairAtmye evAyaM doSaH kintu antarubhayatra vA niranvayasattve'pi, kAryakAlamaprApnuvata: kAraNatvAnupapatteH, ciratarAtItavat / sati abhavataH svayameva niyamena pazcAt bhavataH tatkAryatvaM viruddham, kAlAntare'pi kiM na syAt ?, tadabhAvAvizeSAt, smnntrvt| samarthe sati abhavataH punaH kAlAntarabhAvinaH tatprabhavAbhyupagame kathamakSaNike'rthakriyAnupapattiH ?, tatsattvAsattvayoravizeSAt / kAraNasAmarthyApekSiNa: phalasya kAlaniyamakalpanAyAm acalapakSe'pi samAnaH parihAraH / kSaNavartina ekasmAt kAraNAt kAraNasvabhAvamabhedayatAM vicitrakarmaNAm (= vicitrakAryANAm) utpattau kUTasthe'pi kiM na syAt kramazaH kAryotpattiH ? kathamatro

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY tpattirnAma? tatra samAnaH paryanuyogaH, sadasatoranutpatteH, nisspnnkhpusspvt| sataH punarguNAntarAdhAnamanekaM kramazo'pyanubhavataH kiMvirudhyeta?,kSaNasthAyinaH kasyacidevagrAhyagrAhakAkAravaizvarUpyAnabhyupagame'pisaMviditajJAnasya grAhyagrAhakAkAravivekaMparokSaM bibhrANasya sAmarthyaprApteH, anyathA zUnyasaMvidorvipratiSedhAt / tadayaM kSaNasthAyi kAraNaM svasattAyAM kAryaM kurvat abhyupagacchan kramotpattimuparuNaddhi, skljgdekkssnnvRttiprsnggaat| kAraNasya kAryakAlaprAptau kSaNabhaGgabhaGgAnuSaGgAt, tadaprApnuvatastatkRtau vyalIkakalpanAvizeSeNa kUTasthAnatizAyanAt / tataH subhASitaM kuzalAdyasaMbhUtirekAntagraharakteSviti // 8 // Comment on verses 1-8 These verses are not an organic part of the discussion carried on by Samantabhadra in the present text. For really speaking, they contain little else than the author's expression of faith in the correctness of the Jaina philosophical tradition. However, the procedure here adopted by Samantabhadra is in some sense revealing. In the verse 1 we are told that certain characteristic qualifications of the Jaina tirthankaras (to some one of whom the whole of the present text is addressed) are shared even by a juggler, in the verse 2 that some of them are shared even by an ordinary celestial being, in the verse 3 that some of them are shared even by other sect-founders. In the verse 4 it has been argued that it is possible for a person to get rid of all spiritual defilement whatsoever, in the verse 5 that it is possible for a person to become omniscient. In the verse 6 it is claimed that a Jaina tirthankara is free from all spiritual defilement and is an omniscient- of which the proof is that his teaching does not come in conflict either with the scriptural texts or with logic. Now leaving aside the question of scriptural texts (for it may be doubted as to which ones are meant) the claim amounts to asserting that the Jaina philosophical teaching conforms to the canons laid down by the science of Logic, and the assertion is significant in its own place. In the verse 7 it is said that the teachings patronized by the non-Jaina traditions are in conflict with the findings of plain experience; this appeal to experience is again significant even if one might at times feel that the Jaina is not being sair in his criticism of an adversary - particularly in case this advcrsary himself happens to be an empiricist. In the verse 8 it is said that the non-Jaina traditions fail to account for the generally accepted phenomena of the cthico-religious sphere; in a way this criticism is but a corollary of that urged in the verse 7, but it is instructive to note how much attention is paid to ethico-religious matters by an Indian philosopher in his criticism of his rivals.

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EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE 9-11 Verses bhAvaikAnte pdaarthaanaambhaavaanaamphnvaat| sarvAtmakamanAdyantamasvarUpamatAvakam / / 9 / / Those of your rivals who attribute to entities the character 'absolute being' while repudiating the reality of all kinds of 'non-being' are forced to conclude that an entity is possessed of the form of every other entity, is beginningless, is endless, and is devoid of a form of its own. (9) nisspryaaydrvyaikaantpkssesrvaatmktvaadidossaanussnggH| kutaH punarvizeSAn apahvavIta?, ttsaadhnvybhicaaraat|sNvinirbhaasbhedaatbhaavsvbhaavbhedHprklpyte|spunHabhede'pyaatmnH khaNDazaH pratibhAsanAt tadanyatrApi vibhramAbhAve kozapAnaM vidheyam / tadekaM cakSurAdijJAnapratibhAsabhedavazAtrUpAdivyapadezabhAk, graahygraahksNvittivt| itaretarAbhAvavikalpo'pi kathamayathArtho nasyAt ?, vrnnaadiviklpvt| na hi vastuvyatiriktam asannAma, pramANasyArthaviSayatvAt / abhAvadRSTau hi tadavasAnakAraNAbhAvAt bhAvadarzanamanavasaraM prApnoti / sakalazaktivirahalakSaNasya nirupAkhyasya svabhAvakAryAderabhAvAt kutaH tatpramiti: ? vstunaanaatvNbuddhyaadikaarynaanaatvaatprtiiyte|svbhaavaabhede'pi vividhakarmatA dRSTA, yugapat ekaarthopnibddhdRssttivissykssnnvt| zaktinAnAtve prsvvishessaat| sa cet vyabhicArI, kutaH tadgatiH ? kevalamavidyA svabhAvadezakAlAvasthAbhedAn Atmani paratra vA asataH svayamasatI mithyAvyavahArapadavImupanayati, yataH kSaNabhaGgino bhinnasaMtatayaH skandhA vikalpyeran anyathA veti|prtibhaaskaaryaadybhede'pi kasyacidekatvaMsAdhayatIti sAdhyasAdhanayorabhede kiM kena kRtaM syAt ?, pakSavipakSAderabhAvAt / na kvacidasAdhanA sAdhyasiddhiH, atiprsnggaat||9|| kAryadravyamanAdi syAt prAgabhAvasya nihnve| pradhvaMsasya ca dharmasya pracyave'nantatAM vrajet // 10 // If the reality of 'prior non-being' is repudiated a produced entity turns out to be beginningless, if the character posterior non-being' is not there the same turns out to be endless. (10) prAgabhAvAnabhyupagame ghaTAderanAditvaprasaGgAt puruSavyApArAnarthakyaM syAt / kalpayitvApi tadabhivyaktiM tasyAH prAgabhAvo'GgIkartavyaH / tathAhi - sataH zabdasya tAlvAdibhirabhivyaktiH

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10 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY kriyate, na punaH zabda eva, iti svrucivircitdrshnprdrshnmaatrm| sA yadizravaNajJAnotpattiH, saiva kathaM prAk satI yatnataH kartavyA ? yogyatAyAM samAnazcarcaH / tadAvaraNavigamaH prAka kimabhUt ? bhUtau vA kiM yatnena ? vizeSAdhAnamapi tAdRgeva, karmakartRkaraNAnAM prAgabhAvAbhAvAt / na kazcit vizeSahetuH, tAlvAdayo vyaJjakAH na punazcakrAdayo'pIti / na hi vyaJjakavyApRtiniyamena vyaGgyaM sannidhApayati / nAyaM doSaH sarvagatatvAt varNAnAmityapi vArtam, anyatrApi tathAbhAvAnuSaGgAt / iSTatvAdadoSo'yam / na, kAraNavyApAreSvapi codyAnivRtteH / etenAvasthA pratyuktA / tadvizeSaikAnte tadvato'nupayogaH, tAvatetikartavyatAsthAnAt / abhedaikAnte pUrvavat prasaGgaH / pariNAme'pyeSa paryanuyogaH / tadabhinnAnAMkramazo vRttirmA bhUt / bhinnAnAM vyapadezo'pimA bhUta, smbndhaasiddhernupkaarktvaat| upakAre'pi sarvaM samAnamanavasthA ca / vinAzAnabhyupagame tasya kiMkRtamazravaNam ?, tadA AtmAnamakhaNDayataH kasyacidAvaraNatvAyogAt, AvRtAnAvRtasvabhAvayorabhedAnupapatteH / tayorabhede vA zabdasya zrutirazrutirvetyekAntaH / tamasA'pi ghaTAderakhaNDane pUrvavat upalabdhiH kina bhavitumarhati? svasaMvittyutpatau kAraNAntarApekSA mAbhUta tatkaraNasamarthasya / anyathA tadasAmarthyamakhaNDayadakiJcitkaraM kiM sahakArikAraNaM syAt ? tatkhaNDane vA svabhAvahAniH, avytirekaat| vyatireke vyapadezAnupapattiH, iti pUrvavat sarvam / varNAnAM vyApitvAt nityatvAcca kramazrutiranupapanaiva, samAnakaraNAnAM tAdRzAmabhivyaktiniyamAyogAt sarvatra sarvadA sarveSAM saMkulA zrutiH syAt / vaktazrotRvijJAnayoH tatkAraNakAryayoH kramavRttimapekSya pariNAminAM kramotpattipratipattyoH na kiJcid viruddhaM pazyAmaH / sarvagatAnAmeSa kramo duSkara: syAt / kSaNikeSveva karaNAGgahArAdiSu pratyabhijJAnAt viruddho hetuH| tatkriyaikatve'pikimidAnImanekaMsyAt?, srvvrnnaiktvprsnggaat| zakyaMhivaktum - abhivyaJjakabhedAt vaizvarUpyam, jalacandravat / kvacit pratyakSavirodhe tadanyatrApyavirodhaH kutaH ? tadayaM tAlvAdivyApArajanitazrAvaNasvabhAvaM parityajya viparItasvabhAvamAsAdayannapi nityazcena kiJcidanityam / yugapat pratiniyatadezamandratArazruteH kasyacidekatve na kvacidanekatvasiddhiH / na hi kathaJcit kvacit pratyavamarzo na syAt varNavat / taccheSavizeSabuddherabhivyaJjakahetutvapraklRptau srvsmnyjsNprekssaamhe| tadeteSAM pudgalAnAM karaNasannipAtopanipAte zrAvaNasvabhAvaH zabdaH pUrvAparakoTayorasan prayatnAnantarIyako ghaTAvidavat / pudgalasvabhAvatve darzanavistAravikSepapratighAtakarNapUraNaikazrotrapravezAdhupAlambho gandhaparamANukRtapratividhAnatayopekSAmarhati / karNazaSkulyAM kaTakaTAyamAnasya prAyazaH pratighAtahetorbhavanAdyupaghAtinaH zabdasya prasiddhirasparzatvakalpanAm astaM gamayati / nizchidranirgamanAdayaH sUkSmasvabhAvatvAt snehAdisparzAdivat na virudhyeran / ato yatnajanitavarNAdyAtmA zrAvaNamadhyasvabhAvaH prAk pazcAdapi pudgalAnAM nAstIti tAvAneva dhvanipariNAmaH / tatprAkpradhvaMsAbhAvapratikSepe kauTasthyaM

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11 EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE kramayogapadyAbhyAM svAkArajJAnAdyarthakriyAM vyAvartayatIti nirupAkhyamityabhiprAyaH / tadAnupUrvIkalpanAM vistareNa pratikSepsyAmaH // 10 // sarvAtmakaM tadekaM syaadnyaapohvytikrme| anyatra samavAye na vyapadizyeta sarvathA // 11 // If the reality of 'mutual non-being' is repudiated an entity turns out to be possessed of the form of every other entity, if an entity resides in what is not its proper locus it can be characterized in no way whatsoever. (11) Note: Vasunandin reads anyatra samavayena for anyatra samavaye na; on this reading the latter half of the verse should be translated as : "if 'absolute nonbeing' is not there the same (i.e. an entity) can be characterized in an absolutely indiscriminate fashion." __ svabhAvAntarAt svabhAvavyAvRttiranyApohaH / saMvido grAhyAkArAt kathaJcid vyAvRttau anekAntasiddhiH, anyathA sambandhAsiddhiH / avyAvRttau anyatarasvabhAvahAnerna kiJcit syAt, viSayAkAravikalasyAnupalabdheH / saMvitteH svalakSaNapratyakSavRttAvapi saMvedyAkAravivekasvabhAvAntarAnupalabdheH svabhAvavyAvRttiH / zabalaviSayanirbhAse'pi parasparavyAvRttirabhyupagamanIyA, anyathA citrapratibhAsAsaMbhavAt tadanyatamavat tadAlAbanasyApi nIlAderabhedasvabhAvApatteH / tadvatastebhyo vyAvRttiH, ekAnekasvabhAvatvAd ghaTarUpAdivadityanumAnAt / anyathA dravyameva syAt, na rUpAdayaH / svabhAvaikatve'pi nirbhAsavailakSaNyaM karaNasAmagrIbhedamanuvidadhyAt, dUrAsannaikArthopanibaddhanAnAdarzananirbhAsavat / pratipuruSaM viSayasvabhAvabhedo vA, sAmagrIsambandhabhedAt / anyathA na kevalaM rUpAderabhedaH, kasyacit krmshHsmbndhyntropnipaato'pisvbhaavNnbhedyet| tataHkramavantyapi kAryANitatsvabhAvabhedaM nAnumApayeyuH / tato yAvanti sambandhyantarANi tAvantaH pratyekaM bhAvasvabhAvabhedAH parasparavyAvRttAH / na hi kasyacit kenacit sAkSAt paramparayA vA sambandho nAstIti, nirupAkhyatvaprasaGgAt / tadevaM pratikSaNamanantaparyAyAH pratyekamarthasArthAH / kramazo'pi vicchede arthakriyAnupapatteH / svayamasataH tattvataH kvacidupakAritAnupapatteH / svakAryAtmanA bhavataH pratikSepAyogAt, svabhAvAntarAnapekSaNAt / tasmAdayam utpitsureva vinazyati, nazvara eva tiSThati, sthAsturevotpadyate / sthitirevotpadyate, vinAza eva tiSThati, utpattireva nazyati / sthitireva sthAsyatyutpatsyate vinakSyati, vinAza eva sthAsyati utpatsyate vinakSyati, utpattirevotpatsyate vinazyati sthAsyatIti na kutazcid uprmti| bhAva eva dravati droSyati adudruvat / sattaiva vizeSyate dravyakSetrakAlabhAvAtmanA / tataH parasparavyAvRttasvabhAvAn

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12 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY anantaguNaparyAyAn pratikSaNamAsAdayantI sattaiva tiSThatItyAdi yojyam / tathA bhedAneva saMdravantItyAdi pratipattavyam / atyantAbhAvApAkRtau na kvacit kiJcit kathaJcit na varteta, tathA sarvaM sarvatra sarvathopalabhyeta / kathaM punarabhAvapratipattiH ? kathaM ca na syAt ? pratyakSasya rUpAdisvalakSaNaviSayatvAt, pramANAntarasyApi svakAraNaviSayatvAt / asato'nupalabdheH paryudAsavRttyA vastuni niyamAt / ekasya kaivalyamitarasya vaikalyamiti bruvanapi devAnAMpriyo naavdhaarytibhaavaabhaavprtiptterbhaavaabhyupgmaat|svprruupaadibhaavaabhaavlkssnntvaatsrvsy niHzreNIpadabandhAbhyAmiva bhAvAbhAvasvabhAvAbhyAM pratibandhAt na kiJcit pramANaM sarvAtmanA bhAvamabhAvaM vA grahItumarhati, aniyamaprasaGgAt / bhAvaprameyaikAntavAdinAmabhAvapratipattirayuktiH / ato na bhaavniymprtipttiH| tatprameyatopasaGkhyAnaM pramANadvayaniyamaM vighttyti| bhAvanairAtmyasya pramANAkAraNatvAt pratibandhaniyamo mA bhUt // 11 // Comment on verses 9-11 These three verses can be better understood if they are taken together. Our difficulties in connection with them are two, viz. (i) to determine what is the logic behind Samantabhadra's criticism of the 'doctrine of absolute being', and (ii) to determine who is the alleged proponent of the doctrine in question. The first difficulty is relatively less formidable, for Samantabhadra seems to be clearly arguing that a statement might involve negation in four possible ways while the proponent of the 'doctrine of absolute being' must face four types of undesirable contingencies as a result of his being obliged to deny the possibility of a statement involving negation in any of these four ways. On the other hand, it does not seem to be so easy to identify this proponent of the doctrine of absolute being'. Let us tackle our difficulties one by one. The four possible ways in which a statement might involve negation can be symbolically represented as follows: (i) x does not possess the property p and can never possess it. (ii) x does not possess the property p but can possibly possess it. (iii) x possesses the property p but it did not formerly possess it. (iv) x does not possess the property p but it formerly possessed it. Thus, for example, one might say : (i) This lump of clay does not possess consciousness and can never possess it. (ii) This lump of clay does not possess jar-hood but can possibly possess it.

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EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE 13 (iii) This lump of clay possesses the property jar-hood but it did not formerly possess it. (iv) This lump of clay does not possess the property jar-hood but it formerly possessed it. In the technical terminology of Samantabhadra (i) amounts to saying that x possesses 'absolute nonbeing' of p, (ii) to saying that x possesses 'mutual nonbeing' of p (rather of a possesser of p), (iii) to saying that x formerly possessed 'prior nonbeing' of p, and (iv) to saying that x possessed 'posterior nonbeing' of p. Thus Samantabhadra argues that an advocacy of the 'doctrine of absolute being' implies a denial of all these four types of 'nonbeing', a denial which in its turn results in the following absurdities : (i) Even in case x does not possess the property p and can never possess it, to say that x possesses the property p; e.g. to say about a lump of clay that it is a conscious entity. (ii) Even in case x does not in fact possess the property p which it can possibly possess, to say that x possesses the property p; e.g. to say about a lump of clay that it is a jar. (iii) Even in case x possesses the property p which it did not formerly possess, to say that x always possessed the property p; e.g. to say about the lump of clay which is now a jar that it was always a jar. (iv) Even in case x does not possess the property p which it formerly possessed, to say that x possesses the property p; e.g. to say about the lump of clay which was formerly a jar that it is even now a jar and will always remain a jar. To generalize and summarize, the first and the second absurdities are each of them tantamount to granting that an entity has got no form of its own as also that an entity has got the form of every other entity, the third absurdity is tantamount to granting that a produced entity is beginningless, while the fourth absurdity is tantamount to granting that a produced entity is endless. Then comes the question of identifying the proponent of the doctrine of absolute being'. No school of Indian empiricism ever taught that a particular phenomenon of our everyday experience is devoid of a form of its own, is beginningless, is endless; for it was only our schools of transcendentalism - ready and eager to repudiate the reality of all empirical phenomena - who could say of their

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14 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY alleged trans-empirical reality that it is possessed of a single form, is beginningless, is endless. Even the commentators of Samantabhadra who are inclined to put the doctrine in question into the mouth of the Sankhya philosopher are compelled to argue that a consistent upholder of it ought to be the transcendentalist who, while repudiating the reality of all spatio-temporal diversity, declares his alleged trans-empirical reality to be uniform, beginningless and endless. As a matter of fact, both the 'doctrine of absolute being' and the doctrine of absolute nonbeing' ought to be attributed to the transcendentalist, the former insofar as he declares his alleged transempirical reality to be uniform, beginningless and endless, the latter insofar as he repudiates the reality of all spatio-temporal diversity. But maybe Samantabhadra himself thought that it is the Sankhya philosopher who is guilty of upholding the doctrine of absolute being'; in that case we will have to assess the exact import of his criticism of the Sankhya philosopher, an assessment that will have to be kept in mind while following the whole text of Samantabhadra. Samantabhadra's polemics against his rivals may be divided into two groups, one that is directed against the transcendentalist and the other that is directed against the empiricist. In the former group of polemics Samantabhadra is interested in showing how his rival is clearly repudiating the verdict of experience, in the latter group in showing how his rival is playing into the hands of those who clearly repudiate the verdict of experience. A close study of the criticism levelled in the present case by Samantabhadra's commentators against the Sankhya philosopher should enable us to see that this criticism belongs to the second of these groups. Verse 12 abhAvaikAntapakSe'pi bhaavaaphnvvaadinaam| bodhavAkyaM pramANaM na kena saadhnduussnnm||12|| * Similarly, those who attribute to entities the character 'absolute nonbeing' while repudiating the reality of 'being' can treat neither a piece of cognition nor an uttered sentence as a case of authentic knowledge; how will then they be able either to establish a thesis or to refute one ? (12)

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15 EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE bahirantazca paramArthasat, tadamyatarApAye'pi sAdhanadUSaNaprayogAnupapatteH, iti prakRtArthaparisamAptau kiM trilakSaNaparikalpanayA ? na hi saMvRtyA sAdhyasAdhanavyavasthA yuktimatI, zUnyasiddheraparamArthatve punrniraakRtsdbhaavsysrvsyaashuunytaanussnggaat|smaaropvyvcchede'pi samAnam / heyopAdeyopAyarahitamayamahIkaH kevalaM vikrozati / saMvRtyA'stIti svarUpeNetyayamarthaH / kRtamanukUlam, kevalaM vaktA Atmano vaiyAtyaM suucyti| atha pararUpeNa nAsti, nAmni vivAdAt etadapi taadRgev| tadetenobhayAnubhayavikalpaH pratyuktaH / atha tadasti mRSAtmaneti samAnazcarcaH / saMvRtirvicArAnupapattirityayuktam, tadabhAvAt / tatparapratipAdanArthaM zAstramupadeSTAraMvAvarNayan sarvaMpratikSipatIti kathamanunmattaH? zauddhodanerevatAvatprajJAparAdho'yaM lokAtikrAntaH kathaM babhUvetyativismayamAsmahe / tanmanye punaradyApi kIrtayantIti kiM bata paramanyatra mohanIyaprakRteH ? // 12 // Comment on verse 12 This verse presents little difficulty. For in this case the target of criticism is unmistakably the transcendentalist, However, even in this case one might raise two questions, viz. (i) Which particular school of transcendentalism is being attacked here ? (ii) How far is it proper to dub the transcendentalist as an advocate of the doctrine of absolute nonbeing'? To the first question the answer will be that the entire camp of transcendentalism is under fire here inasmuch as this entire camp repudiates the reality of all empirical phenomena.: To the second question the answer will be that in the eyes of an empiricist the transcendentalist, simply by virtue of repudiating the reality of all empirical phenomena, becomes an advocate of the 'doctrine of absolute nonbeing', that is, of nihilism pure and simple - this irrespective of how the latter proceeds on to describe the trans-empirical reality substituted for the empirical one. As we shall see, the present criticism has been continued by Samantabhadra in his consideration of the doctrine of absolute nondualism' which constitutes 'thesis' in the Section 2. - Verse 13 virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syaadvaadnyaayvidvissaam| avAcyataikAnte'pyukti vAcyamiti yujyate // 13 // The enemies of the logic of syadvada (i.e. the Jaina doctrine of conditional assertion to be elaborately

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16 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY described in verses 101 ff.) can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'absolute being' and 'absolute nonbeing') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (13) bhAvAbhAvayorekatarapratikSepaikAntapakSopakSiptadoSaparijihIrSayA sadasadAtmakaMsarvamabhyupagacchato'pivANI vipratiSidhyeta, tayoH prsprprihaarsthitilkssnntvaat| na hi sarvAtmanA kaJcidarthasantaM tathaivAsantamAcakSANaH svasthaH,svAbhyupetetaranirAsavidhAnakaraNAt, zUnyAvabodhavat / trailokyaM vyakterapaiti, nityatvapratiSedhAt / apetamapyasti, vinAzapratiSedhAditi vaa| tadanyathApetamanyathAstIti syAdvAdAvalambanamandhasarpabilapravezanyAyamanusarati / yo'pi pakSatrayopakSiptadoSajihAsayA sarvathA'vaktavyaM tattvamavalambeta so'pi kathamavaktavyaM brUyAt ? naiSa doSaH, svalakSaNamanirdezyam' 'pratyakSaM kalpanApoDham' ityAdivat / tadapyasat yadasataH samudAhRtam / yathaivAkSaviSaye'bhidhAnaM nAsti tathAkSajJAne viSayo naivAsti / tatastatra pratibhAsamAne'pi na pratibhAseta / na kevalaM viSayabalAt dRSTerutpattiH, api tu cakSurAdizaktezca / tadarthavat karaNamanukartumarhati, na cArtham, vizeSAbhAvAt / darzanasya kAraNAntarasadbhAve'pi viSayAkArAnukAritvameva sutasyeva pitrAkArAnukaraNamityapi vArtam, svopAdAnamAtrAnukaraNaprasaGgAt / ubhayAkArAnukaraNe'pi rUpAdivadupAdAnasyApi viSayatApattiH, atizayAbhAvAt, varNAdervA tadvadaviSayatvaprasaGgAt / tajjanmarUpAvizeSe'pi tadadhyavasAyaniyamAt bahirarthaviSayatvamityasAram / darzanasyAnadhyavasAyAtmakatvAt adoSo'yam, pratyakSasyAdhyavasAyahetutvAt ityanirUpitAbhidhAnam, tatrAbhilApAbhAvAt / tadabhAve'pyadhyavasAyakalpanAyAM pratyakSaM kiM nAdhyavasyet ? yathaiva hi pratyakSasyAbhilApasaMsargayogyatA nAsti tathA tatsamanantarabhAvino'pi vikalpasya / tathAhi kiJcit kenacit viziSTaM gRhyamANaM vizeSaNavizeSyatatsambandhavyavasthAgrahaNamapekSate dnnddivt| nacAyamiyato vyApArAn kartuM samarthaH, pratyakSabalotpatteravicArakatvAt, pratyakSavat / naitadevam, zabdArthavikalpavAsanAprabhavatvAt manovikalpasya tatastarhi kathamakSabuddheH rUpAdiviSayatvaniyamaH ? tadabhyupagame vA tadabhilApasaMsargo'pi tadvat anumIyeta / tasmAdayaM kiJcit pazyan tatsadRzaM pUrvaM dRSTaM na smartumarhati, tannAmavizeSAsmaraNAt / tadasmaranaiva tadabhidhAnaM prtipdyte| tadapratipattau tena tanna yojyti| tadayojayan nAdhyavasyatIti na kvacid viklp:shbdovetyviklpaabhidhaanNjgtsyaat| tathA hi bahirantarvA gRhItamapyagRhItakalpaM

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EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE kSaNakSayasvalakSaNasaMvedanAdivat / tathA cAyAtamacetanatvaM jagataH / sahasmRtirayuktaiva, tannAmAkSaramAtrANAmapi kramazo'dhyavasAnAt / anyathA saMkulA pratipattiH syAt / nAmno nAmAntareNa vinApi smRtau kevalArthavyavasAyaH kiMna syAt ? tnnaamaantrpriklpnaayaamnvsthaa| tadayamazabdaM sAmAnya vyavasyan svalakSaNamapi vyavasyet, bhedAbhAvAt / sAmAnyavat svalakSaNamadhyavasyan abhilApena yojayet / tato na kiJcit prameyamanabhilApyaM nAma / pratyakSasyAnabhilApyatvesmArtaMzabdAnuyojanaMdRSTasAmAnyavyavasAyoyadyapekSetaso'rthovyavahito bhavet / tadindriyajJAnAt sAmAnyavyavasAyo na syAt, prAgivAjanakatvAt / tadantareNApi darzanam 'ayaM gauH' iti nirNayaH syAt / anabhilApyasya vizeSasyAnubhave kathamabhilApyasya smRti: ?, atyantabhedAt / zabdArthayoH sambandhasyAsvAbhAvikatve kathamarthamAtraM pazyan zabdamanusmaret tadarthaM vA ?, yato'yaM vyavasAyaH / cakSurAdijJAnasya kathaJcivyavasAyAtmakatvAbhAve dRSTasajAtIyasmRtirna syAt, dAnahiMsAviraticetasaH svargAdiphalajananasAmarthyasaMvedanavat kSaNakSayAnubhavanavat vaa| pratyakSe'bhilApasaMsargavicchede kutaH tadvikalpAbhilApasaMyojanaM yataH sAmAnyamabhilApyaM syAt / na ca grAhakapratyakSasmRtipratibhAsabhedAt viSayasvabhAvAbhedAbhAvaH, sakRt ekArthopanibaddhadarzanapratyAsannetarapuruSajJAnaviSayavat / tathA ca mandapratibhAsini tatsaGketavyavahAraniyamakalpanAyAmapi kathaJcidabhidheyatvaM vastunaH siddham / ityalaM prasaGgena / tasmAdavAcyataikAnte yadavAcyamityabhidhAnaM tadasamaJjasam, svalakSaNamanirdezyamityAdivat svavacanavirodhAt // 13 // Comment on verse 13 This verse - repeated ten times (i.e. once in each section)- is not of much intrinsic importance. But it does throw some indirect light on two typical notions of Jaina philosophy. For by criticizing the doctrine of both absolute being and absolute nonbeing' Samantabhadra is suggesting that in any controversy the Jaina synthesis of a thesis and an antithesis is not mere mechanical juxtaposition of this thesis and this antithesis; and by criticizing the doctrine of absolute indescribability' he is suggesting that the Jaina characterizes an empirical phenomenon as indescribable in no more than a rather technical sense. 14-16 Verses kathaJcit te sadeveSTaM kathaJcid asadeva tat / tathobhayamavAcyaM ca nayayogAnna sarvathA // 14 // On your showing, on the other hand, an entity is somehow possessed of the character "being', somehow

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18 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY possessed of the character 'nonbeing', somehow possessed of both, while it is somehow indescribable - all these four features characterizing it in accordance with the speaker's intention (alternatively, in accordance with the conditions of assertion) and not in an absolute fashion. (14) na avagrahehAderanyonyam, svalakSaNavivekaikAnte jIvAntaravat svAtmanyapi santAnabhedaprasaGgAt / ahamahamikayA''tmA vivartAn anubhavan anAdinidhanaH svalakSaNapratyakSaH sarvalokAnAM kvacit citravittikSaNe nIlAdivizeSanirbhAsavatAtmabhUtAnparasparatoviviktAn sahakramabhAvino guNaparyAyAn AtmasAtkurvan sanneva / tadekatvAbhAve nIlAdivizeSaniyatadarzananAnAsantAnasaMvedanakSaNavat citrasaMvedanaM na syAt / tathA kramavRttInAM sukhAdInAM matizrutAdInAM vA tAdAtmyavigamaikAnte santatiranekapuruSavat / nairantaryAderavizeSAt. santAnavyatikaro'pi kiM na syAt ? na hi niyAmakaH kazcid vizeSaH anytraabhedprinnaamaat| asaMkare harSaviSAdAdicitrapratipatterayogAt / yathaikatra samanantarAvagrahAdisadAdisvabhAvasaMkarapariNAmaH tathaiva sarvatra cetanAcetaneSu saMpratyatItAnAgateSu, ttsvbhaavaavicchitteH| ataH kathaJcit sadeveSTam / na kevalaM jIvAjIvaprabhedAH sajAtIyavijAtIyavyAvRttilakSaNAH, kintu buddhikSaNe'pikvacitgrAhyagrAhakayoH sitAdinirbhAsAMzaparamANusaMvittayo'pi, parasparaparihArasthitilakSaNatvAt, anyathA sthUlazabalAvalokanAbhAvAt tadekAMzavat / tathA ca sakalacetanetarakSaNapariNAmalavavizeSAH parasparaviviktAtmAnaH / tadanyonyAbhAvamAtraM jgt| anyathA sarvathaikatvaprasaGgAt, anvayasya vizeSApekSaNAdabhAvo vA / tadiSTamasadeva kathaJcit / na hi bhAvAbhAvaikAntayoH niSparyAyamaGgIkaraNaM yuktam, yathaivAsti tathaiva nAstIti viprtissedhaat| kathaJcitsadasadAtmakaM dravyaparyAyanayApekSayA, viparyaye tthaivaasNbhvaat|srvthaa jAtyantarakalpanAyAM vA tadaMzanibandhanavizeSapratipatteratyantAbhAvaprasaGgAt / sarvathobhayarUpatve vA jAtyantarapratipatterayogAt tathA cAnavasthAdidoSAnuSaGgaH / tadiSTaM syAdubhayam / sadbhAvetarAbhyAmanabhilApye vastunaH kevalaM mUkatvaM jagataH syAt, vidhiprtissedhvyvhaaraayogaat| na hi sarvAtmanA anabhilApyasvabhAvaM buddhirdhyvsyti| na cAnadhyavaseyaM pramitaM nAma, gRhItasyApi tAdRzasyAgRhItakalpatvAt mUrchAcaitanyavat / sarvAtmanA abhidheyatve'pi pratyakSatarAvizeSaprasaGgAt / tathAnabhidheyatve'pi satyetarayorabhedaH syAt / svapakSavipakSayostattvAtattvapradarzanAya yatkiJcit praNayan vastu sarvathAnabhidheyaM pratijAnAtIti kimapyetat mahAdbhutam / tatkRtAM vastusiddhimupajIvati, na ca tadvAcyatAM ceti svadRSTirAgamAtram, anavasthAnuSaGgAt // 14 //

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19 EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE sadeva sarvaM ko necchet svarUpAdicatuSTayAt / asadeva viparyAsAnna cenna vyavatiSThate // 15 // Certainly, who will not allow that an entity is possessed of the character being so far as its own form etc. (i.e. form, place, time, root-substance) are concerned while it is possessed of the character 'nonbeing' so far as opposite is the case (i.e. so far as the form etc. of the remaining entities are concerned) ? For if that be not so this entity will not be being viewed as having a fixed nature of its own. (15) syAt sadasadAtmakAH padArthAH sarvasya sarvAkaraNAt / na hi paTAdayo ghaTAdivat kSIrAdyAharaNalakSaNAmarthakriyAM kurvanti ghaTAdijJAnaM vA / tadubhayAtmani dRSTAntaH sulabhaH / zAbdetarapratyayayoH ekavastuviSayayoH ekAtmasamavetayo: kAraNavizeSavazAtparivRttAtmanoH svabhAvabhede'pikathaJcidekatvam astyeva, vicchedaanuplbdheH| upAdAnasya kAryakAlamAtmAnaM kathaJcidanayataH cirataranivRttAviva avizeSAt kAryotpattAvapi vyapadezAnupapatteH tAdRzAM svarUpaikatvam astyeva, vizeSApekSayA tu nAstyeva / na hi paurastyaH pAzcAtyaH svabhAvaH paashcaatyovaapaurstyHnirpekssH| tatrakramo'pipratibhAsavizeSavazAtprakalpyeta tadekatvAdakramaH kiMnasyAt ? tadekamanekAkAram akramakramAtmakam anvayavyatirekarUpaMsAmAnyavizeSAtmakaM sadasatpariNAmaM sthityutpattivinAzAtmakaM svapradezaniyataM svazarIravyApinaM trikAlagocaram AtmAnaM paraM vA kathaJcit sAkSAtkaroti parokSayati vA kezAdivivekavyAmugdhabuddhivat / tAdRzaikacaitanyaM sukhAdibhedaM vastu svato'nyata: sajAtIyavijAtIyAt viviktalakSaNaM bibharti / anyathA anavasthAnAt kvacit kathaJcit aniyamaH syAt / / 15 / / kramArpitadvayAd dvaitaM shaavaacymshktitH| avaktavyottarAH zeSAstrayo bhaGgAH svahetutaH // 16 // Again, an entity is possessed of the characters 'bcing' as well as 'nonbeing' insofar as these are proposed to be asserted successively, while it is indescribable insofar as they are proposed to be asserted simultaneously - this latter being an impossible proposition. Lastly, three more forms of assertion - each made possible by its specific circumstance - arise when an entity is held out to be possessed of the character being' as also to be indescriba-.

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY ble, when it is held out to be possessed of the character 'nonbeing' as also to be indescribable, when it is held out to be possessed of the characters "being' as well as 'nonbeing' as also to be indescribable. svapararUpAdyapekSaM sadasadAtmakaM vastu, na viparyAsena, tathAdarzanAt / kalpayitvApi tajjanmarUpAdhyavasAyAn svAnupalambhavyAvRttilakSaNaM darzanaM pramANayitavyam / tathAhi - buddhiriyaM yayA pratyAsattyA kasyacidevAkAramanukaroti tayA tamevArthaM niyamenopalabheta, nAnyathA pAramparyaparizramaM pariharet / trilakSaNasyApi vibhrmhetuphlvijnyaanairvybhicaaraat| tadanabhyupagame svAbhyupagamAsiddheH kiMsAdhanaH paramupAlabheta ? tadekopalambhaniyamaH svaparalakSaNAbhyAM bhAvAbhAvAtmanaM prasAdhayati / tadabhAve na pravarteta nApi nivarteta pramANAntaravat / niSparyAya bhAvAbhAvauabhidhAnaM nAJjasaiva viSayIkaroti, shbdshktisvaabhaavyaat|vcnsuucnsaamrthyvishessaantilngghnaat / saGketAnuvidhAne'pi kartRkarmaNoH zaktyazaktyoH anyataravyapadezAhatvAt, ayodAruvajralekhanavat / anyathA acAkSuSatvAdayaH zabdAdidharmA na bhaveyuH / ato yAvanti pararUpANi tAvantyeva pratyAtma svabhAvAntarANi, tathA pariNAmAt / dravyaparyAyau vyastasamastau samAzritya caramabhaGgatrayavyavasthAnam / na khalu sarvAtmanA sAmAnyaM vAcyam, tatpratipatterarthakriyAM pratyanupayogAt / na hi gotvaM vAhadohAdau upayujyate / lakSitalakSaNayA vRttiH kathaJcidatAdAtmye na bhavet, sambandhAntarAsiddheH kaarmukaadivt| tAdRzo'nupalambhAt saGketo'pi na siddhayet / satApi tAdRzAnyavyAvRttyAtmanA bhavitavyam, anyathA vizeSavat svabhAvahAniprasaGgAt vizeSANAM vA tadvat tato vyAvRtteH / na cAnyApohaH sarvathArthaH zabdasya vikalpasya vA / sAdhanavacanena nityatvasamAropavyavacchede svalakSaNasyAnityatvAsiddhau saadhnvcnaanrthkyaat| vikalpAbhidhAnayorvastusaMsparzAbhAvesvalakSaNadarzanasyAkRtanirNayasya vastusanigheravizeSAt kiM kena pramitaM syAt ? na hi mithyAdhyavasAyena tattvavyavasthApanam / vastudarzanasamAropavyavacchedayoH anyatarasyApi svatastattvApariniSThitau itaretarAzrayadoSaH / samayAdarzino'pi kvacit anvayabuddhayabhidhAnavyavahAro'tatkAryakAraNavyatirekavyavasthAyAM guDUcyAdyudAharaNapraktRptiM viparyAsayati // 16 / / Comment on verses 14-16 These three verses taken together give a fairly clear idea of the Jaina position on the question of being and nonbeing; (the forthcoming verses 17-23 simply elucidate this very idea and hardly bring to the fore any one that is of basic importance). In these verses Samantabhara offers the precise Jaina definition of four most fundamental ontological notions, viz.

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21 EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE *being', 'nonbeing', 'both being and nonbeing', 'indescribable". Thus we are told that the Jaina seeks to understand an empirical phenomenon in terms of its four coordinates, viz. its form, its root-substance, its place of occurrence, its time of occurrence. Here the concept 'root-substance' needs a special clarification and as follows. According to the Jaina the world of root-substances is divided into two broad groups, viz. (i) numerous physical atoms which are not further divisible but which can combine to form bigger composite bodies, and (ii) numerous individual souls which are neither further divisible nor capable of combining to form bigger composite units. (For the sake of convenience the composite physical bodies might be called 'composite substances' to be contradistinguished from atoms that are being called 'root-substances (of the physical type)'. In theory, every particular empirical phenomenon is describable as a particular conglomeration of certain root-substances each of which is found to manifest a particular form at a particular place and a particular time; but in practice it is described as a particular composite substance found to manifest a particular form at a particular place and a particular time. This explains why the distinction between a root-substance and a composite substance is often obliterated in practice, but it has to be kept in mind in the interest of theoretical clarification.] Now Samantabhadra tells us that an empirical phenomenon is describable as 'being' insofar as it is of the nature of a particular root-substance manifesting a particular form at a particular place and a particular time, while the same is describable as 'nonbeing' insofar as it is not of the nature of another particular rootsubstance, or of a root-substance manifesting another particular form, or of one manifesting a form at another particular place, or of one manifesting a form at another particular time. This statement is most crucial for a correct estimate of the Jaina position on the question; for it makes it crystal-clear that the Jaina does not describe a phenomenon as 'being' in exactly the same respect in which he describes it as 'nonbeing'. A minor - though in some sense quite crucial - point of clarification has been supplied in the form of the distinction drawn between the character called 'both being and nonbeing' and the one called 'indescribable (=not both being and nonbeing)'. Thus the Jaina will describe a phenomenon as 'indescribable' only in the sense that it is impossible to simultaneousely describe it as both 'being' and 'nonbeing'; on the bcing and nonbeing in the sense that it is possible to describe it first as being' and then as 'nonbcing'. Lastly, Samantabhadra tells us that the Jaina will describe an empirical phenomenon not only as 'being', 'nonbeing',

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22 . CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY 'both being and nonbeing' and 'indescribable' but also as 'being and indescribable', 'nonbeing and indescribable' and 'both being and nonbeing and indescribable'. It is easy to see what he means even if what he means is not of any vital significance. 17-18 Verses astitvaM prtissedhyenaavinaabhaavyekdhrminni| vizeSaNatvAt sAdharmyaM yathA bhedavivakSayA // 17 // In the body of one and the same entity (-possessed-ofattributes) the character 'being' is invariably accompanied by its opposite (i.e. by the character 'nonbeing'), the reason for it being that 'being' is a qualifier ; this is just as in the body of one and the same probans the (noticed) character 'presence-in-homologues' is found to be invariably accompanied by its opposite (i.e. by the character 'absence-in-aheterologue') as soon as the speaker intends to bring to light the dissimilarity obtaining between this probans and certain other objects (viz. its heterologues). (17) sarvamitthamanitthaM vetipratijJAyAbhipretyavAprameyatvAdihetUpAdAne'pivyatireko'styeva, prameyatvasya vastudharmatvAt / khapuSpAdayo'pi tatra vyavahAramicchaMtA prameyAH pratipattavyA iti na kiJcitpramANam, prmeyaabhaavsyaapitthaabhaavaanussnggennaavyvsthaaprsnggaat| na caitaviruddham, svlkssnnmnirdeshymityaadivt| darzanesvAkAramanarpayatAMsvabhAvakAryapratibandhAbhAveprameyatvaM pramANAntaramavazyamAkarSati / tato vipratiSiddhametat / na ca svalakSaNamevAnyApohaH, sarvathA vidhiniyamayorekatAnatvAsaMbhavAt / tatsvabhAvabhedAbhAve ca saGketavizeSAnupapatterabhidhAnapratyayavizeSo'pi mA bhUt, tadanyataravat / tato yAvanti pararUpANi pratyekaM tAvantastataH parAvRttilakSaNA: svabhAvabhedAH pratikSaNaM pratyetavyAH / yadi sambandhyantarANi bhAvasvabhAvabhedakAni na syuH tadA nityatve'pi kasyacit sambandhyantareSu kAdAcitkeSu kramazo'rthakriyA navai viprtissidhyet| zakyaM hi vaktum - kramavartIni kAraNAni tattannirvartanAtmakAni iti nityaM svabhAvaM na vai jahAti, kssnniksaamgriisnniptitaiktmvt| tadetat tadA tattat kartuM samarthamekaM svabhAvamavicalitaM bibhrANaM sahakArikAraNAni svabhAvasyAbhedakAni nAnAkAryanibandhanAni kAdAcitkAnipratIkSate iti| tadime'rthA vidhipratiSedhAbhyAM saMpratibaddhAna pratibandhamativartante vastuta ev| tato na saMvRtiH tadvyahArAya bhedamAvRtya tiSThatIti yuktam / tadanekasvabhAvAbhAve vinirbhAsAsaMbhavAt Atmani paratra cAsaMbhavinamAkAramAdarzayatIti mugdhayAte, sarvatrA

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EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE. sahAyarUpAnupalabdheH / tadiyaM saMvRtiH sAmAnyasAmAnAdhikaraNyavizeSaNavizeSyabhAvAdivyavahAranirbhAsA bibhratIsvayamanekarUpatAMpratikSipantaM vyvsthaapyti| tadvatbhAvAntarANAmanekAntAtmakatvevAstavIsAdharmyavaidhAdisthitiravizeSeNa vikalpabuddhermithyAtvaMpratijAnantaM pratikSipatyeva / yat punaretat anyato vyAvRttiranAtmikaiveti tanna, cakSurAdijJAnasya nirvyavasAyAtmakasya svayamabhUtAvizeSAt, nirNayasya bhAvasvabhAvAsaMsparzinaH sarvathA vastutattvAparicchedAt idamitthameveti svayamekAntAnupapatteH / ato'yaM bhAvaH svabhAvabhedAn vidhipratiSedhaviSayAn bibhrANaH pratyakSatarapramANasamadhigatalakSaNaH pratIyeta / tasmAt yat vizeSaNaM tatpratiSedhyAvinAbhAvi kvacit dharmiNi, yathA sAdharmyaM bhedavivakSayA kRtakatvAdau, vizeSaNaM cAstitvam, tataH pratiSedhyadharmapratibandhi // 17|| nAstitvaM prtissedhyenaavinaabhaavyekdhrminni| vizeSaNatvAd vaidhayaM yathA'bhedavivakSayA // 18 // Likewise, in the body of one and the same entity (possessed-of-attributes) the character 'nonbeing' is invariably accompanied by its opposite (i.e. by the character 'being'), the reason for it being that 'nonbeing' is a qualifier ; this is just as in the body of one and the same probans the (noticed) character 'absence-in-a-heterologue' is found to be invariably accompanied by its opposite (i.e. by the character 'presence-in-homologues') as soon as the speaker intends to bring to light the similarity obtaining between this probans and certain other objects (viz. its homologues). (18) bhedAbhedavivakSayoravastunibandhanatve viparyAso'pi kiM na syAt ? tataH samaJjasametat - yat kiJcit vizeSaNaMtat sarvamekatra pratipakSadharmAvinAbhAvi, yathA vaidharmyabhedavivakSayA hetau, tathA ca nAstitvaM vizeSaNam, anyathA vyavahArasaMkaraprasaGgAt / na hi svecchApraklRptadharmadharmivyavasthAyAM paramArthAvatAraH syAt / tadasamIkSitatattvArthaiH lokapratItivazAt bhedAbhedavyavasthitiH tattvapratipattaye samAzrIyate iti bAlAbhilApakalpam, bhAvasvabhAvoparodhAt // 18 // Comment on Verses 17-18 In these verses Samantabhadra employs two illustrations with a view to demonstrating how an entity can be described as "being' and also as 'nonbeing'. The verse 17 tells us how 'being' qua the character

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY of an entity implies 'nonbeing', the verse 18 how 'nonbeing' qua the character of an entity implies 'being'; the conclusion ought to be that the two characters are "equivalent" (in the terminology of modern logic).' This should explain why there is virtually no difference between the empiricist Buddhist's position that 'nonbeing' is not a character over and above "being' and the Jaina's position that 'being' and 'nonbeing' are two such characters as imply each other. Samantabhadra's illustrations point in the same direction. For he argues that being' qua the character of an entity implies 'nonbeing just as 'presence-in homologues' qua the character of a probans implies 'absence-in-aheterologue'; similarly, he argues that 'nonbeing' qua the character of an entity implies 'being' just as 'absence-in-a-heterologue' qua the character of a probans implies 'presence-in-homologues'. Now the students of Logic know that when precisely formulated the two characters in question of a probans turn out to be equivalent. At any rate, these verses should make it further clear that the Jaina's ascription of both being' and 'nonbeing' to an entity is not a case of selfcontradiction. Verse 19 vidheyapratiSedhyAtmA vizeSyaH zabdagocaraH / sAdhyadharmo yathA heturhetushcaapypekssyaa||19|| Whatever is a qualificand amenable to verbal utterance is possessed of the characters "being' as well as 'nonbeing' (lit. is capable of being posited as well as negated), just as an attribute belonging to the locus-ofprobandum will be a probans or not a probans depending on conditions (i.e. depending on what happens to be the probandum in a particular case). (19) kiJcit kenacit viziSTaM gRhyamANaM vizeSaNavizeSyatatsambandhalokasthitisaMkalanena gRhyeta nAnyathetyabhiniveze'pi vastuno vidhipratiSedhasvabhAvayoH pratyekaM drshnmvshyNbhaavi| tato vidhipratiSedhau AtmAnau vizeSasya savikalpakatvaM saadhytH| tataHsAmAnyavizeSAtmakaM 1. As a matter of fact, the characters 'being' and 'nonbeing' here spoken of are equivalent in an even more intimate sense. For if the former of these be represented as 'bcing x' the latter will be represented as 'not being not-x', and it is easy to see that being r' and 'not being not-x' are well-nigh equivalent even in the ordinary sense of the term.

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EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE 25 vastu svalakSaNam / astitvanAstitvayodharmI sAmAnyam / tatra tAdAtmyalakSaNaH sambandhaH, smbndhaantrklpnaayaamnvsthaaprsnggaat| tannaitatsAram - jAtyAdimatAm etatrasaMbhavatyeveti, tadabhAve evAsaMbhavAt / tathA sati naikAntena darzanavikalpAbhidhAnAnAM viSayabhedo'sti, kathaJcit pratibhAsabhede'pi pratyAsannetarapuruSadarzanavat / tathA hi - dhUmAdayaH kRtakatvAdayo vA kvacit agnisalilayorvinAzetarayorvA sAdhanetarasvabhAvAbhyAM sAkSAtkriyeran, itarathA vishessyprtiptteryogaat| anapekSAyAM tu virodhaH / tasmAt yat abhidheyaM tat vizeSyam, yat vA vizeSyaM tat abhilApyam, yat vA vastu tat sarvaM vidheyapratiSedhyAtmakam, ythotpttyaadiH| apekSayA heturahetuzca sAdhyetarayoH, tathA ca vimatyadhikaraNaM sttvaabhidheytvaadi|19|| ____Comment on verse 19. In this verse Samantabhadra employs another illustration with a view to demonstrating how an entity can be described as both being and nonbeing'; (it is immaterial whether he is said to be demonstrating how an entity is 'both being and nonbeing' or to be demonstrating how it is both being' and 'nonbeing'). Samantabhadra says that the same entity is being' in one respect and 'nonbeing' in another just as the same character might be a proper probans in relation to one probandum and not a proper probans in relation to another, an argument which d further convince the reader that the Jaina involves himself in no self-contradiction by describing an entity as 'both being and nonbeing'. Verse 20 zeSabhaGgAzca netavyA yathoktanayayogataH / na ca kazcid virodho'sti munIndra! tava zAsane // 20 // The remaining forms of assertion (out of the seven formulated earlier) are to be understood in the same manner as those described just before; O Lord of Sages ! there certainly is no self-contradiction in the doctrine taught by you. (20) syAdasti syAnAstIti bhaGgadvayamupayuktam / tadapekSayA zeSatvaM bhaGgatrayApekSaM vA / yathoktanayayogata iti vizeSaNatvAdInAkSipati / tadanabhilApyAdayo'pi kvacit dharmiNi pratyanIkasvabhAvAvinAbhAvinaH pratIyante, vizeSaNatvAdibhyaH / pUrvoktamudAharaNam / na caivaM sati kiJcit vipratiSiddham, anyathaiva virodhAt // 20 //

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26 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY Comment on verse 20 In this verse Samantabhadra expects the reader to formulate for himself the rest of the seven forms of assertion accepted in the Jaina tradition; (on one interpretation of the verse 19 Samantabhadra has explicitly formulated three of these forms, on another interpretation just two of them). He also makes bold proclamation that Jaina position on the question involves no self-contradiction. Verse 21 evaM vidhinissedhaabhyaamnvsthitmrthkRt| neti cenna yathA kArya bahirantarupAdhibhiH // 21 // Thus that entity is alone capable of performing a function which is neither exclusively possessed of the character being' nor exclusively possessed of the character 'nonbeing'; for otherwise it will be impossible for a well-known cause to produce the effect concerned depending on the appropriate intrinsic and extrinsic factors (alternatively, it will be impossible for a wellknown cause to produce the effect concerned which it in fact does qua the possesser of certain intrinsic and extrinsic features). (21) Note : Vasunandin reads yathakaryam for yatha karyan, but the reading will give no different meaning. saptabhaGgIvidhau syAdvAde vidhipratiSedhAbhyAM samArUDhaM vastu sadasadAtmakamarthakriyAkAri, kathaJcit sataeva sAmagrIsannipAtinaH svabhAvAtizayotpatteH suvarNasyevakeyUrAdisaMsthAnam / neti cedityAdinA ekAnte'rthakriyAM pratikSipati / na tAvat sataH punarutpattirasti / na cAnutpannasya sthitivipattI, khapuSpavat / nApyasataH sarvathotpattyAdayaH, tadvat / yadi punaH sAmAyAH prAgavidyamAnasya janma syAt ko doSaH syAt ? tasyA niranvayavinAze niSkAraNasya tathaivotpattirna syaat| na hi nirAdhArA utpattirvipattirvA, kriyArUpatvAt, sthitivat / naitat mantavyam 'notpattyAdiH kriyA, kSaNikasya tadasaMbhavAt, tato'siddho hetuH' iti, pratyakSAdivirodhAt / prAdurbhAvAdimataH cakSurAdibuddhau prtibhaasnaat| anyathA tadviziSTavikalpo'pi mA bhUt / na hi daNDapuruSasambandhAdarzane daNDIti vikalpaH syAt / tasmAt sUktam 'yadekAntena sadasadvA tannotpattumarhati, vyomavandhyAsutavat' iti| kathamidAnImanutpannasya gaganAdeH sthitiriti cet, na, anabhyupagamAt / dravyanayApekSayA paraprasiddhayA vA udAharaNam // 21 //

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EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE Comment on verse 21 In this verse Samantabhadra claims that the phenomenon of causation remains unexplained both on accepting the doctrine of absolute being and on accepting the doctrine of absolute nonbeing. Now the very fact that the reality of the phenomenon of causation was deliberately repudiated by the transcendentalists and by them alone should lead us to expect that neither the doctrine of absolute being nor the doctrine of absolute nonbeing is to be attributed to an empiricist school. Let us however wait till Samantabhadra explicitly charges an empiricist school with tending to repudiate the reality of the phenomenon of causation - and with consequent playing into the hands of the transcendentalists. Verse 22 dharme dharme'nya evArtho dhrminno'nntdhrmnnH| aGgitve'nyatamAntasya zeSAntAnAM tdnggtaa||22|| Thus the pointing out of each new attribute in an entity serves a new purpose; for when in an entity possessed of innumerable attributes one particular attribute is treated as primary the remaining ones become secondary. (22) Note : Vasunandin says that an alternative reading for dharme dharme'nya evarthah is bhange bhange'nya evarthah; on this new reading the translation should be: "Thus each new form of assertion serves a new purpose; for when etc." yadi punaH pratyupAdhi paramArthataH svabhAvabhedo na syAt tadA dRSTe'bhihite vA pramANAntaramuktyantaraM vA nirarthakaM syAt, gRhItagrahaNAt punaruktezca svabhAvAtizayAbhAvAt / sadutpattikRtakatvAdeH pratyanIkasvabhAvavizeSAbhAvAtyAvanti pararUpANi tAvantyaH tatastatovyAvRttayaH pratyekamityeSApi kalpanA mA bhUt / satAM hi svabhAvAnAM guNapradhAnabhAvaH syAt / tataH parikalpitavyAvRttyA dharmAntaravyavasthApanaM pariphalguprAyam, vastusvabhAvAbhAvaprasaGgAt / tathendriyabuddhayo'pisvalakSaNaviSayAmAbhUvan, kevalaMvyAvRttiM pazyeyuH, adRSTevikalpAyogAt atiprasaGgAt ca / / 22 / / Cornment on verse 22 In this verse Samantabhadra seems to be answering the charge of redundancy that might be levelled against the Jaina doctrine of 'seven

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY forms of assertion.' Now so far as the first three 'forms of assertion' are concerned the defence can be well made but the same is not true of the remaining four forms. For certainly it is one thing to be told that an entity is of such and such a description, another thing to be told that it is not of such and such a description, and a third thing to be told that it is of such and such a description and not of such and such other description. But the forms of assertion attributing 'indescribability' to the entity described seem to serve no vital purpose and are on the whole technical. 28 Verse 23 ekAnekavikalpAdAvuttaratrApi yojayet / prakriyAM bhaGginImenAM nayairnayavizAradaH || 23 || While following our subsequent treatment of the contrasted characters-e.g. the characters 'one' and 'many' - one well-versed in the doctrine of naya (i.e. the Jaina doctrine of conditional assertion) should himself apply the technique of multi-formed assertion by offering suitable arguments. (23) syAdekaM paddravyanayApekSayA / yadyapi te vizeSAH parasparavyAvRttapariNAmAH kAlAdibhede'pi sadrUpAviziSTAH, citrajJAnanIlAdinirbhAsavat / syAdanekatvamAskandanti / na hi saGkhyAsaGkhyAvatorbhedenAdRSTau vizeSaNavizeSyavikalpaH kuNDalivat kSIrodakavat atadvedini / na ca bhedaikAnte tadvattA asti, vyapadezanimittAbhAvAt anavasthAprasaGgAt ca / tasmAdayaM kathaJcideva saGkhyAsaGkhyAvatoH svabhAvabhedaM pazyati, tadviziSTavikalpanAt, kvacit nirNaye'piM anyatra saMzayAt varNarasAdivat iti // 23 // // ityAptamImAMsAbhASyarUpAyAm aSTazatyAM prathamaH paricchedaH // Comment on verse 23 In this verse Samantabhadra tells his reader that in the subsequent sections of his text he will show how different pairs of mutually contradictory characters are to be attributed to an entity but that he will not explicitly apply to his findings the doctrine of seven forms of assertion. This is a welcome revelation, for now the reader can expect Samantabhadra to concentrate his attention on points that are of really material importance. As for the task of explicitly applying to Samantabhadra's findings the doctrine of seven forms of assertion, it is rather mechanical and can be performed by an average reader for himself.

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SECTION II ONENESS AND SEPARATENESS 24-27 Verses advaitaikAntapakSe'pi dRSTo bhedo virudhyte| kArakANAM kriyAyAzca naikaM svasmAt prajAyate // 24 // If one maintains that things are possessed of the character absolute non-duality', then too one would be contradicting the observed distinction between an act and the various factors-of-action connected with this act (in their capacity as the doer, object, instrument etc. of this act); for certainly, a thing cannot be produced out of itself. (24) atha dvitIyaH paricchedaH sadAyekAnteSu doSodbhAvanamabhihitam / advaitaikAntAbhyupagamAt na tAvatA anekAntasiddhiriti cet, na, prtykssaadivirodhaat| na hi kasyacidabhyupagamamAtraM pramANasiddhaM kriyAkArakabhedaMpratiruNaddhi, kssnnikaabhyupgmvt|nsvto jAyate parato vaa| apitu jAyate eveti suSuptAyate, pratipattyupAyAbhAvAt / tasmAt yat dRSTaviruddhaM tat na samaJjasam, yathA nairAtmyam / viruddhayaye ca tathaiva advaitaM kriyAkArakabhedapratyakSAdibhiH // 24 // karmadvaitaM phaladvaitaM lokadvaitaM ca no bhavet / vidyA'vidyAdvayaM na syAd bandhamokSadvayaM tthaa||25|| (On maintaining the position in question) there will be no duality of the types of act in the form of good and cvil types), no duality of the types of fruit yielded by an act (in the form of happy and unhappy types), no duality of the planes of existence (in the form of this world and the world beyond), no duality of knowledge and ignorance, no duality of bondage and liberation (moksa). (25)

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30 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY pramANapratyanIkaM svamanISikAbhiradvaitamanyadvA kiJcit phalamuddizyAracayet, anyathA tatprati pravartanAyogAt prekSAvRtteH / tathAhi puNyapApasukhaduHkhehaparalokavidyetarabandhamokSavizeSarahitaM prekSApUrvakAribhiranAzrayaNIyam / yathA nairAtmyadarzanaM tathA ca prastutam / / 25 / / hetoradvaitasiddhizced dvaitaM syaaddhetusaadhyyoH| hetunA ced vinA siddhidvaitaM vAGmAvato na kim // 26 // If the doctrine of nondualism is established with the help of a probans there ought to be there the duality of probans and probandum; if the doctrine is established without the help of a probans why the (rival) doctrine of dualism should not be established through a mere movement of lips (alternatively, on the mere authority of scriptural texts) ? (26) yadasiddhaM tat na hitepsubhirahitajihAsubhirvA pratipattavyam / yathA zUnyataikAntaH tathA cAsiddhamadvaitam / atra nAsiddho hetuH / tatsiddhiryadi sAdhanAt, sAdhyasAdhanayostarhi dvaitaM syAt / anyathA advaitasiddhivat dvaitasiddhiH kathaM na syAt ? svAbhilApamAtrAdarthasiddhau sarvaM sarvasya siddhayet // 26 // advaitaM na vinA dvaitAdaheturiva hetunaa| saMjJinaH pratiSedho na pratiSedhyAd Rte kvacit // 27 // There can be no non-dualism without dualism being already there, just as there can be no pseudo-probans without a probans being already there; certainly, the denial of a word-denoted entity never makes sense except when the entity sought to be denied is a real something. (27) 'advaita'zabdaH svAbhidheyapratyanIkaparamArthApekSaH, napUrvAkhaNDapadatvAt, ahetvabhidhAnavat, itynumaanaat| nAtra kiJcit atiprasajyate, tAdRzo no vastupratiSedhanibandhanatvAt / sarvatra pratiSedhyAt Rte saMjJinaH pratiSedhAbhAva: pratyetavyaH / / 27 / / Comment on verses 24-27 These verses should be read together, for they constitute Samantabhadra's most exhaustive criticism against the transcendentalist; (the same criticism in a germ form was levelled in the verse 12 dealing with the doctrine of absolute nonbeing' while partly at least it was levelled

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ONENESS AND SEPARATENESS 31 also in verses 9-11 dealing with the doctrine of absolute being'). The crux of the doctrine of absolute nondualism lies in maintaining that some one trans-empirical reality - call it sunya, vijnana, brahman or whatever you like - is alone real while the diversity exhibited by the empirical world existing in space-time is but an illusory appearance. Against this doctrine Samantabhadra chiefly urges two difficulties, one (expressed in the verse 24) that on its acceptance the phenomenon of causation becomes an impossibility, the other (expressd in the verse 26) that on its acceptance the phenomenon of inferential cognition becomes an impossibility; in other words, Samantabhadra feels that the doctrine is incompatible with an empirical ontology and all logic whatsover. And certainly there can be no worse condemnation of a philosophical position. However, the criticism urged by Samantabhadra against the doctrine in question in the verse 25 is more rhetorical than material while the one urged in the verse 27 is even fallacious. To take the verse 25, the problem of virtue and sin, that of worldly bondage and liberation, that of this world and the world beyond are but so many cases of the problem of empirical causation, a problem basic to all treatment of empirical ontology; similarly, the problem of knowledge and ignorance is basic to all treatment of logic. To take the verse 27, it is difficult to follow Samantabhadra when he in effect argues : "Nondualism cannot be a reality unless dualism is, because 'dualism' is a word, just as pseudoprobans cannot be a reality unless probans is because 'probans' is a word)"; let us however wait till Samantabhadra develops an analogous argument at a later stage (to be precise, in verses 84-85). Verses 28-31 iSTamadvaitaikAntApavAraNam, pRthaktvaikAntAGgIkaraNAt, iti mA'vadIdharat / / pRthaktvaikAntapakSe'pi pRthaktvAdapRthak tu tau| pRthaktve na pRthaktvaM syAdanekastho hyasau guNaH // 28 // On the other hand, if one maintains that things are possessed of the character absolute separateness', then there arises the following difficulty. Two things (sought to be declared separate) ought to be non-separate from separateness itself (which will be an undesirable contingency for one who is out to repudiate all nonseparateness). Certainly, if separateness is separate from

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32 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY the things in question it should not be genuine separateness which is conceived as a quality residing in more than one object (and hence nonseparate from the objects acting as its seat). (28) Note : Vasunandin reads aprthakkstau for apsthak tu tau, but the reading will give no different meaning. pRthAbhUtapadArthebhyaH pRthktvsypRthgbhaavetessaampRthktvprsnggaat| tadguNaguNinoratAdAtmye ghaTapaTavat vyapadezo'pi mAbhUt, smbndhnibndhnaantraabhaavaat| pRthaktvamanyadvA pRthagbhUtamanaMzamanekastheSu niSparyAyaM vartate iti duravagAham // 28 // santAna: samudAyazca sAdharmyaM ca nirngkushH| pretyabhAvazca tat sarvaM na syAdekatvanihnave // 29 // If the reality of oneness (as characterizing many things) is repudiated one cannot legitimately speak of the phenomena - all genuine without a shadow of doubt - like series (of successive entities), aggregate (of simultaneous entities), similarity (between any two entities), re-birth. (29) kAryakAraNayoH pRthaktvaikAnte kAryakAlamAtmAnamanayata: kAraNatvAsaMbhavAt tadnutpatteH kutaH santatiH ? pUrvAparakAlabhAvinorapi hetuphalavyapadezabhAjoH atizayAtmanoH anvayaH santAnaH / kvacit kSaNAntare nIlalohitAdinirbhAsacitraikasaMvedanavat kathaJcit ekatvameva bhavitumarhati / tadavayavapRthaktvakalpanAyAM citranirbhAso mA bhUt, pRthagvarNAntaraviSayAnekasantAnaikakSaNavat / tatra pratyAsattivizeSa: kathaJcidaikyAt ko'paraH syAt ? anyathA vedyavedakAkArayorapi pRthaktvaikAntaprasaGgAt / svabhAvabhede'pi sahopalambhaniyamAt kathaJcidabhedAbhyupagame kathamekasantAnasaMvidAM samanantaropalambhaniyamAt kathaJcidaikyaM na syAt ? tatra yayA pratyAsatyA santAnaH samudAyazca tayaiva kathaJcidaikyamastu / na hi tAdRzAM sAdharmyam anyat anyatrAtmasAGkaryAt / ekajJAnanirbhAsavizeSANAM mithaH svabhAvabhede'pi yathaikatvapariNAmaH svabhAvato'naGkuzaH tathA pretyabhAvAdiSu santAno'nvayaH paramArthaMkatvamAtmasattvajIvAdivyapadezabhAjanaM svabhAvabhedAnAkramya svAmivadananyatra vrtyti||29|| sadAtmanA ca bhinnaM cejjJAnaM jJeyAd dvidhA'pyasat / jJAnAbhAve kathaM jJeyaM bahirantazca te dviSAm / / 30 / /

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33 ONENESS AND SEPARATENESS If cognition does not share with the thing cognized even the universal character 'being', both cognition and the thing cognized turn out to be something nonentitative. Certainly, in the absence of cognition how can our opponent speak of the thing cognized - whether external or internal ? (30) viSayiNo viSayAt kathaJcit svabhAvabhede'pi sadAdyAtmanA tAdAtmyaM bodhAkArasyeva viSayAkArAt, vizeSAbhAvAt / anyathA jJAnamavastu eva khapuSpavat / tadabhAve bahirantarvA jJeyameva na syAt, tadapekSatvAt // 30 // sAmAnyArthA giro'nyeSAM vizeSo naabhilpyte| sAmAnyAbhAvatasteSAM mRSaiva sakalA girH||31|| Certain other people are of the view that words denote universal characters without possessing the capacity to describe a real particular object (distinguished by its own specific characters); and since they (on the other hand) declare the universal characters to be something nonentitative they are forced to conclude that all verbal utterance whatsoever is a falsity. (31) vizeSANAmazakyasamayatvAt, asaMketitAnabhidhAnAt, vizeSadarzanavat tadbuddhau apratibhAsanAt, arthasannidhAnAnapekSaNAcca svalakSaNamanabhidheyam / sAmAnyamavastu ucyate iti vastu nocyate iti syAt / tataH kiM zabdoccAraNena saGketena vA ? 'go'zabdo'pi gAM nAbhidhatte yathA azva'zabdaH / tathA ca vastuno'nabhidhAne maunaM yatkiJcidvA vacanamAcaret, vizeSAbhAvAt / athAsti vizeSaH, kathaM svArthaM nAbhidadhIta ? na vai paramArthaMkatAnatvAt abhidhAnaniyamaH kintu upAdAnavizeSAt ityapi vArtam, avikalpe'pi tathaiva prasaGgAt / tadevamavadhAritAtmakaM vstusvlkssnnmaapniipdyet|naavshymindriyjnyaanmrthsnnidhaanmpeksste, viplavAbhAvaprasaGgAt / nApi vizadAtmakameva, dUre'pi tathA pratibhAsaprasaGgAt, yathA''rAt / kSaNabhaGgAdisAdhanavacanamanyadvA na kiJcit satyaM syAt, vaktrabhipretamAtrasUcitatvAt, prdhaaneshvraadisaadhnvaakyvt|sdrthaaprtipaadnaadvaankssnnbhnggaadisaadhnvcnN vipakSadUSaNavacanaM vA satyam, prsiddhaaliikvcnvt| dRzyavikalpyAkArayoH kathaJcidapyatAdAtmye svalakSaNaM sarvathAnavadhAritalakSaNaM dAnAdicetodharmAdikSaNavat kathaM saMzItimativarteta ?, vikalpAnAM cAvadhAsnuviSayatvAt / so'yamavikalpetararAzyoH arthetaraviSayatvamanyadvA svAMzamAtrA

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY valambinA vikalpAntareNa pratyetIti suparibodhaprajJo devAnAMpriyaH / svata eva vikalpasaMvidAM nirNaye svalakSaNaviSayo'pi vikalpaH syAt / paratazcet, anavasthAnAt apratipattiH / ato'rthavikalpo'pi mA bhUt ityandhakalpaM jagat syAt / na cAyaM prokssbuddhivaadmtishete| svayamanirNItena nAmAtmanA buddhirarthaM vyavasthApayatIti suvyavasthitaM tattvam / na vai svarUpaM pararUpaM vA buddhiradhyavasyati, nirviSayatvAt bhrAnteH / idamato bhrAntataram, bahirantazca sadbhAvAsiddheH / svaparasvabhAvapratipattizUnyena svaparapakSasAdhanadUSaNavyavasthA pratyetIti kimapi mahAdbhutam // 31 // Comment on verses 28-31 These verses containing Samantabhadra's criticism of the doctrine of absolute separateness are important because they are unmistakably directed against two prominent schools of Indian empiricism. To be more concrete, the verse 28 is directed against the Nyaya-Vaisesika empiricist, verses 29-31 against the Buddhist empiricist. Let us take them one by one. In Nyaya-Vaisesika ontology a quality and the substance in which it resides are two different entities while separateness is one among the 24 qualities here posited. Against this position Samantabhadra argues that since a quality cannot be absolutely different from the substance in which it resides and since separateness is regarded by the Nyaya-Vaisesika as a quality of two (mutually separate) substances separateness cannot be absolutely different from these two substances - the implication being that the Nyaya-Vaisesika is forced to give up the doctrine of absolute separateness when he attempts to account for the relationship obtaining between separateness on the one hand and the substances that are separate on the other. A simplified version of Samantabhadra's present criticism against the Nyaya-Vaisesika will be that a quality - be it separateness or any other - cannot be absolutely different from the substance of which it is the quality. And then an impartial reader should note that the very same fact which the Jaina recognizes by saying that a quality is not absolutely different from the substance of which it is the quality is recognized by the Nyaya-Vaisesika by saying that a quality resides by samavaya-relation in the substance of which it is the quality -- so that the difference between the two positions virtually amounts to choosing two different terminologies to express one and the same fact. The verse 29 summarily narrates Samantabhadra's four most telling criticisms against the Buddhist empiricist, the first three pertaining to ontology, the fourth to ethics. Thus he argues that the

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35 ONENESS AND SEPARATENESS Buddhist fails to account for (i) the fact of certain empirical phenomena exhibiting a serial order, (ii) the fact of certain empirical phenomena forming a composite whole, (iii) the fact of certain empirical phenomena exhibiting mutual similarity, and (iv) the fact of transmigration. An impartial reader will however find that each of these four facts is recognized by the Buddhist empiricist even if his explanation of it is couched in a terminology different from that resorted to by the Jaina. The following is how the Buddhist empiricist and the Jaina polemicized against each other. The Jaina says that certain empirical phenomena, even while mutually different, are also somehow mutually one - either qua the modes of the same substance or qua the component parts of the same composite whole or qua mutually similar. The Buddhist empiricist thinks that the Jaina is contradicting himself when he says that the empirical phenomena in question are mutually different as also mutually one; he, therefore, comes out with the suggestion that these phenomena, even while mutually different, are called one. The Jaina on his part thinks that by talking thus the Buddhist empiricist is repudiating the veracity of all verbal usage on man's part; he, therefore, argues against the latter's position in the manner of Samantabhadra. In passing let us note that the Jaina's or the Buddhist empiricist's position on the question of transmigration is but a corollary of his position on the general question of 'serial order' or 'substancehood.' In the verse 30 Samantabhadra draws an inconvenient conclusion from the Buddhist empiricist's alleged position on the question of similarity. Samantabhadra presumes that the Buddhist will deny all similarity between any two empirical phenomena; this means - so proceeds on Samantabhadra - that the latter will deny that a piece of knowledge and its object are similar insofar as both are real, and that in its turn will mean that in the latter's eyes knowledge is not a real phenomenon. But then Samantabhadra asks how one who repudiates the reality of all knowledge whatsover can vindicate the reality of anything whatsover - everything whatsover being a possible object of knowledge. It is difficult to see what Samantabhadra is driving at. In the verse 31 we find Samantabhadra spelling out his basic criticism against the Buddhist - viz. that the latter's understanding of the facts under consideration amounts to repudiating the veracity of all verbal usage on man's part. In the subscquent parts of his discussion Samantabhadra will further elaborate his criticism of the NyayaVaiscsika and Buddhist positions on the questions of ontology.

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36 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY Verse 32 virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyukti vAcyamiti yujyte||32|| The enemies of the logic of syadvada can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'absolute non-duality' and 'absolute separateness') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (32) astitvanAstitvaikatvAnekatvavat pRthaktvetaraparasparapratyanIkasvabhAvadvayasaMbhavo'pi mA bhUt, vipratiSedhAt / na khalu sarvAtmanA viruddhadharmAdhyAso'sti, tadanyonyavidhipratiSedhalakSaNatvAt, vandhyAsutavat / sarvathAnabhilApyatattvAdhigame'pi yadetadanabhilApyaM tattvamiti tat vyAhanyate, pUrvavat // 32 // Comment on verse 32 This verse literally repeats the verse 13 and serves in the present section the same purpose as the latter does in the first. verses 33-36 anapekSe pRthaktvaikye hyavastu dvyhetutH| tadevaikyaM pRthaktvaM ca svabhedaiH sAdhanaM ythaa||33|| Oneness and separateness as unrelated to each other are both something fictitious on account of the two sets of considerations (that have already been offered). As a matter of fact, one and the same phenomenon is characterized by both oneness and separateness just as one and the same probans is characterized by a number of essential features (enumerated by the logicians). (33) Note : The 'essential features of a probans' here meant are (i) presence in the locus-of-probandum, (ii) presence in homologues, and (iii) absence in a heterologue. . ekatvapRthaktve naikAntataH staH, pratyakSAdivirodhAt, iti spaSTayati / pRthaktvaikatve tathAbhUte na stAm, ekatvapRthaktvarahitatvAt, vyomakusumAdivat / sApekSatve hi tadevaikyaM

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ONENESS AND SEPARATENESS 37 pRthaktvamityaviruddham, sapakSavipakSayorbhAvAbhAvAbhyAm sAdhanavat, svabhedairvA saMvedanavat, svArambhakAvayavairvA ghttaadivt| tAdRzaM hisaadhnNsvaarthkriyaayaaH| tadantareNApi pAThAntaramidaM bahu saMgRhItaM bhavati // 33 // satsAmAnyAt tu sarvaikyaM pRthagdravyAdibhedataH / bhedAbhedavivakSAyAmasAdhAraNahetuvat // 34 // All the phenomena of the world are one with each other insofar as they all share the universal character "being' while they are separate from each other insofar as each of them has got its own root-substance etc. (i.e. its own root-substance, place, time, form); this is just as the speaker sometimes intends to emphasize the identity of an effect with its appropriate cause while sometimes he intends to emphasize their mutual difference (alternatively, this is just as the speaker sometimes intends to emphasize the oneness of a valid probans while sometimes he intends to emphasize its numerous essential features). (34) Note: Prthagdravyadibhedatah might also mean 'they are separate from each other insofar as they share the universal characters substancehood etc. (i.e. substance-hood, quality-hood etc.) kazcidAha - sarvArthAnAM samAnapariNAme'pi kathamaikyam ?, bhedAnAM svabhAvasAryAnupapatteH / yathaikabhedasya svabhAvavicchedAbhAvAt / anyathaikaM sadanyadasat syAt / tataH samaJjasaM sarvamekaM sadavizeSAditi / tasyaiva sato dravyAdibhedAt pRthaktvam, udAharaNaM pUrvavat // 34 // vivakSA cAvivakSA ca vishessye'nntdhrminni| sato vizeSaNasyAtra nAsatastaistadarthibhiH // 35 // It is only in the case of the existing qualifications - and not the nonexisting ones - of a qualificand-possessedof-innumerable-attributes that those who are so desirous (that is, who are desirous of emphasizing this qualification rather than that) intend to speak of this qualification and not to speak of that. (35) vidhipratiSedhadharmANAM satAmeva vivakSetarAbhyAM yogastadarthibhiH kriyeta, anyathA

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38 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY arthaniSpatterabhAvAt / upacAramAtraM tu syAt / na cAgnirmANavaka ityupacArAt pAkAdau upayujyate / tadekaikazaH parasparavyAvRttayo'pi pariNAmavizeSAH / / 35 / / pramANagocarau santau bhedAbhedau na sNvRtii| tAvekatrAviruddhau te gunnmukhyvivkssyaa||36|| Difference and non-difference that are taken cognizance of by the authentic sources of knowledge are verily real and no mere appearances. On your showing, they coexist in one and the same body without coming in conflict with each other while they become primary or secondary depending on the speaker's intention. pramANam avisaMvAdijJAnam, andhigtaarthaadhigmlkssnntvaat| tadevaMsatibhedamabhedaMvA nAnyonyarahitaM viSayIkaroti pramANam / na hi bahirantarvA svalakSaNaM sAmAnyalakSaNaM vA tathaivopalabhAmahe yathaikAntavAdibhirAmnAyate, sUkSmasthUlAkArANAM sthUlasUkSmasvabhAvavyatirekeNa pratyakSAdau aprtibhaasnaat| tatra svabhAvAntarasya prAdhAnyavivakSAyAmAkArAntarasya guNabhAvaH syAt, ghaTo'yaM paramANavo rUpAdayo veti // 36 // // iti AptamImAMsAbhASyarUpAyAm aSTazatyAM dvitIyaH pricchedH|| Comment on verses 33-36 In these verses Samantabhadra offers a positive formulation of the Jaina position on the question of identity and difference. His aim is to show (i) how certain phenomena constitute the different modes of the same substance, (ii) how certain phenomena constitute the different component parts of the same compsite whole, (iii) how certain mutually different phenomena are also mutually similar. And he feels that in none of these three cases is a proper demonstration possible unless the phenomena concerned are treated as somehow mutually different and somehow mutually identical; he further feels that in his explanation of each of these cases the transcendentalist is blind to the aspect of difference, the empiricist Buddhist to that of identity. However, it is very necessary for an impartial reader to distinguish between the nature of the Jaina's dissatisfaction with the transcendentalist and that of his dissatisfaction with the empiricist Buddhist. For the transcendentalist is interested in explaining away the facts under consideration while the empiricist Buddhist in offering in connection with them an alternative explanation to that acceptable to a Jaina - nay,

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ONENESS AND SEPARATENESS 39 in offering virtually the same explanation as is acceptable to a Jaina but one that is couched in a different terminology. Thus the world of empirical happenings is viewed by the Jaina in the form of numerous (physical and psychical) root-substances each of which assumes a new mode each moment, a mode which is more or less similar to the past and future modes of its own proper root-substance and to the past, present and future modes of the remaining root-substances; the same is viewed by the empiricist Buddhist in the form of numerous (physical and psychical) events (Skt. svalaksanas) each of which is replaced by a new event each moment, a new event which is more or less similar to the remaining events - past, present, future. The Jaina's worldpicture has to face the difficulties that arise from an insistence on speaking in the language of unchanging substances and their momentary modes, the empiricist Buddhist's world-picture has to face difficulties that arise from an insistence on speaking in the language of momentary events (without an unchanging substratum of any so But it will be misleading to suggest that they differ from each other as fundamentally as either of them does from the transcendentalist's world-picture. Let us however wait till Samantabhadra pointedly rai the problem of identity and change, that of the formation of a composite whole out of its component-parts, that of similarity.

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SECTION III PERMANENCE AND TRANSIENCE 37-40 Verses nityatvaikAntapakSe'pi vikriyA noppdyte| prAgeva kArakAbhAvaH kva pramANaM kva ttphlm||37|| If one maintains that the things are possessed of the character absolute permanence', then too one cannot account for the process of transformation. And when there is already an absence (i.e. an impossibility) of agentship, how can one thing be treated as an authentic source of knowledge and another thing the result yielded by this source ? (37) atha tRtIyaH paricchedaH sadasadekatvapRthaktvaikAntapratiSedhAnantaraM nityatvaikAntapratikSepaH / pUrvAparasvabhAvaparihArAvAptilakSaNAm arthakriyAM kauTasthye'pi bruvANaH kathamanunmattaH ?, kArakajJApakahetuvyApArAsaMbhavAt, pariNAmavivartadharmAvasthAvikArANAM svabhAvaparyAyatvAt / tadetad vinAzotpattinivAraNam abuddhipUrvakam, pratyakSAdivirodhAt, kSaNikaikAntavat // 37 // pramANakArakairvyaktaM vyaktaM cedindriyArthavat / te ca nitye vikArya kiM sAdhoste zAsanAd bahiH // 38 // It might be maintained that an authentic source of knowledge or an agent reveals the vyakta (lit. manifest - meaning the manifest phenomena allegedly the products of a root-substance called prakrti which is therefore alternatively designated avyakta or non-manifest) just as a sensc-organ does its object and that this source of knowledge and this agent are both something permanent. But what thing can be treated as capable of undergoing

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PERMANENCE AND TRANSIENCE a transformation on the showing of those who have not embraced the doctrine taught by you ? (38) Note : An authentic source of knowledge reveals an entity in the sense of bringing it to light, an agent reveals it in the sense of bringing it into existence. In a way, a sense-organ revealing its object is itself a case of an authentic source of knowledge revealing an entity. Yasovijaya is very emphatic that the reading pramanakarakair vyaktam should be replaced by pramanakarakavyaktam; the replacement ensures a verbal facility but does not affect meaning. atha matam - pramANakArakANi vyavasthitameva bhAvaM vyaJjayanti cakSurAdivat svArtham, tato na kiJcit vipratiSiddham / viSayavizeSavijJAnAdeH zAzvatatvAt na kiJcit vyaktyarthaM pshyaamH| kathaJcit apUrvotpattau tdekaantvirodhaat| tadabhAve vikaaryaanupptteH| navai kiJcit viruddham, kAryakAraNabhAvAbhyupagamAt, ityanAlocitasiddhAntam // 38 // yadi sat sarvathA kArya puNvnnotpttumrhti| pariNAmapraklRptizca nityatvaikAntabAdhinI // 39 // If an effect is something absolutely existent it cannot be a produced entity-just as purusa, i.e. soul (on the Sankhya philosopher's showing) is not. On the other hand, to posit the possibility of a thing undergoing transformation goes counter to the thesis that things are possessed of the character 'absolute permanence'. (39) na tAvat sataH kAryatvaM caitanyavat / nApyasataH, siddhAntavirodhAt, gaganakusumAdivat / nAparam ekAntaprakArAntaramasti, vivartAdeH pUrvottarasvabhAvapradhvaMsotpattilakSaNatvAt / tadetat trailokyaM vyakterapaiti nityatvapratiSedhAt, apetamapyasti vinAzapratiSedhAt, itianekAntoktiH andhasarpabilapravezanyAyamanusarati // 39|| puNyapApakriyA na syAt pretyabhAvaH phalaM kutH| bandhamokSau ca teSAM na yeSAM tvaM nAsi nAyakaH // 40 // Those who do not accept your (spiritual) leadership are incapable of accounting for the virtuous and sinful acts, for re-birth, for the fruits of the acts performed, for worldly bondage and liberation (moksa). (40)

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY __ naitat prekSApUrvakAribhirAzrayaNIyam, puNyapApapretyabhAvabandhamokSavikalparahitatvAt, nairAtmyAdivat / na caitat kvacit ekAnte saMbhavati // 40 // Comment on verses 37-40 These verses contain Samantabhadra's criticism of the doctrine of absolute permanence. The difficulty is that he has chosen Sankhya to be the representative rival system in this connection. For as a matter of fact, the Sankhya can be said to be an upholder of the doctrine of absolute permanence only insofar as his view of the psychical phenomena is concerned; as for the physical phenomena the Sankhya position is not much different from that of the Jaina himself, the only significant difference between the two being that the former views the world of physical phenomena as the series of modifications undergone by one permanent root-substance called prakti while the latter views it as the series of modifications undergone by numerous permanent root-substances called atoms. Samantabhadra seems to be aware of the anomaly of his present criticism, but he submits that the Sarkhya's attempt to do justice to the aspect of change (exhibited by the world of physical phenomena) is inconsistent with the latter's advocacy of absolute permanence. The submission is unfair to the Sankhya whose only fault seems to be his using a language that tends to suggest as if an effect lies hidden in its cause in a ready-made form. In any case, Samantabhadra's disagreement with the Sankhya should be treated as an inner-family disagreement between two empiricists. The verses 37-39 pertain to ontological and epistemological matters, the verse 40 to the ethical ones. Verses 41-54 kSaNikaikAntapakSe'pi pretyabhAvAdhasambhavaH / pratyabhijJAdyabhAvAna kAryArambhaH kutaH phalam // 41 // If one maintains that things are possessed of the character absolute momentariness', then too re-birth etc. remain an impossibility. Certainly, in the absence of the phenomena like recognition etc. how can there be the production of an effect and (consequently, how can there be the reaping of fruits of the acts performed ? (41) kSaNakSayaikAntadarzanam ahitam, asaMbhavatpretyabhAvAditvAt, ucchedaikAntavat dhrauvyaikAntAbhyupagamavat vaa| bhinnakAlakSaNAnAm asaMbhavadvAsanatvAt akAryakAraNavat /

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PERMANENCE AND TRANSIENCE na vinaSTaM kAraNam, asattvAt, ciratarAtItavat / samanantaratve'pi abhAvAvizeSAt / na ca pUrvasyottaraM kAryam, tadasatyeva hi bhAvAt, vastvantaravat atikrAntatamavat vA / na hi samarthe'smin sati svayamanutpitsoH pazcAt bhavataH tatkAryatvaM samanantaratvaM vA nityavat / kAraNAbhAvAvizeSe'pi kAryotpattisamayaniyamAvaklaptau kasyacit kauTasthye'pi tatkaraNasamarthasadbhAvAbhede'pi kAryajanmanaH kAlaniyamaH kiM na syAt ?, vizeSAbhAvAt / tathA ca AkasmikatvaM syAt / ubhayatrAvizeSeNa kathaJcidanupayoge'pi kvacit vyapadezakalpanAyAm anyatrApi kiM na bhavet ? kSaNasthitiH eko'pi bhAvaH anekasvabhAvaH, citrakAryatvAt, nAnArthavat / na hi kAraNazaktibhedamantareNa kAryanAnAtvaM yuktam, rUpAdijJAnavat / anyathA rUpAdernAnAtvaM na siddhayet, cakSurAdisAmagrIbhedAt tajjJAnani sabhedaH avakalpyeta / yugapadekArthopanibaddhadRSTInAmapi bhavitavyameva pratibhAsabhedena, kaarnnsaamgriibhedaat| anyathA darzanabhedo'pi mA bhUta, pratyAsannetarayorvezadyetaranirbhAsopalabdheH / seyamubhayataH pAzArajjuH / sakRt kAraNasvabhAvabhedamantareNa yadi kAryanAnAtvam, kramazo'pi kasyacit apekSitasahakAriNaH kAryasantatiH kiM na syAt ? sahakAriNaH taddhetusvabhAvamabhedayanto'pi kAryabhedahetavaH syuH kSaNakSayavat / na hi kAdAcitkAni tat tat kartuM samarthAnIti sthiro'rthaH tatkaraNasvabhAvaM jahAti, tadbuddhipUrvakatvAbhAvAt, kSaNikasAmagrIsanipatitaikakAraNAntaravat / kalpayitvApi svahetuprakRtiM bhAvAnAM svaprakRtiravazyamanveSyA, tatsvabhAvavazAt ttkaarnnprkRtivyvsthaapnaat| tadayamakAraNo'pi svabhAvaniyato'rthaH syaat| yat yat bhAvaM prati anapekSaM tat tadbhAvaniyatam / yathA vinAzaM prati anapekSaM vinazvaraM tathaiva sthitiM prati anapekSaM sthAsnu / taddhetorakiJcitkaratvAt tadvyariktAvyatiriktAkAraNAt ityAdi sarvaM smaanm|aadau sthitidarzanAt zabdavidyutpradIpAdeH ante'pi sthiteranumAnaM yuktm| anyathA ante kSayadarzanAt Adau tatpratipattiH asamaJjasaiva / tAdRzaH kAraNAdarzane'pi kathaJcidupAdAnAnumAnavat tatkAryasantAnasthitiH adRssttaa'pianumiiyet| tasmAtkathaJcana sthitimataH pratikSaNaM vivrto'pinaanythaa| prabhavAderayogAt kutaHpretyabhAvAdiH? satyapi hetuphalabhAve'kAraNakAryAntaravat santatirna syAt, atAdAtmyAvizeSAt / tatsvabhAvavizeSAvaklRptau tAdAtmye ko'paritoSaH ?, virodhasya sarvathA'pi aparihAryatvAt / tatsantAnApekSayA pretyabhAvAdimAmaMsta, jJAnajJeyayoH pratikSaNaM vilkssnntvaat|nvaiprtybhijnyaanaadiH puruSAntaravat antaravacca / tataH karmaphalasambandho'pi nAnAsantAnavat aniyamAt na yuktimavatarati / tat sUktam 'kSaNikapakSo buddhimadbhiranAdaraNIyaH, sarvathA arthakriyAvirodhAt, nityatvaikAntavat' / satyeva kAraNe yadi kArya, trailokyamekakSaNavarti syAt, tataH santAnAbhAvAt pakSAntarAsaMbhavAcca / iti sthitam / / 41 / /

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44 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY yadyasat sarvathA kAryaM tanmA jani khapuSpavat / mopAdAnaniyamo bhUnmAzvAsaH kAryajanmani // 42 // If an effect is absolutely non-existent, then it should rather never be produced just as sky-flower is never produced, then there should rather be no fixed rule that this material cause will bring about that effect, then there should rather be no confident feeling that this effect will be forthcoming out of that cause. (42) kathaJcit sataH kAryatvam, upAdAnasyottarIbhavanAt, sakRdapi viruddhadharmAdhyAsAnirAkRteH / tathA cAnvayavyatirekapratIteH bhAvasvabhAvanibandhanAyAH kiM phalamapalApena ? tadanyataranirAkRtau ubhayanirAkRtiH, abhedAt / tanna asat kAryam, sarvathAnutpAdaprasaGgAt, khpusspvt| na tAdRk kAraNavat, sarvathA'bhUtatvAt vandhyAsutavat, kathaJcidasthitAnutpannatvAt iti yojyam / satyapi prabhavalakSaNe pUrvapUrvasyottarIbhavanaM mRtpiNDasthAsakozakuzUlAdiSu sakalalokasAkSikaM siddham / svamanISikAbhiH sadRzAparAparotpattivipralambhAnavadhAraNAvaktRptim AracayatAM mA upAdAnaniyamo bhUt, kAraNAntaravat, tadanvayAbhAvAvizeSAt sarvathA vailkssnnyaat| niranvayasyApitAdRzIprakRtirAtmAnaM kAraNAntarebhyoyayAvizeSayatIti cet, na, atyantavizeSAnupalabdheH / tadavizeSAdazI sarvathA AndhyaM syAt / tasmAt iyamasya prakRtiryayA pUvottarasvabhAvahAnopAdAnAdhikaraNasthitiM pratikSaNaM bibharti yataH ayamupAdAnaniyamaH siddhaH / athApi kathaJcit upAdAnaniyamaH kalpyeta, kAryajanmani kathamAzvAsaH ? tadatyantAsataH kAryasyotpatteH tantubhyaH paTAdireva na ghaTAdiriti nirhetuko niyamaH syaat|puurvpuurvvishessaatuttrottrniymklpnaayaamanupaadaane'pisyaat| tathA'darzanam ahetuH, atraiva vicArAt / kathaJcidAhitavizeSatantUnAM paTasvabhAvapratilambhopalambhAt tadanyataravidhipratiSedhaniyamanimittAtyayAtpratIteralamapalApena / tasmAt upalabdhilakSaNaprAptAnupalabdhiH ananvayasyaiva, na punarubhayarUpasya / ityalaM prasaGgena // 42 // na hetuphlbhaavaadirnybhaavaadnnvyaat| santAnAntaravannaikaH santAnastadvataH pRthak // 43 // There can obtain no relationship of cause-effect etc. between two entities that are (utterly) separate from one another, their mutual separateness in its turn being due to the absence of a persistent element running through the two; this is just as there is (on the momentarist's own

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PERMANENCE AND TRANSIENCE 45 showing) no relationship of cause-effect etc. between two entities that belong to two different series. Moreover, there is in fact nothing like a 'series' apart from the members constituting this series. (43) vilakSaNAnAmatyantabhede'pisvabhAvataH kilAsaMkIrNAH santatayaH karmaphalasambandhAdinibandhanaM zazaviSANasyeva vartulatvamAracitaM kazcetanaH zraddadhIta ? ||43|| anyeSvananyazabdo'yaM saMvRtirna mRSA kthm| mukhyArthaH saMvRtirna syAd vinA mukhyAna saMvRtiH // 44 // It might be pleaded that 'series' is just a word which has been attributed in common to things that are in fact different and that therefore its employment is a case of mere usage. But why should a meaning yielded by mere usage be not a falsity ? Moreover, the chief meaning of a word cannot be dubbed as a meaning yielded by mere usage, while there can be no occasion for usage unless the word concerned has got a chief meaning. santAnibhyo'nanyaH santAnaH - anyathAAtmano nAmAntarakaraNAt-,nityAnityavikalpAnupapatteH / api tu saMvRtyA anyeSu ananyavyavahArAt ekatvamupacaritamiti / vyalIka vyavahAre'pi vizeSAnupapatteH sambandhaniyamAbhAvastadavasthaH / upacArastu na Rte mukhyAt, yathA 'agnirmANavakaH' iti / skhalati hi tatrAnanyapratyayaH, parIkSA'kSamatvAt / ata evAmukhyArthaH prastutAsAdhanam // 44 // catuSkoTervikalpasya srvaantessuuktyyogtH| tattvAnyatvamavAcyaM cet tayoH sntaantdvtoH||45|| avaktavyacatuSkoTivikalpo'pi na kathyatAm / asarvAntamavastu syAdavizeSyavizeSaNam // 46 // One might argue : "It is the case with any and every alleged characteristic of an entity that we are not entitled lo give verbal expression to any of the following four alternatives as to the relationship between this characteristic and this entity : (i) this characteristic belongs to this entity, (ii) this characteristic does not belong to this

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46 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY entity, (iii) this characteristic both belongs and does not belong to this entity, (iv) this characteristic neither belongs nor does not belong to this entity. Consequently, we can also not say about a series whether it is one with its members or different from them (or both or neither)". To this we reply : "In that case you can make assertion not even to the effect that we are not entitled to give verbal expression to the four alternatives in question. Moreover, an entity that is allegedly devoid of all characteristics whatsover is really a nonentity, for such an entity can act neither as a qualificand nor as a qualifier". (45-46) sattvaikatvAdiSu sarvadharmeSu sadasadubhayAnubhayacatuSkoTe: abhidhAtumazakyatvAt santAnatadvatorapibhedAbhedobhayAnubhayacatuSkoTe: anbhilaapytvm| sattve tadutpattivirodhAt, asattve punarucchedapakSopakSiptadoSAt, ubhaye cobhayadoSaprasaGgAt, anubhayapakSe'pi vikalpAnupapatteH, ityAdi yojyam // 45 // na hi sarvathA anabhilApyatve anabhilApyacatuSkoTeH abhidheyatvaM yuktam, kathaJcidabhilApyatvaprasaGgAt / api caivaM sati sarvavikalpAtItam avastu eva syAt, anyatra vAcoyukteH // 46 // dravyAdyantarabhAvena niSedhaH saMjJinaH stH| asadbhedo na bhAvastu sthAnaM vidhiniSedhayoH // 47 // It is only a really existing entity-denoted-by-a-word which - when proposed to be a possesser of the root- * substance etc. (i.e. root-substance, place, time, form) that are not its own root-substance etc. - can be subjected to a negative assertion. On the other hand, an alleged entity which is really but a nonentity can be subjected neither to a positive assertion nor to a negative one. (47) dravyakSetrakAlabhAvAntaraiH pratiSedhaH saMjJinaH sataH kriyate, napunarasataH, tadvidhipratiSedhAviSayatvAt / na caitat viruddham, svalakSaNamanirdezyamityAdivat / abhAvo'nabhilApya ityapi bhAvAbhidhAnAt ekAntavRttau eva doSaH, bhAvAbhidhAnairapi kathaJcidabhAvAbhidhAnAt // 47 //

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PERMANENCE AND TRANSIENCE avastvanabhilApyaM syAt sarvAntaH privrjitm| vastvevAvastutAM yAti prakriyAyA viparyayAt // 48 // What is devoid of all characteristics whatsover, let that be an indescribable nonentity (as posited by our rival). On the other hand, a real entity (as posited by us), too, can be treated as a nonentity when the procedure (of attributing characteristics to it) is reversed (i.e. when it is proposed that this entity possesses characteristics that are not in fact its own characteristics). (48) bhAvavyatirekavAcibhirapi vAkyatAmApanairbhAvAbhidhAnAt nAtra kiJcit viruddhm| ataH sUktam 'yadavastu tadanabhilApyaM yathA na kiJcit / yat punarabhilApyaM tat vastveva yathA khpusspaabhaavH|' anyasya kaivalyamitarasya vaikalyam, svabhAvaparabhAvAbhyAM bhAvAbhAvavyavasthiterbhAvasya // 48 // sarvAntAzcedavaktavyAsteSAM kiM vacanaM punH| saMvRtizcenmRSaivaiSA paramArthaviparyayAt // 49 // If all characteristics whatsover are indescribable why is it that our rival himself goes on to speak of certain characteristics (which according to him belong to reality)? If it is replied that this kind of talk is but a mere usage, it turns out to be but a falsity, for such a thing (i.e. what is a mere usage) is just the opposite of truth. (49) punarapi avaktavyavAdinaM paryanuyujmahe * sarve dharmA yadi vAggocarAtItAH, kathamime'bhilapyante ? iti / saMvRtyA iti cet, na, vikalpAnupapatteH / svarUpeNa cet, kathamanabhilApyAH ? pararUpeNa cet, tat teSAM svarUpaM syAt, kevalaM vAcaH skhalanaM gmyet| ubhayapakSe'pi ubhayadoSAnuSaGgaH / tattvena cet, kathamavaktavyAH ? mRSAtvenacet, kathamuktAH? tadalamapratiSThitamithyAvikalpaudhaiH // 49 // azakyatvAdavAcyaM kimabhAvAt kimbodhtH| AdyantoktidvayaM na syAt kiM vyAjenocyatAM sphuTam // 50 // We ask whether the reality is thus (being declared to be) indescribable because our rival is incapable of describing it, or because it does not exist, or because our

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY rival has no knowledge about it. Of these the first and third alternatives should not be acceptable to our rival. Why then does he resort to camouflage and not clearly state his position (viz. that the reality is indescribable because it does not exist) ? (50) arthasyAnabhilApyatvam abhAvAt vakturazakteH anavabodhAt vA ?, prakArAntarAsaMbhavAt / buddhikaraNapATavApekSatvAt / na ca sarvatra tadabhAvo yuktaH / tato nairAtmyAnna vizeSyeta, madhyamapakSAvalambanAt / azakyasamayatvAt anabhilApyam artharUpamiti cet, na, kathaJcit zakyasaGketatvAt, dRzyavikalpyasvabhAvatvAt paramArthasya pratibhAsabhede'pItyuktam / viSayaviSayiNobhinnakAlatvaM pratyakSe'pi samAnam / aviparItapratipattiranyAtrApi / darzanavikalpayoH paramArthaMkatAnatvAbhAve na kiJcit siddham, dRSTasya anirNayAt adRSTakalpatvAt, adRSTanirNayasya pradhAnAdivikalpAvizeSAt // 50 // hinastyanabhisandhAtR na hinastyabhisandhimat / badhyate tadvayApetaM cittaM baddhaM na mucyate // 51 // On our rival's position the mind that kills has not willed to kill, one that has willed to kill does not kill, one that suffers bondage has neither willed to kill nor killed, one that attains liberation (moksa) has not suffered bondage. (51) santAnAderayogAt, itikartavyatAsu cikIrSoH vinAzAt, karturacikIrSutvAt, tadubhayavinirmuktasya bandhAt, tadavinirmuktezcayamaniyamAderavidheyatvam, kurvatovAyatkiJcanakAritvam // 51 // ahetukatvAnnAzasya hiMsAheturna hiNskH| cittasantatinAzazca mokSo nASTAGgahetukaH // 52 // . Since it is our rival's position that destruction is causeless, he should be ready to concede that the killer is not the cause of killing and that the celebrated) eightfold path is not the cause of liberation (moksa) conceived (by our rival himself) in the form of a destruction of the series of mental states. (52) ahetuM vinAzamabhyupagamya kasyacit yadi hiMsakatvaM brUyAt kathamaviklavaH ?, tathA nirvANaM santAnasamUlatalaprahANalakSaNaM samyaktvasaMjJAsaMjJivAkkAyakarmAntarvyAyAmAjIvasmRtisamAdhilakSaNASTAGgahetukam, anyonyaM vipratiSedhAt // 52 //

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40 PERMANENCE AND TRANSIENCE virUpakAryArambhAya yadi hetusamAgamaH / AzrayibhyAmananyo'sAvavizeSAdayuktavat // 53 // It might be maintained that the activity of a cause is required in order to bring into existence a dissimilar effect (i.e. an effect dissimilar from the one that had occurred at the same place but at the immediately preceding moment). But then the relation of this cause should be the same to both the coming into existence of the effect in question and the going out of existence of the effect of the preceding moment, for the two processes (viz. the coming into existence of the effect in question and the going out of existence of the effect of the preceding moment) are not different from one another; this is just as the entities that are internally connected do not have different causes. (53) Note : By 'internally connected' entities are meant entities that cannot but go together; different schools of philosophy will illustrate them differently but in every case the concerned pair of entities should be jointly caused. visabhAgasantAnotpAdanAya hetusannidhirna pradhvaMsAya, pUrvasyasvarasato nivRtteH iti cet, sapunaruttarotpAdaHsvarasataH kiMnasyAt?, vinaashhetuvt|svrsotpnnmpitdnntrbhaavitvaat tenavyapadizyate iti cet, itaratra smaanm| paramArthataH tadahetukatvepratipattrabhiprAyAvizeSe'pi svataHprahANavAdI na zaknoti AtmAnaM nyAyamArgam anukArayitum / sarvadA virUpakAryatvAt . sabhAgavisabhAgAvaktRptiM pratipattrabhiprAyavazAt samanugacchan sahetukaM vinAzaM tataH kiM nAnujAnIyAt ? na ca samanantarakSaNayo zotpAdau pRthagbhUtau mithaH svAzrayato vA yau samaM sahetuketarau stAm, pratipattyabhidhAnabhede'pi grAhyagrAhakAkAravat, svabhAvapratibandhAt / saMjJAcchandamatismRtyAdivat satyapi bhede samakAlabhAvinoH kathaM sahakArI punaranyatarasyaiva heturaheturvA, kAryarUpAderiva kaarnnm| tasmAt kAryakAraNayorutpAdavinAzaunasahetukAhetukau, * sahabhAvAt, rasAdivat / na tasya kiJcit bhavati, na bhavatyeva kevalam' iti cet, 'bhavatyeva kevalam' iti samAnam / tasmAdayaM vinAzaheturbhAvamabhAvIkarotIti na punarakiJcitkaraH / kAryotpattiheturvA yadyabhAvaM na bhAvIkuryAt bhAvaM karotIti kRtasya karaNAyogAt akiJcitkaraH / tadatatkaraNAdivikalpasaMhatiH ubhayatra sadRzI // 53 / /

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50 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY skandhasantatayazcaiva saMvRtitvAdasaMskRtAH / sthityutpattivyayAsteSAM na syuH kharaviSANavat // 54 // Thus on our rival's position the series and the aggregates, being mere usages, trun out to be something nonentitative (strictly speaking, un-originated); of such alleged entities there can certainly be no continuation, origination and cessation, just as there can be no continuation etc. of the horns of a donkey. (54) rUpa-vedanA-vijJAna-saMjJA-saMskAraskandhasantatayaH asaMskRtAH, saMvRtitvAt / yat punaH saMskRtaM tat paramArthasat, yathA svalakSaNam / na tathA skandhasantatayaH / tataH sthityutpttivipttirhitaaH| tato visabhAgasantAnotpattaye vinAzaheturiti popluuyte||54|| Comment on verses 41-54 These verses contain Samantabhadra's important criticism of the doctrine of absolute momentarism attributed to the empiricist Buddhist. The criticism is divided into three parts, viz. (i) the verses 41-44 where basic difficulties have been urged against the empiricist Buddhist's understanding of the phenomenon of causation, (ii) the verses 45-50 where difficulties have been urged against the doctrine of absolute indescribability (which is in fact upheld by the transcendentalist but is here attributed to the empiricist Buddhist), and (iii) the verses 5154 where difficuties have been urged against the empiricist Buddhist's understanding of certain miscellaneous ontological and ethical phenomena. We take up these parts one by one. (i) Samantabhadra's criticism of the empiricist Buddhist's understanding of causal phenomena occurs in the verses 42-44; the verse 41 only contains an application of this criticism to the question of transmigration. Samantabhadra urges the following three difficulties against the Buddhist : (a) if an effect is utterly non-existent before its production, there can be no necessity why it should be produced out of one cause rather than any other; (b) if an effect is utterly different from its alleged cause there can be no necessity why it should be produced out of this cause rather than any other; (c) to say that an effect, even if utterly different from its cause, belongs to the same 'series' as this cause, does not save the situation inasmuch as the Buddhist concept of 'series' is logically untenable. An impartial reader can see that the first of these difficulties is almost verbal - just like the opposite difficulty earlier urged

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PERMANENCE AND TRANSIENCE 51 against the Sankhya; he can also see that the second difficulty loses force if the third is met. And a closer study reveals that the third difficulty can be met inasmuch as the Buddhist concept of 'series' serves the same purpose - and serves it as well - as the Jaina concept of 'root-substance'. In this connection it is necessary to pay serious attention to the empiricist Buddhist's notion of samvrti or usage; for when he calls a phenomenon samvrti he only means to emphasize that it is not to be cognized by bare senses but by senses assisted by thought. Samantabhadra, on the other hand, will like the empiricist Buddhist to equate samvrti with illusion, pure and simple, but he knows that the latter does not oblige him - at least does not do so straightway. Hence the complexity of the argument of the verse 44. There were no doubt Buddhists who equated sarvrti with illusion, but these were the advocates of transcendentalism, not empiricism. Hence the doctrine of absolute indescribability which Samantabhadra criticizes by way of continuing his criticism of the empiricist Buddhist's notion of samvrti is to be treated not as a doctrine preached by the empiricist Buddhist who attaches due worth to thoughtactivity but as one preached by the transcendentalist who would dub all thought-activity as an illusion-creating agency. (ii) The occasion for Samatabhadra's criticism of the doctrine of absolute indescribability is noteworthy. Samantabhadra finds that the empiricist Buddhist refuses to call a 'series' a real entity in the sense in which he calls the members of this series real entities but that he at the same time refuses to dismiss a 'series' as an illusory appearance. This reminds him of the teaching of certain Buddhists who maintain that reality is describable neither as existent nor as nonexistent nor as both nor as neither, and he goes on to criticize it under the impression that it is also the teaching of the empiricist Buddhist. The criticism is illuminating in its own way, for it clearly enables us to grasp the sense in which a real entity cannot be indescribable according to the Jaina - himself a believer in indescribability of some sort. Samantabhadra argues that since a real entity is describable both as existent and as non-existent and since the Buddhist characterises a real entity as indescribable on the ground that it is describable neither as existent nor as non-existent what the latter is characterizing as indescribable is not a real entity but a nonentity; (we are not here informed about the sense in which the Jaina himself characterizes a real entity as indescribable, but the argument should help us in appreciating the Jaina's characterization in question).

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52 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY (iii) The following are the difficulties urged by Samantabhadra against the empiricist Buddhist's understanding of certain miscellaneous ontological and ethical phenomena : (a) if an effect is utterly different from its cause the mind which performs a good or bad act must be utterly different from the mind which allegedly reads the fr of this act; this means that the empiricist Buddhist is forced to explain away the causation in question; (b) the empiricist Buddhist's thesis on destruction being uncaused is particularly vulnerable; (c) since the empiricist Buddhist reduces all empirical phenomena into certain series and certain aggregates and since all series and all aggregates are according to him mere samvrtis or usages he is bound to explain away all empirical phenomena. Now, in view of what has already been said in connection with the empiricist Buddhist's understanding of causal phenomenon in general it should be easy to see how the first and the third of these difficulties can be met. But something remains to be said about the empiricist Buddhist's thesis on destruction being uncaused. The thesis was a rather intriguing way of expressing the idea that each and every empirical phenomenon is momentary by nature, an idea essentially acceptable also to the Jaina who would however precisely formulate his position by saying that each and every mode-aspect of each and every empirical phenomenon is momentary. An essentially different position was adopted by the Nyaya-Vaisesika who was of the view that an empirical phenomenon need not be momentary either in its substance-aspect or in its mode-aspect. Samantabhadra's antiBuddhist arguments on the present question would better befit a NyayaVaisesika than a Jaina. verses 55 virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 55 // The enemies of the logic of syadvada can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'absolute permanence' and 'absolute momentariness') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossiblity on their part. (55)

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PERMANENCE AND TRANSIENCE 53 nityatvetaraikAntadvayamapi ayuktam aGgIkartum, virodhAt, yugapat jIvitamaraNavat / nityatvAnityatvAbhyAmata evAnabhilApyam iti ayuktam, tadekAnte anabhilApyokteH anupapatteH // 55 // Comment on verse 55 This verse literally repeats the verse 13 and serves in the present section the same purpose as the latter does in the first. Verses 56-60 nityaM tat pratyabhijJAnAnnAkasmAt tdvicchidaa| kSaNikaM kAlabhedAt te buddhysnycrdosstH||56|| A real is something permanent, because it is subject to recognition while the (indispensable) uninterruptedness of an object of recognition cannot be accidental; at the same time, a real is something momentary because it is different at different times. In the absence of these features (viz. permanence and momentariness) in a real there would arise the undesirable contingency of one state of cognition never being replaced by another one. This is your position. (56) Note: If there is no change, there cannot at all arise a new state of cognition; if there is no permanence, there cannot arise a new state of cognition of the form of recognition. ___ tadekAntadvaye'pi parAmarzapratyAyAnupapatteH anekAntaH / sthityabhAve hi pramAturanyena dRSTaM nAparaH pratyabhijJAtumarhati, sambandhavizeSe'pi pitreva dRSTaM putraH / sannapyatizayaH pRthaktvaM na nirAkaroti / tadeva anyatrApi pratyavamarzAbhAvanibandhanam / ekasantatyA pratyabhijJAnaM pratyabhijJAnabalAccaikasantatiriti vyaktamitaretarAzrayaNametat / na ca pakSAntare samAnam, sthiteranubhavanAt / tadvibhramakalpanAyAm utpAdavinAzayoranAzvAsaH, tathAnubhavanirNayAnupalabdheH yathA svalakSaNaM parigIyate / tatraitat syAt svabhAvAvinirbhAge'pi na saGkalanam, darzanakSaNAntaravat / satyam, ekAnte evAyaM doSaH / tataH kSaNikam, kAlabhedAt / darzanapratyabhijJAnasamayayorabhede tabhayAbhAvaprasaGgAt / kiJca pakSadvaye'pi jJAnAsaJcArAnuSaGgAt anekaantsiddhiH|apoddhaarklpnyaa kathaJcit jAtyantare'pivastuni pratyabhijJAnAdinibandhane sthityAdayo vyvsthaapyern| nacasvabhAvabhedopalambhe'pinAnAtvavirodhasaMkarAnavasthAnuSaGgaH, cetasi grAhyagrAhakAkAravat // 56 / /

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54 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY na sAmAnyAtmanodeti na vyeti vyaktamanvayAt / vyetyudeti vizeSAt te sahaikatrodayAdi sat // 57 // An entity neither originates nor ceases so far as its universal character is concerned, for the continuation of this universal character is an obvious fact; on the other hand, an entity originates as well as ceases so far as its particular characters are concerned. This is how on your position a real entity is characterized by the co-existence of origination etc. (.e. of origination, cessation, continuation). (57) Note: That is to say, 'universal character' is equivalent to the 'substance-aspect of an empirical phenomenon, 'particular character its 'mode-aspect'. However, it is more usual to speak of 'universal character' and 'particular character in the case of two (or more) independent empirical phenomena each of which has got its own 'substance-aspect' and its own 'mode-aspect'; in ordinary language these empirical phenomena are said to possess mutual similarity of some sort or other, a similarity that is technically assigned the title 'universal character' (or just 'universal'). calAcalAtmakaM vastu, kRtakAkRtakAtmakatvAt / na hi cetanasya anyasya vA sarvathotpattiH, sadAdisAmAnyasvabhAvena sata evAtizayAntaropalambhAt ghaTavat kathaJcit utpAdavigamAtmakatvAt ityAdi yojyam // 57 / / kAryotpAdaH kSayo hetorniyamAllakSaNAt pRthak / na tau jAtyAdyavasthAnAdanapekSAH khapuSpavat // 58 // The production of an effect is the same thing as the destruction of the cause of this effect, for the two (i.e. the production of an effect and the destruction of the cause of this effect) are invariably found to go togather even if they are mutually distinguishable through their respective definitions. And inasmuch as there is here a continuation of the concerned universal character etc. (i.e. of the concerned universal character, the concerned numerical identity, the concerned inherent capacity, and so forth) the two are not independent of each other, an

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PERMANENCE AND TRANSIENCE 55 independence that would have reduced them to the status of (a nonentity like) sky-flower. (58) kAryakAraNayorutpAdavinAzau kathaJcit bhinnau, bhinnalakSaNasambandhitvAt, sukhduHkhvt| syAdabhinnau, tadabhedasthitajAtisaGkhyAdyAtmakatvAt, puruSavat / utpAdavigamadhrauvyalakSaNaM syAdbhinnam, askhalanAnApratIteH, ruupaadivt| utpAdaH kevalo nAsti sthitivigamarahitatvAt viyatkusumavat / tathA sthitivinAzau pratipattavyau // 58 ghaTamaulisuvarNArthI naashotpaadsthitissvym| zokapramodamAdhyasthyaM jano yAti sahetukam // 59 // When there occur three phenomena - viz. that of destruction (of a jar), that of production (of potsherds), and that of continuation (of gold) - three persons, viz. one desirous of getting a jar, one desirous of getting potsherds, and one desirous of getting gold - respectively experience three feelings - viz. that of sorrow, that of joy, and that of neutrality; and such a behaviour on their part is well-established. (59) Note : That is to say, one and the same event has got an aspect of destruction, one of production, and one of continuation. pratItibhedam itthaM samarthayate - ghaTaM bhaktvA maulinirvartane ghaTamaulisuvarNArthI tannAzotpAdasthitiSu viSAdaharSodAsInyasthitimayaMjanaHpratipadyate iti, nirhetuktvetdnupptteH||59|| payovratona dadhyatti na payo'tti ddhivrtH| agorasavato nobhe tasmAt tattvaM tryaatmkm||60|| One who has taken a vow to feed himself on nothing save milk does not partake of curd, one who has taken a vow to feed himself on nothing save curd does not partake of milk, while one who has taken a vow not to partake of any dairy-product partakes of neither milk nor curd; hence it follows that a real entity is possessed of three characters (viz. origination, cessation and continuation). (60) Note : That is to say, the event called 'production of curd' can at the same time be called 'destruction of milk' or 'continuation of a dairyproduct', just as in the earlier example the event called 'production of

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56 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY potsherds' can at the same time be called 'destruction of jar' or 'continuation of gold'. lokottaradRSTAntenApi tatra pratItinAnAtvaM vinAzotpAdasthitisAdhanaM pratyAyayati / dadhipayo'gorasavratAnAM kSIradadhyubhayavarjanAt kSIrAtmanA nazyat dadhyAtmanA utpadyamAnaM gorasasvabhAvena tiSThatIti / tataH tattvaM trayAtmakam // 60 // // iti AptamImAMsAbhASyarUpAyAm aSTazatyAM tRtIyaH pricchedH|| Comment on verses 56-60 In these verses Samantabhadra defends the Jaina position according to which a real entity is somehow permanent and somehow momentary. He seems to base his defence on the fact that we often recognize a thing to be the same as that seen at an earlier occasion. The fact may suffice to prove that there are things that reveal both a changing and an unchanging aspect but it is difficult to see how it can prove that everything reveals both a momentary and a permanent aspect. Really speaking, the Jaina should substantially endorse the entire Buddhist case on momentarism - only formulating the same in the language of 'modes' and 'substances' rather than in that of 'events' and 'series'. In this connection we should particularly take note of the distinction the Jaina is logically bound to draw between a 'rc )t-substance and a 'composite substance'. For just as the empiricist Buddhist maintains that an apparently unitary and stationary object of our everyday experience is but a conglomeration of numerous momentary events' the Jaina will maintain that the same (to be called a 'composite substance') is but a conglomeration of numerous root-substances' each exhibiting a new mode every moment. Thus the difference between the empiricist Buddhist and the Jaina is not that the former is repudiating the findings of plain experience and the latter honouring them but that the former is explaining these findings with the help of one set of terminologies and the latter with the help of another set. In any case, we have to distinguish between the occasion when the Jaina is conducting his argument in terms of the absolutely permanent 'root-substances and their respective momentary modes and the occasion when he is doing so in terms of the relatively permanent 'composite-substances' and their relatively changing respective modes; the distinction is necessary in order to correctly assess the Jaina's theoretical analysis of the situation under consideration as also in order to compare and contrast it with the corresponding analysis undertaken by the empiricist Buddhist.

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SECTION IV DIFFERENCE AND IDENTITY 61-66 Verses kAryakAraNanAnAtvaM guNaguNyanyatA'pi ca / sAmAnyatadvadanyatvaM caikAntena ydiissyte||61|| If one maintains that an effect is absolutely distinct from its cause, a quality is absolutely distinct from the thing qualified by this quality, and a universal is absolutely distinct from the particular possessing this universal (one would be faced with the following difficulties). (61) atha caturtha: paricchedaH avayavaguNasAmAnyatadvatAM vyatirekaikAntam AzaGkya pratividhatte // 61 // ekasyAnekavRttirna bhAgAbhAvAd bahUni vaa| bhAgitvAd vA'sya naikatvaM doSo vRtteranArhate // 2 // An effect cannot reside in what are many, for it is possessed of no parts; alternatively, one would be forced to concede that this effect is itself of the form of a number of entities (which is an undesirable contingency). Or one might concede that this effect is possessed of parts, but then it will no more be a single entity (which again is an undesirable contingency). These are the difficulties that a certain non-Jaina position has to face on the question of the mode of an effect's residence in its cause. (62) Note : It should be useful to remember that 'effect' here stands for a composite body and 'cause' for the component-parts of this body.

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58 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY .. tatraekamanekanavartamAnaMpratyadhikaraNaMnatAvadekadezena, nissprdeshtvaat| nApisarvAtmanA, avyvyaadibhutvprsnggaat| athApi kathaJcit pradezavattvam, tatrApi vRttivikalpo'navasthA c| tadekameva na syAditi / nAyaM prasaGgo'nekAnte, kathaJcit tAdAtmyAt, vedyavedakAkArajJAnavat // 62 // dezakAlavizeSe'pi syAd vRttiryutsiddhvt| samAnadezatA na syaanmuurtkaarnnkaaryyoH||6|| On the rival's position it should be possible for an effect to occupy a place and a time that are different from those of its cause, just as two externally connected physical substances may occupy two different places and two different times. Nay, since an effect as well as its cause are corporeal entities it should never be possible for them to occupy one and the same place. (63) Note : In Nyaya-Vaisesika ontology an extermal connection - to be contradistinguished from samavaya which may be called an internal connection' - can obtain only between two independent substances and not (say) between a quality and the thing qualified by this quality or between a universal and the thing possessing this universal. But the relation conceived to obtain between a composite body and its component parts is also samavaya, a position against which Samantabhadra argues that since in Nyaya-Vaisesika ontology a composite body is one substance and its component parts another group of substances the relation between a composite body and its component parts ought to be not samavaya but 'external connection' which is the relation obtaining between two independent substances. tasmAt aGgAGgyAdeH atyantabhedAt taddezakAlavizeSeNApivRttiHprasajyeta, ghaTavRkSavat / varNAdibhiranaikAntikatvamiti ayuktam, tadvyatirekaikAntAnabhyupagamAt / avayavAvayavinoH samAnadeze vRttirna bhavet, mUrtimattvAt, kharakarabhavat // 63 / / AzrayAzrayibhAvAna svAtantryaM smvaayinaam| ityayuktaH sa sambandho na yuktaH samavAyibhiH // 64 // It might be pleaded that there obtains the relation of substratum-superstratum between two entities that are related through samavaya-relation and that therefore they

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DIFFERENCE AND IDENTITY cannot exist in independence from each other. To this we reply that it is not proper to posit a relation which is supposed to relate two entities by existing alongside them but which is itself not related to them (a description that fits the samavaya-relation posited by the rival in question). (64) kAryakAraNAdInAM parasparaM pratibandhAt kutaH svAtantryaM yato dezakAlAdibhedena vRttiriti cet, samavAyasya samavAyAntareNa vRttau anavasthAprasaGgAt svato vRttau dravyAdestathopapatteH / asambaddhaH samavAyaH kathaM dravyAdibhiH saha varteta yataH pRthaksaddhirna syAt ? // 64 // 59 sAmAnyaM samavAyazcApyekaikatra samAptitaH / antareNAzrayaM na syAnnAzotpAdiSu ko vidhiH / 65 // Since a particular universal as well as the samavayarelation exist in their entirety in some one entity (acting as their substratum) it follows that they ought to exist nowhere else inasmuch as an entity to act as their substratum can be available nowhere else; but then what happens (to the universal in question and to the samavaya-relation) when an old entity perishes or when a new entity comes into existence ? (65) pratyekaM parisamApteH AzrayAbhAve sAmAnyasamavAyayoH asaMbhavAt utpattivipattimatsu kathaM vRttiH ? ' utpitpradeze prAk nAsIt, nAnyato yAti, svayameva pazcAt bhavati, AzrayavinAze ca na nazyati, pratyekaM parisamAptaM ca' iti vyAhatametat // 65 // sarvathA'nabhisambandhaH sAmAnyasamavAyayoH / tAbhyAmartho na sambaddhastAni trINi khapuSpavat // 66 // On the rival's position there obtains absolutely no relation between a universal and the samavaya-relation, nor is the entity alleged to be the substratum of both related to either; thus all these three (viz. the universal in question, the samavaya-relation and the entity in question) turn out to be nonentities like sky-flower. (66) sAmAnyasamavAyayoH parasparataH sambandhAsambhavAt tAbhyAmartho'pi na sambaddhaH / tataH trINyapi nAtmAnaM bibhRyuH, kUrmaromAdivat // 66 //

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60 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY Comment on verses 61-66 In these verses Samantabhadra criticizes the doctrine upholding absolute distinctness between an effect and its cause, between a quality and the thing qualified by this quality, between a universal and the particular thing possessing this universal. The details of the criticism make it abundantly clear that the representative rival system in this connection is Nyaya-Vaisesika. Let us moreover note that Samantabhadra here does not discuss the general problem of cause-effect relationship but the particular problem of the relationship between a composite substance and its component parts, the former being, according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, an effect of the latter; (again, the problem of the relationship between a quality and the thing qualified has not at all been specifically raised in the present section - perhaps because it is going to be taken up in the next). Samantabhadra raises difficulties against the following three theses of the Nyaya-Vaisesika : (i) A composite substance is an entity quite different from the component parts that go to constitute (and thus cause) it while the relation obtaining between the two is a third entity called samavaya. (ii) A universal is an eternal entity residing in several particular entities while the relation obtaining between a universal and a corresponding particular entity is again samavaya. (iii) Samavaya is one and eternal. A closer study however reveals that the relation called samavaya serves in Nyaya-Vaisesika ontology essentially the same purpose as the relation called 'identity-cum-difference' does in its Jaina counterpart. Thus almost the same fact which the Jaina describes by saying that the relation between a substance and its modes is that of identity-cumdifference is described by the Nyaya-Vaisesika by saying that the qualities and the actions of a substance reside in it by samavayarelation; similarly, almost the same fact which the Jaina describes by saying that the relation between a composite substance and its component parts is that of identity-cum-difference is described by the Nyaya-Vaisesika by saying that a composite substance resides in its component parts by samavaya-relation; lastly, almost the same fact which the Jaina describes by saying that two similar things are somehow (i.e. qualitatively) identical and somehow (i.e. numerically) different is described by the Nyaya-Vaiscsika by saying that two similar things

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DIFFERENCE AND IDENTITY 61 are the seats of a common universal that resides in both by samavayarelation. Even then, to the extent that the Nyaya-Vaisesika tends to talk as if qualities, actions, universals and samavaya-relation are substancelike entities (while universal and samavaya-relation not only substancelike but also eternal) Samantabhadra's criticism seems to be in place. verses 67-69 ananyataikAnte'NUnAM saGghAte'pi vibhaagvt| asaMhatatvaM syAdbhUtacatuSkaM bhrAntireva saa||67|| If one maintains that an effect is absolutely nondistinct from atoms (that are to act as its cause), then there arises the difficulty that these atoms should remain as much unrelated after their mutual conjunction (that is to give rise to the effect in question) as they were in the early state of mutual disjuction; moreover, in that case the four basic elements (viz. earth, water, fire, air) will turn out to be but illusory appearances. (67) Note: That is to say, since on the rival's showing earth etc. ought to be of the form of atoms and since they are not visible in the form of atoms, the rival should conclude that the visible form of earth etc. is an illusory appearance. ___kAryakAraNAderabhedaikAnte dhAraNAkarSaNAdayaH paramANUnAM saGghAte'pi mA bhUvana, vibhAgavat / nAhito'pi vizeSo teSAM vibhAgaikAntaM nirAkaroti / tata evAnyatrApi tat nessyte| pRthivyAdibhUtacatuSTayasthitirevaM vibhramamAtraM prApnoti / iSTatvAt adoSa iti cet, na, pratyakSAdivirodhAt / / 67 // kAryabhrAnteraNubhrAnti: kAryaliGgaM hi kaarnnm| ubhayAbhAvatastatsthaM guNajAtItaracca n||68|| And when their effects (viz. the basic elements earth, water, fire, air) thus turn out to be illusory appearances, these atoms themselves follow suit, for the nature of cause is inferred from that of its effect. Again, in the absence of all cause and all effect there also do not exist qualities, universals etc. supposedly residing in a cause or an effect. (68)

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY cakSurAdibuddhau sthUlaikAkAraH pratibhAsamAnaH paramANubhedaikAntavAdaMpratihanti tadviparItAnupalabdhirvA / tatraitat syAt bhrAntaikatvAdipratipattiriti cet, na, pAramANUnAM cakSurAdibuddhau svabhAvamanarpayatAM kaarylinggaabhaavaatttsvbhaavaabhyupgmaanupptteH| tadvayAbhAvAt tavRttayo jAtiguNakriyAdayo na syuH, vyomakusumasaurabhavat // 68 // ekatve'nyatarAbhAvaH zeSAbhAvo'vinAbhuvaH / dvitvasaGkhyAvirodhazca saMvRtizcenmRSaiva sA // 69 // If an effect and its cause are declared to be one, then either of them must be non-existent; but then the other partner too must be non-existent inasmuch as the two invariably go together. Moreover, in that case (i.e. if an effect and its cause are declared to be one) the twoness of an effect and its cause will remain unaccounted for; and if it is said that this twoness is a mere usage, it turns out to be but a falsity. (69) Note : Astasahasri (particularly as elucidated by Yasovijaya) understands the first half of this verse in a slightly different fashion; on its understanding the translation will be : "When two things (e.g. an effect and its cause) that are invariably found to go together are declared to be one, then either of them must be non-existent - which in its turn will mean that the other partner too is non-existent." __AzrayAzrayiNorekatve tdnytraabhaavH| tataHzeSAbhAvaH, tatsvabhAvAvinAbhAvitvAt, vandhyAsutarUpasaMsthAnavat / tathA ca sati dvitvasaGkhyApi na syAt / tatra saMvRtikalpanA zUnyatvaM nAtivartate, paramArthaviparyayAt, vyalIkavacanArthavat // 69 // Comment on verses 67-69 In these verses Samantabhadra criticizes a position according to which nothing new whatsoever happens to atoms when they go to constitute a composite substance; this he calls the doctrine of absolute non-distinction contrasted to the Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine of absolute distinctness. It is difficult to see who is the upholder of the positi in question. Both the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Jaina posit eternal atoms, but they differ in that the former considers a composite substance to be absolutely distinct from the atoms which go to constitute it while the latter considers it to be identical with yet distinct from these atoms; however, no school of Indian philosophy posits eternal atoms while

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DIFFERENCE AND IDENTITY 63 maintaining that a composite substance is absolutely identical with the atoms which go to constitute it. From the tenor of Samantabhadra's criticism we can plausibly surmise that his target is the empiricist Buddhist; but then let us also be clear that the position here attributed to the latter is not his real position. The empiricist Buddhist no doubt maintains that a composite substance is nothing over and above the atoms that go to constitute it, but since by 'atom' he understands a momentary event his position is virtually the same as that of the Jaina who maintains that a composite substance comes into existence as a result of its constituent atoms undergoing a new (momentary) modification. Verse 70 virodhAnobhayaikAtmyaM syaadvaadnyaayvidvissaam| avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate / / 79 / / The enemies of the logic of syadvada can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'absolute distinctness' and 'absolute non-distinctness') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (70) avayavetarAdInAM vyatirekAvyatirekaikAntau na vai yaugapadyena saMbhavinau, virodhaat| tathA anabhilApyataikAnte svavacanavirodhaH, tadabhilApyatvAt / syAdvAdAbhyupagame tu na doSaH, kathaJcit tathAbhAvopalabdheH // 70 // Comment on verse 70 This verse literally repeats the verse 13 and serves in the persent section the same purpose as the latter does in the first. Verses 71-72 dravyaparyAyayoraikyaM tyorvytirektH| pariNAmavizeSAcca zaktimacchaktibhAvataH // 71 // saMjJAsaGkhyAvizeSAcca svlkssnnvishesstH| prayojanAdibhedAcca tannAnAtvaM na sarvathA // 72 //

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64 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY A substance and its mode are one with each other insofar as they are invariably found to go together, insofar as a substance is found to undergo transformation that is peculiar to itself, insofar as a substance is a possessor of such capacities as it is found to exercise. On the other hand, they are also different from each other insofar as they have got different designations, different numerical properties, different definitions, different utilities, and so on and so forth; however, they are not different from each other in an absolute fashion. (71-72) Note : The translation follows Vasunandin. According to the Astasahasri, the only reason why a substance and its mode are one with each other is that they are invariably found to go together, all the rest are, according to it, the reasons why they are different from each other. Moreover, the Astasahasri takes the phrase 'parinamavisesat' to mean 'insofar as a substance is characterized one way, its mode another way'. yat pratibhAsabhede'pi avyatiriktaM tat ekam, yathA vedyavedakajJAnaM rUpAdidravyaM vA mecakajJAnaM vA / tathA ca dravyaparyAyau na vyatiricyate, tadanyatarApAye arthasyAnupapatteH / upayogavizeSAt rUpAdijJAnanirbhAsabhedaH svaviSayaikatvaM na vai nirAkaroti, sAmagrIbhede yugapadekArthopanibaddhavizadetarajJAnavat / tadevaM sati virodhAdhupAlambhaH caturasradhiyAM mano manAgapi na prINayati, varNAderapyabhAvaprasaGgAt / ekatvAnekatvaikAntau nAnyonyaM vijayete, bhaavsvbhaavprtibndhaat| yat parasparaviviktasvabhAvapariNAmasaMjJAsaGkhyAprayojanAdikaM tat bhinnalakSaNam, yathArUpAdi, tathA cdrvypryaayau| viruddhadharmAdhyAsAskhalaguddhipratibhAsabhedAbhyAM vastusvabhAvabhedasiddheH / anyathA'nAnaikaM jagat syAt, tadabhyupagame prakArAntarAsambhavAt // 71-72 // // ityAptamImAMsAbhASyarUpAyAm aSTazatyAM caturthaH pricchedH|| Comment on verses 71-72 In these verses Samantabhadra puts forward the Jaina position on the question of (i) the relation between a cause and its effect, (ii) the relation between a thing and its quality, (iii) the relation between a thing's universal features and its particular features. The point to be noted is that one and the same concept - viz. the concept of substancemode relationship - is here made the basis of the explanation of all the three relations in question. Thus (i) in the case of the relation between

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DIFFERENCE AND IDENTITY 65 a cause and its effect the suggestion has been made that the substanceaspect of an empirical phenomenon also represents the aspect of 'cause' while its mode-aspect also the aspect of 'effect', (ii) in the case of the relation between a thing and its quality the suggestion has been made that the substance-aspect of an empirical phenomenon also represents the aspect of thing' while its mode-aspect also the aspect of quality', and (iii) in the case of the relation between a thing's universal features and its particular features the suggestion has been made that the substance-aspect of an empirical phenomenon also represents the aspect of 'a thing's universal features' while its mode-aspect also the aspect of 'a thing's particular features'. This possession of a universal mode of ontological explanation is a particularly strong point of the Jaina, just as the possession of a somewhat different but equally universal mode of ontological explanation is a particularly strong point of the empiricist Buddhist; (the lack of such a universal mode of ontological explanation is one great weakness of the otherwise powerful NyayaVaisesika system while the possession of it serves no worthwhile purpose in the case of the transcendentalist systems). However, that only means that 'substance' and 'mode' are but two precisely defined concepts in terms of which the Jaina offers his ontological explanations and not hat there can be no other such concepts in terms of which one might choose to offer one's ontological explanations.

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SECTION V DEPENDENCE AND INDEPENDENCE Verse 73 tataH kArikAdvayena (71-72) sAmAnyavizeSAtmAnamarthaM saMhRtya tatrApekSAnapekSaikAntapratikSepAya Aha - yadyApekSikasiddhiH syAnna dvayaM vyavatiSThate / anApekSikasiddhau ca na saamaanyvishesstaa||73|| If an entity and its attribute are absolutely dependent on each other, then neither of them succeeds in retaining its identity; on the other hand, if they are absolutely independent of each other, then the fact of there being universal as well as particular characters remains unaccounted for. (73) Note : That is to say, the universal character of an empirical phenomenon represents its 'substance-aspect' and its particular character its 'mode-aspect', and hence to maintain that a substance and its mode are absolutely independent of each other is to maintain that the universal character of an empirical phenomenon is absolutely independent of its particular character; but as a matter of fact, the universality of a universal character and the particularity of a corresponding particular character are mutually determined - so that on the second rival's understanding a universal character will be no real universal character and a particular character no real particular character. atha paJcamaH paricchedaH dharmadharmiNoH ApekSikI siddhiH, pratyakSabuddhau tadanavabhAsanAt, dUretarAdivat / tayoranyonyApekSaikAnte svabhAvataH pratiSThitasya ekatarasyApi abhAve anyatarAbhAvAt ubhayaM na prakalpyeta / dUrAsannabhAvayorapi svabhAvavivartavizeSAbhAve samAnadezAderapi prasaGgAt / tadimau svabhAvataH stAm, anyathA itaretarAzrayadoSAnuSaGgAt / anapekSApakSe'pi nAnvayavyatirekau syAtAm, bhedAbhedayoH anyonyApekSAtmakatvAt vizeSatarabhAvasya / / 73 / /

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DEPENDENCE AND INDEPENDENCE Comment on verse 73 In this verse Samantabhadra comes out against two doctrines which he considers to be extremist. They are (i) the doctrine that an entity and an attribute of it are absolutely dependent on each other, and (ii) the doctrine that an entity and an attribute of it are absolutely independent of each other. Really speaking, Samantabhadra here has in mind the empiricist Buddhist and the Nyaya-Vaisesika, the former insofar as he maintains that to distinguish in an empirical phenomenon an entity and an attribute of it is a mere usuage, the latter insofar as he maintains that to distinguish in an empirical phenomenon an entity and an attribute of it is to distinguish two independent realities. An impartial reader will however feel that in this connection the empiricist Buddhist, the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Jaina are maintaining a virtually identical position even if each uses a set of terminologies that is peculiar to himself. In any case, in view of Samantabhadra's earlier polemics against the empiricist Buddhist and the Nyaya-Vaisesika it should not be much difficult to follow his present arguments urged against the same opponents. Verse 74 virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 74 // The enemies of the logic of syadvada can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'absolute dependence' and 'absolute independence') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (74) 67 anantarekAntayoH yugapat vivakSA mA bhUt, vipratiSedhAt, sadasadekAntavat / tathA'nabhidheyatvaikAnte'pi / iti kRtaM vistareNa // 74|| Comment on verse 74 This verse literally repeats the verse 13 and serves in the present section the same purpose as the latter does in the first.

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68 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY Verse 75 dharmadharmyavinAbhAvaH siddhayatyanyonyavIkSayA / na svarUpaM svato hyetat kArakajJApakAGgavat / / 75 / / The fact that an entity and its attribute require each other just proves that the two invariably go togather, but it does not prove that the nature of each of them is exhausted by the fact that it requires the other. For certainly each of them has got a nature of its own. All this should be understood on the analogy of the factors operative in production-situation, or of those operative in knowledge-situation (which factors doubtless require one another but each of which is possessed of an independent nature of its own). (75) na kevalaM sAmAnyavizeSayoH svalakSaNam apekSitaparasparAvinAbhAvalakSaNaM svataH - siddhalakSaNam, api tu dharmadharmiNorapi, kartRkarmabodhyabodhakavat // 75 // / / ityAptamImAMsAbhASyarUpAyAm aSTazatyAM paJcamaH paricchedaH // Comment on verse 75 In this verse Samantabhadra explicitly formulates the Jaina position on the question of entity-attribute relationship. He rightly submits that the concepts 'entity' and 'attribute' (better known as 'substance' and 'mode') are correlate, for in his system of ontology both of them and they alone - are required to explain the nature of an empirical phenomenon. But his implied suggestion that the concepts chosen in this connection by the empiricist Buddhist and the NyayaVaisesika are hopelessly inadequate seems unjustified.

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SECTION VI REASON AND SCRIPTURE Verses 76-78 siddhaM ceddhetutaH sarvaM na pratyakSAdito gatiH / siddhaM cedAgamAt sarvaM viruddhArthamatAnyapi // 76 // If one maintains that every proposition has to be established with the help of a probans (i.e. with the help of inference), then knowledge gained through perception etc. becomes an impossibility; if one maintains that every proposition has to be established on the basis of scriptural authority, then even such theses as are mutually contradictory will stand established. atha SaSThaH paricchedaH upeyatattvaM vyavasthApya upAyatattvaM vyvsthaapyte| yuktyA yat na ghaTAmupaiti tat ahaM dRSTvApi na zraddadhe ityAdeH ekAntasya bahulaM darzanAt pratyakSatadAbhAsayorapi vyavasthitiH anumAnAt, anyathA saGkaravyatikaropapatteH / kathaJcit sAkSAtkaraNamantareNa na kvacit anumAnam, kiM punaH zAstropadezAH ? na caite yuktinirapekSAH, parasparaviruddhArthatattvasiddhiprasaGgAt / na hi pratyakSAnumAnAbhyAmantareNa upadezaM jyotirjJAnAdipratipattiH // 76 / / virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 77 // The enemies of the logic of syadvada can also not maintain that the two (viz. "absolute authoritativeness of inference' and 'absolute authoritativeness of the scripture") characterize one and the same phenomenon, for that will be a self-contradictory position. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescrib

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70 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY able, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. yuktItaraikAntadvayAbhyupagamo'pi mA bhUt, viruddhayorekatra sarvathA asaMbhavAt / tadavAcyatve'pi pUrvavat / / 77 // vaktaryanApte yaddhetoH sAdhyaM tddhetusaadhitm| Apte vaktari tadvAkyAt sAdhyamAgamasAdhitam // 78 // When the speaker happens to be not an authority on the subject matter concerned what he establishes with the help of a probans should be called 'something established with the help of a probans'; when the speaker happens to be an authority on the subject matter concerned what he establishes on the basis of his mere utterance should be called 'something established on the basis of scriptural authority.' (78) yo yatra avisaMvAdakaH sa tatra aaptH| tato'paraH anaaptH| tattvapratipAdanam avisaMvAdaH, tdrthjnyaanaat| tenAtIndriye jaimini: anyovA zrutimAtrAvalambInaivaAptaH, tadarthAparijJAnAt, tathAgatavat / na hi tAdRzo'tIndriyArthajJAnamasti, doSAvaraNakSayAtizayAbhAvAt / zruteH paramArthavittvam, tataH zruteravisaMvAdanam, iti anyonyasaMzritam / svataH zrutena vai prAmANyam, acetanatvAt, ghaTavat / sannikarSAdibhiH anaikAntikatvam ayuktam, tatprAmANyAnabhyupagamAt / athApi kathaJcit tatpramANatvaM syAt, avisaMvAdakatvAt / zruteH ayuktameva, tadabhAvAt / tenopacAramAtramapi na syAt, tadarthabuddhiprAmANyAsiddheH / AptavacanaM tu pramANavyapadezabhAk, tatkAraNakAryatvAt / tadatIndriyArthadarzanotpatteH tadarthajJAnotpAdanAcca / naitat zruteH saMbhavati, sarvathA AptAnukteH, piTakatrayavat / vaktRdoSAt tAdRzo'prAmANyam, tadabhAvAt zruteH prAmANyamiti cet, kuto'yaM vibhAgaH siddhayet ? abhyupagamAnabhyupagamAbhyAM kvacit pauruSeyatvamanyadvA vyavasthApayatIti suvyavasthitaM tattvam / etena kartRsmaraNAbhAvAdayaH pratyuktAH, vedetarayoravizeSAt / itaratra buddho vakteti cet, tatra kamalodbhavAdiriti kathaM na samAnam ? sudUramapi gatvA tadaGgIkaraNetaramAtre vyavatiSTheta / vedAdhyayanavaditarasyApi sarvadAdhyayanapUrvAdhyayanatvapraklRptau na vaktraM vakrIbhavati, tadatizayAntarANAM ca zakyakriyatvAt itaratrApi, mantrazakterapi darzanAt / siddhe'pi tadanAditve pauruSeyatvAbhAve vA katham avisaMvAdakatvaM pratyetavyam ?, mlecchavyavahArAdeH tAdRzo bahulamupalambhAt / kAraNadoSanivRtteH kAryadoSAbhAvakalpanAyAM pauruSeyasyaiva vacanasya doSanivRttiH, kartuH

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REASON AND SCRIPTURE vItadoSasyApi saMbhavAt / tadadhyetRvyAkhyAtRzrotRRNAM rAgAdimattvAt netarasyeti niHzaGkaM naH cetaH / vaktRguNApekSaM vacanasyAvisaMvAdakatvaM cakSurjJAnavat, taddoSAnuvidhAnAt / tataH anAptavacanAt na arthajJAnam, andharUpadarzanavat / tatra yadeva yuktiyuktaM tadeva pratipattuM pratipAdayituM vA zakyam, 'agnirhimasya bheSajam' ityAdivat, nAgnihotrAdivAkyasAdhanam / siddhe punaH Aptavacanatve yathA hetuvAdaH tathA AjJAvAdaH api prmaannm| nanu cApauruSeyatvavat AptazAsanamapi azakyavyavastham / uktamatra sarvathaikAntavAdAnAM syAdvAdapratihatatvAditi / tatra AptiH sAkSAtkaraNAdiguNaH saMpradAyAvicchedo vA, anyathA andhaparamparayA apratipatteH // 78 // // ityAptamImAMsAbhASyarUpAyAm aSTazatyAM SaSThaH paricchedaH samAptaH / / 71 Comment on verses 76-78 In these verses Samantabhadra comments on a controversy arisen in the field of Logic. His argument is simple, but precisely because of its simplicity it makes one point clearer than was possible uptil now. Here we can see how the Jaina, when he comes across two mutually opposite solutions of a problem neither of which is wholly to his liking, does not rest content with a lethargic declaration to the effect that both the solutions are somehow satisfactory and somehow not but endeavours to define the precise limit within which either is satisfactory.

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SECTION VII PAN-INTERNALISM AND PAN-EXTERNALISM . Verses 79-80 antaraGgArthataikAnte buddhivAkyaM mRssaa'khilm| pramANAbhAsamevAtastat pramANAdRte katham // 79 // If it is maintained that the internal entities are alone real (i.e. that all cognition is a mere manipulation of one's subjective states), then all cognitions and all propositions will turn out to be a falsity and hence a piece of pseudoauthentic knowledge. But how can there be pseudoauthentic knowledge without there being authentic knowledge ? (79) atha saptamaH paricchedaH tajjanmakAryaprabhavAdi vedyavedakalakSaNam anaikAntikam Adarya saMvittireva khaNDazaH pratibhAsamAnA vyavahArAya kalpyate iti abhiniveze'pi pramANaM mRgyam / kSaNikatvam ananyavedyatvaM nAnAsantAnatvamiti svataH tAvat na siddhayati, bhraanteH| tathA AtmasaMvedane'pi vyavasAyavaikalye pramANAntarApekSayA anupalambhakalpatvAt / na hi tathA buddhayaH saMvidante yathA vyAvarNyante / nApi parataH, sambandhapratipatterayogAt / svAMzamAtrAvalambinA mithyAvikalpena prakRtatattvavyavasthApane bahirartheSvapi avirodhAt / kathaJcit atra vedyalakSaNaM yadi vyavatiSTheta prakRtaM kRtaM syAt, nAnyathA / na cAnuktadoSa lkssnnmsti| tatsaMbhave nAnyatra tdsNbhvo'bhidheyH| tatsvaparapakSayoH siddhayasiddhayarthaM kiJcit kathaJcit kutazcit avitathajJAnamAdaraNIyam, anyA'zeSavibhramAsiddheH / etena yat grAhyagrAhakAkAraM tat sarvaM vibhrAntam, yathA svapnendrajAlAdijJAnam, tathA ca pratyakSAdikamiti prativihitaM veditavyam // 79 // sAdhyasAdhanavijJapteryadi vijnyptimaatrtaa| na sAdhyaM na ca hetuzca pratijJAhetudoSataH // 8 //

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PAN-INTERNALISM AND PAN-EXTERNALISM 73 If it is on the basis of the cognition of a thesis and a probans that the rival seeks to prove that cognition is alone real, then his thesis will not be a genuine thesis nor his probans a genuine probans; for the former will then be vitiated by the typical defects of a thesis, the latter by those of a probans. (80) 'sahopalambhaniyamAt abhedo nIlataddhiyoH dvicandradarzanavat' iti atra arthasaMvidoH sahadarzanamupetya ekatvaikAntaM sAdhayan kathamavadheyAbhilApa: ? svAbhilApAbhAvaM vA svavAcA pradarzayan kathaM svasthaH ? pRthak anupalambhAt bhedAbhAvamAnaM sAdhayet / taccAsiddham, sambandhAsiddherabhAvayoH, kharazRGgavat / etenAsahAnupalambhAt abhedasAdhanaM pratyuktam, bhAvAbhAvayoH sambandhAsiddheH, tAdAtmyatadutpattyoH arthasvabhAvaniyamAt / siddhe'pi pratiSedhaikAnte vijJaptimAtraM na siddhayet, tadasAdhanAt / tatsiddhau tadAzrayaM dUSaNamanuSajyeta / tadekopambhaniyamo'pi asiddhaH, sAdhyasAdhanayoravizeSAt / tathA ekajJAnagrAhyatvaM dravyaparyAyaparamANubhiH anaikAntikam / ananyavedyatvam asiddham / ekakSaNavartisaMvittInAM sAkalyena sahopalambhaniyamAt vyabhicArI hetuH, tathotpattareva saMvedanatvAt / dRSTAnto'pi sAdhyasAdhanavikalaH, tathopalambhAbhedayorarthe pratiniyamAt bhrAntau tadasaMbhavAt / nanu cAsahAnupalambhamAtrAt abhedamAtrama / kathaJcit arthasvabhAvAnavabodhaprasaGgAt / sarvavijJAnasvalakSaNakSaNakSayaviviktasantativibhramasvabhAvAnumiteH sAkalyenaikatvaprasaGgAt / ekArthasaMgatadRSTayaH paracittavido vA nAvazyaM tadbuddhiM tadarthaM vA saMvidantIti hetoH asiddhiH / sahopalambhaniyamazca syAt bhedazca syAt / kiM vipratiSidhyeta ?, svhetuprtiniymsNbhvaat| tasmAt ayaM mithyAdRSTiH parapratyAyanAya zAstraM vidadhAnaH paramArthataH saMvidAno vA vacanaM tattvajJAnaM ca pratiruNaddhIti na kiJcit etat, asAdhanAGgavacanAt adoSodbhAvanAcca nigrahArhatvAt / / 80 // Comment on verses 79-80 In these verses Samantabhadra criticizes the epistemological doctrine according to which all cognition is a mere subjective happening, that is, a happening to which there correspondes nothing in the world of objective realities. Samantabhadra rightly argues that since a piece of authentic knowledge is that knowledge which is true of its objcct and since the doctrinc in question posits no objective reality, it is deprived of all title to talk of authentic or non-authentic knowledge - nay, of all title to prove or disprove anything, his own theses not excluded. The doctrine can be attributed to all schools of

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74 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY transcendentalism, but Samantabhadra here specially seems to have in mind thc Vijnanavada school of Buddhism which was notorious for its pan-subjectivism. Verse 81 bahiraGgArthataikAnte pramANAbhAsanihnavAt / sarveSAM kAryasiddhiH syAd viruddhaarthaabhidhaayinaam||81|| If it is maintained that the external entities are alone real (i.e. that all cognition is the reflection of an objective state of affairs), then since there should no more arise a piece of pseudo-authentic knowledge the successful execution of an operation should be possible on the part of even such persons as uphold mutually contradictory positions (which possibility is an undesirable contingency). (81) yat kiJcit cetaH tat sarvaM sAkSAt paramparayA vA bahirarthapratibaddham, yathA agnipratyakSetaravedanam / svapnadarzanamapi cetaH, tathA viSayAkAranirbhAsAt / sAdhyadRSTAntau pUrvavat iti / atrApi lokasamayapratibaddhAnAM parasparaviruddhazabdabuddhInAM svArthasambandhaH paramArthataH HA11C811 Comment on verse 81 In this verse Samantabhadra criticizes the epistemological doctrine according to which all cognition is true of some objective reality. In all probability Samantabhadra here has in mind the Prabhakarite Mimamsaka who would diligently seek to prove that even the clearest cases of illusory cognition are somehow the cases of valid cognition. Samantabhadra's point is that if this doctrine is accepted everybody will be free to prove whatever he fancies. Verse 82 virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyukti vAcyamiti yujyate // 82 // The enemies of the logic of syadvada can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'pan-subjectivism' and 'panobjectivism') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely

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PAN-INTERNALISM AND PAN-EXTERNALISM 75 indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (82) antarbahirjeyaikAntayoH sahAbhyupagamoviruddhaH / tadavAcyatAyAm uktivirodhaH puurvvt||82 Comment on verse 82 This verse literally repeats the verse 13 and serves in the present section the same purpose as the latter does in the first. Verses 83-87 bhAvaprameyApekSAyAM pramANAbhAsanihnavaH / bahiSprameyApekSAyAM pramANaM tannibhaM ca te // 8 // If it is maintained that all knowables are of a subjective character, then there results the repudiation of all possibility of pseudo-authentic knowledge. But on your position, which grants the reality of the knowables of an objective character, both authentic knowledge and pseudo-authentic knowledge remain a possibility. (83) Note : Here bahisprameya means 'knowable of an objective character (be it external or internal)' and not knowable of an external character'. As contrasted to bahisprameya is bhavaprameya meaning 'knowable of a subjective character'. sarvasaMvitteH svasaMvedanasya kathaJcit pramANatvopapatteH tadapekSAyAM sarvaM pratyakSam, na kazcit pramANAbhAsaH / tathA anabhyupagame'nyata eva buddheranumAnaM syAt / tatrArthajJAnam aliGgam, tadavizeSeNAsiddheH / vizeSe vA tadanyatareNArthaparisamApteH kiM dvitIyena ? yat cedamarthajJAnaM tat cet arthasvalakSaNam, syAt vyabhicArAt ahetuH / etena indriyAdipratyakSaM pratyuktam / tataH pratyakSetarabuddhayavabhAsasya svasaMvedanAt pratyakSaviruddham / sukhaduHkhAdibuddherapratyakSatve harSaviSAdAdayo'pi na syuH, AtmAntaravat / etena pratikSaNaM niraMzaM saMvedanaM pratyakSaM pratyuktam, yathApratijJamanubhavAbhAvAt, yathAnubhavamanabhyupagamAt, sarvatra sarvadA bhrAnteH apratyakSatvAvizeSAt, kathaJcit bhrAntau ekAntahAneH, vikalpasvasaMvedane'pi vikalpAnativRtteH / tasmAt svasaMvedanApekSayA na kiJcit jJAnaM sarvathA pramANam / bahirarthApekSayA tupramANatadAbhAsavyavasthA, tatsaMvAdakavisaMvAdakatvAt, kvacit svarUpe kezamazakAdijJAnavat // 83 // jIvazabdaH sabAhyArthaH saMjJAtvAddhetuzabdavat / mAyAdibhrAntisaMjJAzca mAyAdyaiH svaiH pramoktivat // 84 //

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76 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY The word 'soul', inasmuch as it is a designation, must have a corresponding object just as the word 'probans' has a corresponding object. Even the words like 'deception' etc., which designate illusory cognition, have got respective corresponding objects in the form of deception etc. just as the words designating authentic knowledge have got a corresponding object (in the form of authentic knowledge). (84) svarUpavyatiriktena zarIrendriyAdikalApena 'jIva'zabdaH arthavAn / ato na kRtaH prakRtaH syAditi viklavollApamAtram, lokarUDheH samAzrayaNAt / yatrAyaM vyavahAraH 'jIvo gatastiSThati' iti vA / nAtra saMjJA abhipretamAtraM sUcayati, tato'rthakriyAyAM niyamAyogAt, karaNapratipattInAM tadabhAve anAdaraNIyatvAt, sAdhanatadAbhAsayoH anyathA vishessaasNbhvaat| paramparayA'pi paramArthaMkatAnatvaM vAcaH pratipattavyam / kvacit vyabhicAradarzanAt anAzvAse cakSurAdibuddherapi, tadAbhAsopalabdheH / kutodhUmAdeH agnyAdipratipattiH?, kAryakAraNabhAvasya vyabhicAradarzanAt, kASThAdijanmanaH agneriva maNiprabhRterapi bhAvAt / tadvizeSaparIkSAyAm itaratrApi, vizeSAbhAvAt / abhisandhivaicitryAt abhidhAnavyabhicAropalambhe taditarAdhyakSAnumAnakAraNasAmagrIzaktivaicitryaM pazyatAM kathamAzvAsaH syAt ? tasmAt ayam akSaliGgasaMjJAdoSAvizeSe'pi kvacit parituSyat anyatamapradveSeNa IzvarAyate, parIkSAklezalezAsahanAt / bhAvopAdAnasaMbhave hi samAkhyAnAmitaropAdAnapraklRptiH / bhAvazcAtra harSaviSAdAdyanekAkAravivartaH, pratyAtmavedanIyaH, pratizarIraM bhedAtmakaH, apratyAkhyAnArhaH pratikSipantam AtmAnaMpratibodhayati, itikRtNpryaasen| na himAyAdisamAkhyAHsvArtharahitAH, viziSTapratipattihetutvAt, pramANasamAkhyAvat / / 84 / / buddhizabdArthasaMjJAstAstisro buddhyaadivaacikaaH| tulyA buddhayAdibodhAzca trayastatpratibimbakAH / / 85 // The designations are of three kinds - viz. those designating a piece of cognition, those designating a word, those designating an object - and they are respectively denotative of a piece of cognition etc. (i.e. of a piece of cognition, a word, an object). And the three kinds of knowledge (yielded by a designation) pertaining to a picce of cognition etc. (i.e. to a picce of cognition, a word, an object) equally reflect the respective corresponding objects (i.e. the corresponding picce of cognition, the corresponding word, the corresponding object). (85)

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PAN-INTERNALISM AND PAN-EXTERNALISM 77 hetuvyabhicArAzaGkAM pratyastamayati, tisRNAmapi svavyatiriktavastusambandhadarzanAt tadbuddhInAM ca tanni sanAt tadviSayatopapatteH / / 85 // vaktRzrotRpramAtRRNAM bodhavAkyapramAH pRthak / bhrAntAveva pramAbhrAntau bAhyArthI tAdRzetarau // 86 // The three operations - viz. the speaker having a piece of cognition (that is sought to be given verbal expression), the hearer having the auditory perception of the sentence, the expert on the problems of authentic knowledge seeking to gain a piece of authentic knowledge - are different from each other. However, if it is maintained that all (alleged) authentic knowledge (insofar as it is the knowledge of a corresponding object) is but illusory, then all corresponding object of a piece of cognition turns out to be illusory - irrespective of whether it is in fact illusory or otherwise. (86) Note: Vasunandin reads vakyabodhaprama for bodhavakyaprama. On this reading the translation would be "The three operations -- viz. the speaker uttering a sentence, the hearer having cognition (i.e. auditory perception) of a sentence, the expert on the problems of authentic knowledge etc." bahirarthAbhAvAt vaktrAditrayaM na buddheH pRthagbhUtam / tato'siddhatAdidoSaH sAdhanasyeti, tanna, rUpAdeAhakasya tadvyatiriktavijJAnasantAnakalApasyacasvAMzamAtrAvalambinaH pramANasya vibhramakalpanAyAMsAkalyenAsiddheH antrjeyaabhyupgmvirodhaat| tau higrAhakApekSayA bAhyArthoM bhrAntau eva / kutastatra heyopAdeyavivekaH ? // 86 / / buddhizabdapramANatvaM bAhyArthe sati naasti| satyAnRtavyavasthaivaM yujyate'rthAptyanAptiSu // 87 // A piece of cognition or a verbal utterance can possibly claim to be a case of authentic knowledge if there exist objects corrsponding to the pieces of cognition and the verbal utterances - not if there exist no such objects. For then it becomes possible to speak of the truth or falsity (of the pieces of cognition and the verbal utterances) by applying the criterion of the attainability or otherwise of the concerned corresponding objects. (87)

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78 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY svaparapratipattyarthaM sAdhanaM buddhizabdAtmakam, svasaMvittyaiva prprtipaadnaayogaat| tasya ca sati bahirarthe pramANatvam arthaprAptitaH siddhayet, asati pramANAbhAsatvam arthAnAptitaH, iti / tadevaM paramArthataH san bahirarthaH, sAdhanadUSaNaprayogAt / anyathA svapnetarAvizeSAt kiM kena sAdhitaM dUSitaM ca ? iti kutaH santAnAntaram anyat vA / taimirikadvayadvicandradarzanavat bhrAntaH sarvo vyavahAra iti atrApi tattvajJAnaM zaraNam, anyathA bahirarthavat abhisaMhitasyApi nirAkaraNApatteH / tathA paramANvAdidUSaNe'pi pratipattavyam, anyathA tatkRtam akRtaM syAditi sarvatra yojyam / tadime vijJAnasantAnAH santi na santi iti tattvApratipatteH dRSTApahnutiH anibandhanaiva, dRzyena AtmanA kathaJcit adRzyAnAmapi paramANUnAM bahirapi samavasthAne vipratiSedhAbhAvAt antarjeyavat / tatra pUrvAdidigbhAgabhedena SaDaMzAdikalpanayA vRttivikalpena vA parapakSopAlambhe svapakSAkSepAt, kathaJcit virodhaparihArasya punaH AyAsatAmapi ashkteH| tat sAkSAt paramparayA vA vimatyadhikaraNabhAvApannaM jJAnam, svarUpavyatiriktArthAlambanam, grAhyagrAhakAkAratvAt, santAnAntarasiddhivat / na hi vyApAravyAhAranirbhAso'pi vipluto naasti| tadanyatrApi vAsanAbhedo gamyeta, na santAnAntaram / / 87 / / // ityAptamImAMsAbhASyarUpAyAm aSTazatyAM saptamaH pricchedH|| Comment on verses 83-87 In these verses Samantabhadra works out his own positive position on the question of subjectivity or otherwise of cognition. The steps taken by him in the verses 83, 86 and 87 are clear and make sense, for here he in effect lays down both the definition of valid cognition and the criterion for testing the validity of a piece of cognition - neither of which is possible on accepting either of the two doctrines earlier criticized. Thus following Samantabhadra's lead we can say that valid cognition is that cognition which is true of its object and that the validity of a piece of cognition can be tested by seeing whether it enables us to undertake successful practice in relation to what happens to be its object. But it is difficult to follow what Samantabhadra says in the verses 84 and 85. Here he seems to be arguing that each and every word has got a corresponding object in the world of reality, his illustration being the word 'soul' (as also the words 'illusion', 'knowledge' etc.); but if that be Samantabhadra's argument it is fallacious as it stands. For what a word must have is an intelligible definition and not a real object satisfying this definition. As a matter of fact, to say that each and every word has got a corresponding object in the world of reality is almost to commit the same mistake as the Prabhakarite does when he says that all cognition is valid cognition.

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SECTION VIII FATE AND PERSEVERANCE Verses 88-91 daivAdevArthasiddhizced daivaM pauruSataH kthm| daivatazcedanirmokSaH pauruSaM niSphalaM bhvet||8|| If it is maintained that all attainment of desirable objects is due to fate, then the question arises how it somehow happens that perseverance creates (i.e. decisively influences) fate. And if it is replied that fate is always a creation of fate it follows that a man should never attain liberation (moksa) and that all his endeavour should always prove futile. (88) atha aSTamaH paricchedaH yogyatA pUrvakarma vA daivam, ubhayamadRSTam / pauruSaM punaH ihaceSTitam dRSTam / tAbhyAm arthasiddhiH, tadanyatarApAye'ghaTanAt / pauruSamAtre'rthAdarzanAt, daivamAtre vA samIhAnarthakyaprasaGgAt // 88 / pauruSAdeva siddhizcet pauruSaM daivataH kthm| pauruSAccedamoghaM syAt sarvaprANiSu pauruSam // 89 // If it is maintained that all attainment of objects is due to perseverance, then the question arises how it sometimes happens that fate creates perseverance. And if it is replied that perseverance is always a creation of perseverance it follows that the endeavour of all people should always prove a success. (89) taddhi pauruSaM vinA daivasaMpadA na syAt / taduktam - tAdRzI jAyate buddhirvyavasAyazca taadRshH| sahAyAstAdRzAH santi yAdRzI bhavitavyatA / / iti tat sarvaM pauruSApAditamiti cet, tadvyabhicAradarzino na vai zraddadhIran / / 89 / /

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syaadvaadnyaayvidvissaam| avAcyataikAnte'pyukti vAcyamiti yujyate // 10 // The enemies of the logic of syadvada can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'omnipotence of fate' and 'omnipotence of perseverance') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position will be selfcontradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (90) daivetarayoH sahaikAntAbhyupagame vyAghAtAt, avAcyatAyAM ca svavacanavirodhAt syAdvAdanItiH // 10 // abuddhipUrvApekSAyAmiSTAniSTaM svadaivataH / buddhipUrvavyapekSAyAmiSTAniSTaM svapauruSAt // 11 // The happy and unhappy circumstances available to one that involve no premeditation on one's part are said to be dut to one's fate, the happy and unhappy circumstances available to one that involve a premeditation on one's part are said to be due to one's perseverance. (91) tata: atarkitopasthitamanukUlaM pratikUlaM vA daivakRtam, tadviparItaM hi pauruSApAditam, apekSAkRtatvAt tdvyvsthaayaaH||91|| // ityAptamImAMsAbhASyarUpAyAm aSTazatyAM aSTamaH pricchedH|| Comment on verses 88-91 In these verses Samantabhadra comments on a controversy arisen in the field of ethical studies. The problem under discussion is well known and Samantabhadra's argument fairly simple. We have only to remember that India's theological systems - and Jainism was one of them - used to equate a soul's fate with the stock of karmas accumulated by this soul in beginningless series of births and rebirths; (the supposition was that each good and bad act performed by a soul remains stuck to it in the form of karma so long as - and only so long as - its fruit has not been reaped by the soul in question).

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SECTION IX 'INJURY DONE TO OTHERS A SIN, PLEASURE GIVEN TO OTHERS VIRTUE AND `INJURY DONE TO ONESELF A VIRTUE, PLEASURE GIVEN TO ONESELF SIN' Verses 92-95 pApaM dhruvaM pare duHkhAt puNyaM ca sukhato ydi| acetanAkaSAyau ca badhyeyAtAM nimittataH // 12 // If it is maintained that sin is necessarily accumulated as a result of causing pain to others while virtue as a result of causing pleasure to others, then even an inanimate entity and even a personage free from all spiritual defilement should possibly suffer bondage inasmuch as both can somehow be instrumental in causing pain and pleasure to others. (92) atha navamaH paricchedaH paratra sukhaduHkhotpAdanAt puNyapApabandhaikAnte kathamacetanAH kSIrAdayaH na badhyeran vItarAgA vA ?, tannimittatvAt / / 12 / / puNyaM dhruvaM svato duHkhAt pApaM ca sukhato ydi| vItarAgo munirvidvAMstAbhyAM yuJjyAnimittataH // 93 // If it is maintained that virtue is necessarily accumulated as a result of causing pain to oneself while sin as a result of causing pleasure to oneself, then even a sage free from all attachment should possibly acquire a stock of sins and virtues inasmuch as even such a sage can somehow be instrumental in causing to himself some kind of pain and some kind of pleasure. (93)

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82. CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY AtmasukhaduHkhAbhyAM pApetaraikAntakRtAnte punaH akaSAyasyApi dhruvameva bandhaH syaat| tato na kazcit moktumarhati, tadubhayAbhAvAsaMbhavAt / / 13 / / virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syaadvaadnyaayvidvissaam| avAcyataikAnte'pyukti vAcyamiti yujyte||14|| The enemies of the logic of syadvada can also not maintain that the two (viz. 'causing pain and pleasure to others' and 'causing pain and pleasure to oneself') characterize one and the same phenomenon, for such a position is self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (94) prastutaikAntadvayasiddhAnte vyAhateH, anabhidheyatAyAm anabhidheyAbhidhAnavirodhAt, kathaJcideva iti yuktam / / 94 // vizuddhisaMklezAGgaM cet svaparasthaM sukhaasukhm| puNyapApAsravo yukto na ced vyrthstvaarhtH||15|| Whether an act be of the form of pleasure or of pain and whether it be experienced by others or by oneself it will cause an effective accumulation of sin in case it is performed with an unclean mind while it will cause an effective accumulation of virtue in case it is done with a clean mind. In the absence of an unclean mind the accumulated sin will remain ineffective, in the absence of a clean mind the accumulated virtue will remain so; this is what actually happens in the case of an exalted personage like you. (95) Note : Here 'clean mind' should mean 'mind possessed of an auspicious type of worldly desires', 'unclean mind' 'mind possessed of an inauspicious type of worldly desires'. Again, an accumulated virtue or sin might be of two sorts, effective and ineffective. It is a highly technical Jaina notion that a mind possessed of desires (of the auspicious and inauspicious types) accumulates virtues and sins that prove effective (in the form of a cause of re-birth) while a mind free

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'INJURY DONE TO OTHERS A SIN... 83 from desires accumulatcs virtues and sins that are washed off as soo as they are accumulated (and hence cause no re-birth). Here 'virtue and 'sin' respectively mean good and bad karmas which the Jaina tradition conceives as physical entities. AtmanaH parasya vA sukhaduHkhayoH vizuddhisaMklezAGgayoreva puNyapApAsavahetutvam, naca anyathA, atiprasaGgAt / ArtaraudradhyAnapariNAmaH saMklezaH / tadabhAvo vizuddhiH, AtmanaH svAtmani avasthAnam // 95|| // ityAptamImAMsAbhASyarUpAyAm aSTazatyAM navamaH pricchedH|| Comment on Verses 92-95 In these verses, too, Samantabhadra comments on a controversy arisen in the field of ethical studies, but the problem discussed here is not so well known. The crux of Samantabhadra's argument is not much difficult to follow even if its details are partly mystifying. What is being argued is that the virtuous or sinful character of an act does not depend on how it externally affects the persons involved (qua *agent' or qua' 'patient') in this act but on whether it has been performed with a clean or an unclean mind. But to say, as Samantabhadra does in the course of his argument, that if virtue and sin are earned as a result of respectively causing pleasure and pair : to others they should possibly be earned even by an inanimate object (that might possibly be instrumental in one's causing pleasure or pain to others) makes little sense.

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SECTION X "WORLDY BONDAGE RESULTS FROM EVEN SLIGHT IGNORANCE' AND 'MOKSA RESULTS FROM EVEN SLIGHT KNOWLEDGE Verses 96-100 ajJAnAcced dhruvo bandho jJeyAnantyAnna kevlii| jJAnastokAd vimokSazdajJAnAd bhuto'nythaa||96|| If it is maintained that worldly bondage necessarily results from (even slight) ignorance, then nobody can ever attain moksa inasmuch as there are an infinite number of things there to be known. On the other hand, if it is maintained that moksa (necessarily) results from even slight knowledge, then the question arises why there should also be no worldly bondage in that case and that for the simple reason that a lot of ignorance is yet left over. (96) ___ atha dazamaH paricchedaH yadi bandho'yam ajJAnAt, nedAnI kazcit mucyate, sarvasyaiva kvacit ajJAnopapatteH jnyeyaanntyaat|ydipunH jJAnanirhAsAt brahmaprAptiH, ajJAnAt sutarAMprasajyeta, duHkhanivRtteriva sukhaprAptiH / / 96 / / virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syaadvaadnyaayvidvissaam| avAcyataikAnte'pyukti vAcyamiti yujyate // 97 / / The enemies of the logic of syadvada can also not maintain that the two viz. 'necessary causation of worldly bondage by even slight ignorance' and 'necessary causation of moksa by even slight knowledge') characterize

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"WORLDY BONDAGE RESULTS... 85 one and the same phenomenon. And if they say that the phenomena that are there are absolutely indescribable, then even to say that a phenomenon is indescribable becomes an impossibility on their part. (97) na hi sarvAtmanA ekasyaikadA jJAnastokAt mokSaH bahutazcAjJAnAt bandhaH iti ekAntayoravirodhaH syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAM siddhayayi yena tadubhayaikAtmyaM syAt // 97|| ajJAnAnmohino bandho nAjJAnAd vItamohataH / jJAnastokAcca mokSaH syaadmohaanmohino'nythaa||98|| Ignorance causes worldly bondage in the case of one who is under the sway of delusion while it does not do so in the case of one who is free from delusion. Similarly, slight knowledge causes moksa in the case of one who is free from delusion while it does not do so in the case of one who is under the sway of delusion. (98) Note: The Astasahasri reads na jnanat for najnanat, but that seems to be a misprint. mohanIyakarmaprakRtilakSaNAt ajJAnAt yuktaH krmbndhH| tataH anyato'pibandhAbhyupagame atiprsnggaat| tathaiva buddharapakarSAt mohanIyaparikSayalakSaNAt mokSyati, viparyaye viparyAsAt ityadhigantavyam / / 98 // kAmAdiprabhavazcitra: krmbndhaanuruuptH| tacca karma svahetubhyo jIvAste zuddhayazuddhitaH / / 19 / / The origination of attachment etc. is of various types corresponding to the various types of karmic bondage (which is responsible for the origination of attachment etc.); the karma, in its turn, originates from what are its own appropriate causes. And on your position the souls are of two types, viz. those possessed of spiritual purity (and hence destined to attain moksa) and those possessed of spiritual inpurity (and hence destined not to attain moksa). (99) saMsAro'yaM naikasvabhAvezvarakRtaH tatkAryasukhaduHkhAdivaicitryAt / na hi kAraNasyaikarUpatve kaarynaanaatvNyuktm,shaalibiijaangkurvt| apariNAminaH sarvathAarthakriyA'saMbhavAt, tallakSaNatvAt vastunaH, sadbhAvameva tAvat na saMbhAvayAmaH / tatra kAladezAvasthAsvabhAvabhinnAnAM tanukaraNabhuvanAdInAM kila ayaM kartA iti mahaccitram / etena IzvarecchA prtyuktaa| na ca etena

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86 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY asyAH sambandhaH, tatkRtopakArAnapekSaNAt / tato vyapadezo'pi mA bhUt / abhisandheH anityatve'pi samAnaH prasaGgaH, sakRt utpattyAdiprasaGgAt vicitratvAnupapatteriti / tayorekasvabhAvatve'pi karmavaicitryAt kAmAdiprabhavavaicitryamiti cet, yuktametat, kintu na IzvarecchAbhyAM kiJcit, tAvatA arthaparisamApteH / etena viramyapravRttisannivezavizeSAdibhyaH pRthivyAdeH buddhimatkAraNapUrvakatvasAdhanena IzvaraprApaNaM pratyuktam / prAk kAyakaraNotpatteH Atmano dharmAdharmayozca svayamacetanatvAt vicitropabhogayogyatanukaraNAdisaMpAdanakauzalAsaMbhavAt tanimittamAtmAntaraM mRtpiNDakulAlavaditi cet, na, tasyApi vitanukaraNasya tatkRterasaMbhavAt tAdRzo'pi nimittabhAve karmaNAmacetanatve'pi tannimittatvam apratiSiddham, sarvathA dRSTAntavyatikramAt / sthitvApravartanArthakriyAdi cetanAdhiSThAnAditi niyame punaH IzvarAderapi mA bhUt / nAyaM prasaGgaH buddhimattvAditi cet, tata eva tarhi prahINatanukaraNAdayaH prANino mA bhUvan / karmaNo vaicitryAditi cet tarhi teSAmIzvarajJAnanimittatve samAnaH prasaGgaH / tadanimittatve tanukaraNAderapi tannimittatvaM mA bhUt, vizeSAbhAvAt / evaM caarthkriyaaderpitaabhyaamaikaantiktvm| tataH karmabandhavizeSavazAt citrAH kAmAdayaH, tataH karmavaicitryam / na hi bhAvasvabhAvopAlambhaH karaNIyaH, anyatrApi tatprasaGgAnivRtteH / na tarhi keSAMcit muktiH itareSAM saMsArazca, karmabandhanimittAvizeSAt iti cet, na, zuddhayazuddhitaH pratimuktItarasaMbhavAt AtmanAm / / 99 / / zuddhayazuddhI punaH zaktI te paakyaapaakyshktivt| sAdhanAdI tayorvyaktI svabhAvo'tarkagocaraH // 10 // Now purity and impurity are the possible inherent capacities of a soul just as cookability and noncookability are the possible inherent capacities (of a grain of corn). As for the manifestation of these capacities, it is beginningless in the case of impurity and is possessed of a beginning in the case of purity. And this difference of behaviour on the part of the two capacities is unamenable to logic. (100) Note: That is to say, the impure type of souls have been behaving in an unworthy fashion since beginningless time but it is at a particular time that the pure type of them begin to behave in a conspicuously worthy fashion. bhavyetarasvabhAvau teSAM sAmarthyAsAmarthya, maassaadipaakyaaprshktivt| zakteH prAdurbhAvApekSayA saaditvm| abhisandhinAnAtvaMzuddhayazuddhizaktyoritibhedamAcAryaH praah| tato'nyatrApi

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"WORLDY BONDAGE RESULTS... 87 sAdhanAdI prakRtazaktyoH vyaktI / kutaH zaktipratiniyamaH ? iti cet, na hi bhAvasvabhAvAH gefuitholl: 1180011 Comment on verses 96-100 In these verses Samantabhadra comments on a controversy arisen in the field of ethico-theological (rather than purely ethical) studies, for the problem discussed here - viz. the problem of moksa - is at least partly theological. Samantabhadra's argument is clear enough but it seems to be somewhat in conflict with the traditional Jaina understanding of the problem. For what is here being argued is that the attainment and non-attainment of moksa depends not on the (total or partial) cessation and non-cessation of ignorance but on the (total) elimination and non-elimination of the delusion-causing karmas. It is somehow difficult to square this argument (plausible in itself) with the traditional Jaina position that the attainment of moksa must be preceded by a total cessation of ignorance and this total cessation of ignorance by a total elimination of the delusion-causing karmas. Thus both the traditional Jaina position and Samantabhadra's argument make a total elimination of the delusion-causing karmas a necessary cause of the attainment of moksa, but the former does and the latter does not make a total cessation of ignorance such a necessary cause!. The verses 99 and 100 offer some incidental information about the doctrine of karmas as understood by the Jaina tradition. 101 - 113 Verses. tattvajJAnaM pramANaM te yugapat srvbhaasnm| kramabhAvi ca yajjJAnaM syAdvAdanayasaMskRtam // 101 // On your showing, that knowledge pertaining to an entity which takes cognizance of all its aspects in one sweep is technically called pramana (lit. authentic knowledge), while that which takes cognizance of these 1. In all probability when Samantabhadra grants the possibility of that ignorance does not cause worldly bondage or that slight knowledge causes moksa he is having in mind the soul that is rid of the delusion-causing karmas but has not yet become omniscient. For since in the case of such a soul the karmic bondage taking place is of an ineffective sort Samantabhadra might talk as if here there takes place no karmic bondage: similarly, since in the case of this soul moksa is bound to take place rather soon Samantabhadra might talk as if moksa has here already taken place.

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88 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY aspects in succession is technically called syadvada and naya (the former seeking to cover all these aspects, the latter some one of them). (101) buddheranekAntAt yena AkAreNa tattvaparicchedaH tadapekSayA prAmANyam / tena pratyakSatadAbhAsayorapiprAyazaH saGkIrNaprAmANyetarasthitiH unnetavyA, prasiddhAnupahatendriyadRSTerapi candrArkAdiSu dezapratyAsattyAdyabhUtAkArAvabhAsanAt, tathA upahatAkSAderapi saGkhyAdivisaMvAde'pi candrAdisvabhAvatattvopalambhAt / tatprakarSApekSayA vyapadezavyavasthA gandhadravyAdivat / tathA anumAnAderapi kathaJcit mithyApratibhAse'pi tattvapratipattyaiva prAmANyam / ekAntakalpanAyAM tu nAntarbahiH tattvasaMvedanaM vyavatiSTheta, svayamadvayAdeH dvayAdipratibhAsanAt, rUpAdisvalakSaNAnAM ca tathaivAdarzanAt yathA vyAvarNyante / tadvizeSopalambhAbhyupagame'pi tdvyvsaayvaiklym| kvacit dharmAdharmasaMvedanavat proksstvopptteH| vikalpAnAm atattvaviSayatvAt kutaH tattvapratipattiH ? maNipradIprabhAdRSTAnto'pi svapakSaghAtI, maNipradIpaprabhAdarzanasyApi saMvAdakatvena prAmANyaprAptyA pramANAntarbhAvavighaTanAt / na hi tat pratyakSam, svaviSaye visaMvAdanAt, zuktikAdarzanavat rajatabhrAntau / nApi laiGgikam, lingglinggismbndhaaprtiptteH| anyathA dRSTAntetarayorekatvAt kiMkena kRtaM syAt ? kAdAcitkArthaprApteH aarekaaderpisNbhvaat| nahi mithyaajnyaansysNvaadnaikaantH| tathAnalaiGgikam, sarvathaivAvisaMvAdakatvAt / tasmAt sUktam 'tattvajJAnameva pramANaM kAraNasAmagrIbhedAt pratibhAsabhede'pi' iti| pramANameva vA tttvjnyaanm| tataHsvalakSaNadarzanAnantarabhAvinaH tattvavyavasAyasyapramANatvopapatteH pratyakSamanumAnamiti pramANe eva iti avadhAraNaM pratyAcaSTe / anadhigatArthAdhigamAbhAvAt tadapramANatve laiGgikasyApi mA bhUt, vizeSAbhAvAt / anadhigatasvalakSaNAdhyavasAyAt anumiteratizayakalpanAyAM prakRtasyApi na vai pramANatvaMpratiSedhyam, anirNItanirNayAtmakatvAt, kSaNabhaGgAnumAnavat / dhvanerakhaNDazaH zravaNAt adhigamo'pi prAthamakalpikaH tttvnirnniitirev| tadatyaye dRSTerapi visaMvAdakatvena prAmANyAnupapatteH adarzanAnatizAyanAt / tadarzanAbhAve'pi tattvanizcaye tadanyasamAropavyavacchedalakSaNe pramANalakSaNAGgIkaraNAt / kvacit kutazcit dhUmaketulaiGgikavat nirNItArthamAtrasmRteH adhigatArthAdhigamAt prAmANyamAbhUt, prmitivishessaabhaavaat| prakRtanirNayasyaprAmANye hi na kiJcit atiprasajyate, nirNIte'pi kathaJcit atizAyanAt / pratyabhijJAnaM pramANam, vyavasAyAtizayopapatteH, tatsAmarthyAdhInatvAt pramANatvasthiteH / anyathA hi visaMvAdaH syAt, saMzayAdivat / liGgaliGgisambandhajJAnaM pramANam, anizcitanizcayAt, anumAnavat / sattvakSaNikatvayoH dhUmatatkAraNayoH vA sAkalyena vyAptipratipattau na pratyakSamutsahate, sannihitArthAkArAnukAritvAt, aparIkSAkSamatvAcca, nAnumAnam, anavasthAnuSaGgAt / sudUramapi gatvA

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89 WORLDY BONDAGE RESULTS... tadubhayavyatiriktaM vyavasthAnimittam abhyupagantavyam / upamAnAdikaM pramANAntaramicchatAM tattvanirNayapratyavamarSapratibandhAdhigamapramANatvapratiSedhaH prAyazo vaktu: jaDimAnamAviSkaroti / iti pratyakSaM parokSamityetat dvitayaM pramANam arthApattyAderanumAnavyatireke'pi parokSe antarbhAvAt / tatra sakalajJAnAvaraNaparikSayavijRmbhitaM kevalajJAnaM yugapat srvaarthvissym| tathoktam 'sarvadravyaparyAyeSu kevalasya' iti| tajjJAnadarzanayoH kramavRttau hi sarvajJatvaM kAdAcitkaM syAt / kutaH tatsiddhiH ? iti cet, sAmAnyavizeSaviSayayoH vigatAvaraNayoH ayugapat pratibhAsAyogAt pratibandhakAntarAbhAvAt / zeSaM sarvaM kramavRtti, prakArAntarAsaMbhavAt / cakSurAdijJAnapaJcakasyApi parasparavyavadhAne'pi vicchedAnupalakSaNam, kSaNakSayavat / yaugapadye hi santAnabhedAt parasparaparAmarzAbhAvaH santAnAntaravat / mAnasapratyakSe'pi cakSurAdijJAnAnantapratyayodbhavena kazcit vizeSa: kramavRttau, vyavadhAnapratibhAsavikalpapratipatterasaMbhavAt / yaugapadye hi sparzAdipratyavamarzavirodhaH puruSAntaravat / viSayasyAnekAntAtmakatvAt matijJAnAdi syAdvAdanayalakSitaM pratipattavyam, kevalajJAnavat syAdvAdopalakSitatvAcca // 101 // upekSA phalamAdyasya zeSasyAdAnahAnadhIH / pUrvA vA'jJAnanAzo vA sarvasyAsya svagocare // 102 // of these types of knowledge the former (i.e. pramana ) has got neutrality (in relation to the object concerned) for its result while the latter (i.e. syadvada and naya) either acceptance or rejection (of the object concerned). Or, we might say that all knowledge has got for its result either neutrality (to be understood in a special sense -- e.g. in the sense of the withdrawal of attention from everything save what is its proper object') or 'the destruction of ignorance as to its object'. (102) siddhaprayojanatvAt kevalinAM sarvatra upekSA / karuNAvataH paraduHkhajihAsoH kathamupekSA ? tadabhAve kathaM cAptiH ? iti cet, svaduHkhanivartanavat akaruNayApi vRtteranyaduHkhanirAcikIrSAyAm / dayAloreva AtmaduHkhanivartanam, ato'yamasamAdhiriti cet, na, na vai pradIpaH kRpAlutayA AtmAnaM paraM vA tamaso nivartayatIti / kalpayitvApi kRpAlutAM tatkaraNasvabhAvasAmarthya mRgyam / evaM hi paramparAparizramaM pariharet / matyAdeH sAkSAt phalaM svArthavyAmohavicchedaH, tadabhAve darzanasyApi sanikarSAvizeSAt kSaNapariNAmopalambhavat avisaMvAdakatvAsaMbhavAt / paramparayA hAnopAdAnasaMvittiH / tathA hi - karaNasya kriyAyAzca

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90 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY kathaJcit ekatvaM pradIpatamovigamavat, nAnAtvaM ca parazvAdivat / tasmAt grAhyasaMvidAkArayoH pramANaphalavyavasthAyAmapi visaMvAdAnirAkaraNe tadajJasyeva viSadRSTiH pramANatvaM na pratipattumarhati / tAvataiva pramANatve kSaNikatvAdyanumAnam adhigatArthAdhigamalakSaNatvAt na vai prmaannm||102|| vAkyeSvanekAntadyotI gamyaM prati vizeSaNam / syAnnipAto'rthayogitvAt tava kevlinaampi||10|| The word syat prefacing a sentence is grammatically a nipata (i.e. a particle) and it, by indicating that the state of affairs sought to be described by the sentence concerned has got numerous aspects, qualities, shows (in a particular fashion) the purport of this sentence; and since what the word syat thus adds to the meaning of the sentence concerned is objectively a fact its use - authenticated by you - has got the approval even of the omniscient personages. (103) Note : Vasunandin reads visesakah for visesanam meaning the same thing. padAnAM parasparApekSANAM nirapekSaH samudAyo vAkyam / na tarhi tadAnImidaM bhavati - yathA yat sat tat sarvaM pariNAmi, yathA ghaTaH, saMzca zabdaH iti, tasmAt pariNAmIti aakaangkssnnaat| prtipttuHdhrmo'yNvaakyessuadhyaaropyte|scetprtipttaa tAvatAarthapratyeti, kimiti zeSamAkAGkSati ? prakaraNAdinA vAkyakalpena api arthapratipattau na vA prAthamakalpikavAkyalakSaNaparihAraH, satyabhAmAdipadavat / sdsnityaanityaadisrvthaikaantprtiksseplkssnn:anekaantH| kvacitprayujyamAnaH syAt'zabdaH tadvizeSaNatayAprakRtArthatattvamavayavenasUcayati, prAyazo nipAtAnAMtatsvabhAvatvAt, ev'kaaraadivt|nhi kevalajJAnavat akhilam akramamavagAhate, vAcaH kramavRttitvAt, tadbuddherapi tathAbhAvAt // 103 / / syAdvAdaH sarvathaikAntatyAgAt kiMvRttacidvidhiH / saptabhaGganayApekSo heyAdeyavizeSakaH // 104 // Syadvada consists in making conditional (i.e. non-absolutist) assertions concerning these or those aspects of a situation and this by utterly giving up absolutism of all sorts; such syadvada - based on the doctrine of 'seven forms of assertion and on the doctrine of naya - helps the

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'WORLDY BONDAGE RESULTS... 91 ascertainment of things sought to be accepted and those sought to be rejected (by the person uttering a sentence). (104) kathaJcidityAdiH kiMvRttacidvidhiH syAdvAdaparyAyaH / so'yam anekAntamabhipretya saptabhaGganayApekSaH svabhAvaparabhAvAbhyAM sadasadAdivyavasthA pratipAdayati / saptabhaGgI proktaa| dravyArthika paryAyArthika pravibhAgavazAt naigamAdayaH zabdArthanayAH bahuvikalpA: mUlanayadvayazuddhayazuddhibhyAm // 104 // syAdvAdakevalajJAne srvtttvprkaashne| bhedaH sAkSAdasAkSAcca hyavastvanyatamaM bhvet||105|| The knowledge of the form of syadvada and the knowledge of an omniscient personage are both the revealer of all things whatsoever (and in all their aspects); they only differ in that the former is an indirect type of knowledge while the latter a direct one. And if somebody posits a third type of knowledge he would be positing something fictitious. (105) syAdvAdakevalajJAne iti nirdezAt tayorabhyarhitatvAniyamaM darzayati, prsprhetuktvaat| abhyarhitatve vA pUrvanipAte vyabhicAraM sUcayati / kathaM punaH syAdvAdaH sarvatattvaprakAzanaH ?, yAvatA 'matizrutayornibandho dravyeSvasarvaparyAyeSu' / jIvAdayaH sapta padArthAH tattvam, ttprtipaadnaavishessaat| tathAha bhedaH - sAkSAdasAkSAcceti / sAkSAtkRtereva sarvadravyaparyAyAn paricchinatti, nAnyataH, iti yAvat / / 105 / / sadharmaNaiva sAdhyasya saadhaadvirodhtH| syAdvAdapravibhaktArthavizeSavyaJjako nyH||106|| A naya gives expression to some particular aspect of a total situation that has been comprehended by syadvada , and this it does by pointing out only those features which the situation shares with its homologues and not those which are to be found only in its heterologues (an account which makes nayaa correlate - virtual synonym - of 'probans', the hint being that syadvadais a correlate - virtual synonym - of 'scripture'). (106) 'sapakSeNaiva sAdhyasya sAdharmyAt' iti anena hetoH trailakSaNyam 'avirodhAt' iti anyathAnupapattiM ca darzayatA kevalasya trilakSaNasyAsAdhanatvam uktam, tatputratvAdivat /

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92 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY ekalakSaNasya tu gamakatvam, 'nityatvaikAntapakSe'pi vikriyA nopapadyate' iti bahulamanyathAnupapattereva samAzrayaNAt / yatra arthakriyA na saMbhavati tat na vastutattvam, yathA vinAzaikAntaH / tathA ca nityatve'pi kramayogapadyAbhyAm arthakriyA na saMbhavati, nAparaM prakArAntaram, iti trilakSaNayoge'pi pradhAnamekalakSaNam, tatraiva sAdhanasAmarthyapariniSThiteH / tadeva ca pratibandhaH pUrvavadvItasaMyogyAdisakalahetupratiSThApakam / tataH syAdvAdetyAdinA anumitam anekAntAtmakam arthatattvam Adarzayati / tasya vizeSo nityatvAdiH pRthak pRthak / tasya pratipAdako nayaH / tathA coktam - arthasyAnekarUpasya dhIH pramANaM tdNshdhiiH| nayo dharmAntarApekSI durNayastannirAkRtiH / / iti tadanekAntapratipattiH pramANam, ekadharmapratipattiH nayaH, tatpratyanIkapratikSepaH durNayaH kevalavipakSavirodhadarzanena svapakSAbhinivezAt // 106 // nayopanayaikAntAnAM trikAlAnAM samuccayaH / avibhrADbhAvasambandho drvymekmnekdhaa||107|| A substance is but the meeting-ground of all those features - belonging to the past, present and future periods of time - that are expressed in an exclusive fashion by these and those types and sub-types of naya, a meeting-ground which however does not make it obligatory that an independent relation be posited between it and the features in question. This is how a substance is one and yet possessed of a multifarious nature. (107) uktalakSaNo dravyaparyAyasthAnaH saGgrahAdiH nayaH, tacchAkhAprazAkhAtmA upanayaH / tadekAntAnAM vipakSopekSAlakSaNAnAM trikAlaviSayANAM samitiH dravyam / tataH teSAmapoddhArAt guNaguNyAdivat // 107|| mithyAsamUho mithyA cena mithyaikAntatA'sti naH / nirapekSA nayA mithyA sApekSA vastu te'rthakRt // 10 // It might be objected that what is a conglomeration of false features is itself but a falsity (while a naya, inasmuch as it deals with some partial aspect of a total situation,

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'WORLDY BONDAGE RESULTS... 93 is an expression of some false feature). To this we reply that in our view a naya as such is not false; for a naya is false only when it seeks to stand aloof from (i. e. seeks to repudiate the truth of) the remaining nayas while the nayas acting in concert manage to describe entities that are efficacious (i.e. are genuinely real). (108) sunayadurNayayoH yathA asmAbhiH lakSaNaM vyAkhyAtaM tathA na codyaM na parihAraH / tathA hinirapekSatvaM pratyanIkadharmasya nirAkRtiH, sAkSepatvam upekSA, anyathA pramANanayAvizeSaprasaGgAt, dharmAntarAdAnopekSAhAnilakSaNatvAt pramANanayadurNayAnAM prakArAntarAsaMbhavAcca, tadatatsvabhAvapratipatteH tatpratipatteH anyanirAkRteH ca / iti vizvopasaMhatiH // 108|| niyamyate'rtho vAkyena vidhinA vAraNena vaa| tathA'nyathA ca so'vshymvishessytvmnythaa||109|| A sentence determines the nature of an entity either positively or negatively. Hence it is in the very nature of things that an entity must be characterized by a feature as also by the contrary of this feature; for if that were not so the entity will not be a genuine entity possessed of genuine characteristics. (109) Note : When it is said that an entity is characterized by both a feature and its contrary what is meant is not that it is characterized by both x and not-x but that it is characterized by both x and absence of not-x'. yat sat tat sarvamanekAntAtmakam, arthakriyAkAritvAt, svaviSayAkArasaMvittivat / na kiJcidekAntaM vastutattvam, sarvathA tadarthakriyA'saMbhavAt, gaganakusumavat / nAsti sadekAntaH, sarvavyApAravirodhaprasaGgAt, asdekaantvt| itividhinApratiSedhena vA vastutattvaM niyamyate, anyathA tadviziSTamarthatattvaM na syAt / ityanena vidhipratiSedhayoH guNapradhAnabhAvena sadasadAdivAkyeSu vRttiriti lakSayati // 109 // tadatadvastuvAgeSA tdevetynushaastii| na satyA syAnmRSAvAkyaiH kathaM tattvArthadezanA // 110 // If an entity that is in fact characterized by a seature as also by the contrary of this feature is described by a sentence as characterized by just this feature (and not also

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94 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY by the contrary of this feature), this sentence will not be true. And how can the nature of reality be expounded through sentences that are false ? (110) Note: Vasunandin reads tadatadvastu vagesa for tadatadvastuvagesa and tadevetyanusasati for tadevetyanusasati, the former alteration is unimportant, the latter a mistake. And the following is how Vasunandin understands the verse : 'An entity as characterized by a feature as also by the contrary of this feature is described by a sentence as precisely thus characterized. If (even) such a sentence be not true, how will it be possible to expound the nature of reality through sentences that are false ? pratyakSAdipramANaviSayabhUtaM viruddhadharmAdhyAsalakSaNam aviruddhNvstu| tadeva' ityaikAntena pratipAdayantI mithyaiva bhAratI / kathamanayA arthadezanam ? ityekAnte vAkyArthAnupapattiH AlakSyate // 110 // vAksvabhAvo'nyavAgarthapratiSedhaniraGkazaH / Aha ca svArthasAmAnyaM tAdRg vAcyaM khapuSpavat // 11 // It is the nature of a sentence that it is absolutely capable of negating the meaning of another sentence (i.e. of the sentence that is its own opposite). And a sentence allegedly capable of expressing just its own meaning (i.e. not also capable of negating the meaning of its own opposite) denotes something that is fictitious like skyflower. (111) vAcaH svabhAvo'yaM yena svArthasAmAnya pratipAdayantI tadaparaM nirAkaroti, anyatarApAye anuktaantishaaynaat| idaMtayA nedaMtayAvAnapratIyeta tadarthaH, kuurmromaadivt| nakhalu sAmAnya vizeSaparihAreNa vishessovaakvciduplbhaamhe| anupalabhamAnAzca kathaMsvaMparaMvAtathAbhinivezena vipralabhAmahe ? // 11 // sAmAnyavAg vizeSe cenna zabdArtho mRSA hi saa| abhipretavizeSApteH syAtkAraH stylaanychnH||112|| It might be said that a word denotes something universal but that it is made to stand for something particular, but in that case the denotation of a word must be a falsity. So it is the word syat which by enabling one

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'WORLDY BONDAGE RESULTS... 95 to grasp the intended particular feature acts like the stamp of truth (marking a sentence). (112) astIti kevalamabhAvavyavacchedAt apohamAha iti cet, kaH punarapohaH ? parato vyAvRttirabhAvaH / kathamevaM sati abhAvaM pratipAdayati bhAvaM na pratipAdayatItyanuktasamaM na syAt ? tadvikalpo mithyAbhinivezavazAditi cet, nacaitat tasyapatipAdakam, mithyAvikalpahetutvAt, vyalIkavacanavat / tataH syAdvAda eva satyalAJchano na vAdAntaramityatizAyayati // 112 / / vidheyamIpsitArthA pratiSedhyAvirodhi yt| tathaivAdeyaheyatvamiti syAdvAdasaMsthitiH // 113 // Something posited becomes a means of fulfilling one's intention only in case it does not stand opposed to something negated; the same is the case with something declared to be worthy of acceptance and something declared to be worthy of rejection (i.e. they too become a means of fulfilling one's intention only in case they do not stand opposed to each other). This is how syadvada views the matter. (113) astItyAdi vidheyamabhipretya vidhAnAt nAstitvAdibhi:aviruddham, vidhipratiSedhayoH anyonyAvinAbhAvalakSaNatvAt, svArthajJAnavat / tadvidheyapratiSedhyAtmavizeSAt syAdvAdaH prakriyate saptabhaGgIsamAzrayAt / / 113 / / ___Comment on verses 101-113 These verses constitute a summing up of the entire discussion that has gone earlier and in view of what has been said earlier it should not be difficult to follow them. A noteworthy distinction here drawn is that between pramana, syadvada and naya. Ordinarily, pramana means any piece whatsoever of valid cognition, but here it is made to stand for the all-comprehensive cognition of an omniscient; on the other hand, syadvada is made to stand for the all-comprehensive cognition of an ordinary person ( a single aspect of which cognition is called naya). However, the distinction is not of much practical importance inasmuch as an ordinary person capable of acquiring all-comprehensive cognition is as good as an omniscient (and - be it noted - impossibility). An instructive thesis is that all humanly made assertions are only conditionally valid assertions and that with a view to cmphasizing this aspect of the situation it is proper to add the word

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96 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY syat (meaning somehow') 1o whatever assertion one might happen to make. Another instructive thesis is that all assetion is at the same time a negation viz. the negation of its own opposite; (the doctrine of 'seven forms of assertion' is a particular - though, as we have seen, not an inevitable - corollary of this very thesis). Incidentally, the doctrine of 'seven forms of assertion' has been shown to have for its corollary the doctrine of 'substance'; thus from the fact that assertions can be made about a present, past or future state of affairs the conclusion is drawn that a real entity is of the form of a permanent substance possessed of an infinite number of modes, present, past and future. In this connection it might be useful to recall that the Jaina characterizes an entity as 'indescribable' in two senses, viz. (i) in the sense that it is impossible to simultaneously point out what this entity is and what it is not, and (ii) in the sense that this entity is of the form of a substance possessed of infinite modes which it is impossible for us to describe in their entirety; in the doctrine of seven forms of assertion' the formei sense of the word has been adopted, but the latter seems to be more appropriate on relatively less technical occasions. Verse 114 itIyamAptamImAMsA vihitA hitmicchtaam| smygmithyopdeshaarthvishessprtipttye||114|| Thus has the author composed the text called Aptamimamsa with a view to enabling those who are desirous of doing good to themselves to distinguish between a true preaching and a false one. (114) Note : Vasunandin reads hitamicchata for hitamicchatam; on this reading the translation should be : 'Thus has the author, who is desirous of doing good (to others), composed the text called Aptamimamsa with a view to enabling one to distinguish between a truc preaching and a false one.' iti svoktaparicchede vihiteyamAptamImAMsA sarvajJavizeSaparIkSA niHzreyasakAminAm, abhavyAnAM tadanupayogAt / tattvetaraparIkSAM prati bhavyAnAmeva niyatAdhikRtiH // 114|| Comment on verse 114 This is the real concluding verse of the text, the verse 115 being, in all probability, a later interpolation.

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'WORLDY BONDAGE RESULTS... Verse 115 jayati jagati klezAvezaprapaJcahimAMzumAn vihtvissmaikaantdhvaantprmaannnyaaNshumaan| yatipatirajo yasyAdhRSyAn matAmbunidhelavAn svamatamatayastIrthyA nAnA pare samupAsate // 115 // Victory be to the lord of sages who is free from birth (i.e. from the cycle of births and re-births), who acts like the sun in relation to the snow of the tangled onrush of miseries, who is possessed of the rays of the form of pramana and naya that put an end to the hopeless darkness of the form of the absolutist theses, the unvanquished drops of the ocean of whose doctrine are nurtured by the various rival teachers under the misimpression that they are their own (newly developed) doctrines. (115) ___Comment on verse 115 As just suggested, this verse - even if commented on by Vasunandin -- seems to be a later interpolation; otherwise, it is difficult to see why Akalanka and Vidyananda have left it untouched. zrIvardhamAnamakalaGkamanindyavandya pAdAravindayugalaM praNipatya mUrnA / bhavyaikalokanayanaM paripAlayantaM syAdvAdavartma pariNaumi samantabhadram / / // ityAptamImAMsAbhASyarUpA aSTazatI smaaptaa||

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INDEX OF HALF-VERSES agorasavato nobhe 60 asaMhatatvaM syAd bhUta 67 aGgitve'nyatamAntasya 22 astitvaM pratiSedhyena 17 acetanAkaSAyau ca 92 ahetukatvAnnAzasya 52 ajJAnAcced dhruvo bandho 96 AdyantoktidvayaM na syAt 50 ajJAnAnmohino bandho 98 AptAbhimAnadagdhAnAM7 advaitaM na vinA dvaitAt 27 Apte vaktari tadvAkyAt 78 advaitaikAntapakSe'pi 24 AzrayAzrayibhAvAna 64 adhyAtma bahirapyeSa 2 AzrayibhyAmananyo'sau 53 ananyataikAnte'NUnAM 67 Aha ca svArthasAmAnyaM 111 anapekSe pRthaktvaikye 33 itIyamAptamImAMsA 114 anApekSikasiddhau ca73 ityayuktaH sa sambandho 64 anumeyatvato'gnyAdi 5 upekSA phalamAdyasya 102 anyatra samavAye na 11 ubhayAbhAvatastatsthaM 68 anyeSvananyazabdo'yaM 44 ekatve'nyatarAbhAvaH 69 antaraGgArthataikAnte 79 ekasyAnekavRttirna 62 antareNAzrayaM na syAt 65 ekAnekavikalpAdau 23 abuddhipUrvApekSAyAm 91 ekAntagraharakteSu8 abhAvaikAntapakSe'pi 12 evaM vidhiniSedhAbhyAm 21 abhipretavizeSApteH 112 kathaJcitte sadeveSTaM 14 avaktavyacatuSkoTi 46 karmadvaitaM phaladvaitaM 25 avaktavyottarAH zeSAH 16 kAmAdiprabhavazcitraH 99 avastvanabhilApyaM syAt 48 kArakANAM kriyAyAzca 24 avAcyataikAnte'pyuktiH 13, 32,55,70, kAryakAraNanAnAtvaM 61 74, 77, 82, 90, 94, 97 kAryadravyamanAdi syAt 10 avibhrADbhAvasambandho 107 kAryabhrAnteraNubhrAntiH 68 avirodho yadiSTaM te 6 kAryotpAdaH kSayo hetoH 58 azakyatvAdavAcyaM kim 50 kuzalAkuzalaM karma 8 asadeva viparyAsAt 15 kramabhAvi ca yajjJAnaM 101 asadbhedo na bhAvastu 47 kramArpitadvayAd dvaitaM 16 asarvAntamavastu syAt 46 kvacid yathA svahetubhyo 4

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99 INDEX OF HALF-VERSES kSaNikaM kAlabhedAt te 56 kSaNikaikAntapakSe'pi 41 ghaTamaulisuvarNArthI 59 catuSkoTervikalpasya 45 cittasantatinAzazca 52 jayati jagati klezA 115 jIvazabdaH sabAhyArthaH 84 jJAnastokAcca mokSaH syAt 98 jJAnastokAd vimokSazcet 96 jJAnAbhAve kathaM jJeyaM 30 tacca karma svahetubhyo 99 tattvajJAnaM pramANaM te 101 tattvAnyatvamavAcyaM cet 45 tathA'nyathA ca so'vazyam 109 tathaivAdeyaheyatvam 113 tathobhayamavAcyaM 14 tadatadvastuvAgeSA 110 tadevaikyaM pRthaktvaM ca 33 tAbhyAmartho na sambaddhaH 66 tAvekatrAviruddhau te 36 tIrthakRtsamayAnAM ca 3 tulyA buddhayAdibodhAzca 85 te ca nitye vikArya kiM 38 tvanmatAmRtabAhyAnAM 7 divyaH satyo divaukassva 2 devAgamanabhoyAna 1 dezakAlavizeSe'pi 63 daivatazcedanirmokSaH 88 daivAdevArthasiddhizcet 88 doSAvaraNayorhAni 4 dravyaparyAyayoraikyaM 71 dravyAdyantarabhAvena 47 dvitvasaGkhyAvirodhazca 69 dharmadharmyavinAbhAvaH 75 dharme dharme'nya evArtho 22 na ca kazcid virodho'sti 20 na tau jAtyAdyavasthAnAt 58 nayopanayaikAntAnAM 107 na satyA syAnmRSAvAkyaiH 110 na sAdhyaM na ca hetuzca 80 na sAmAnyAtmanodeti 57 nasvarUpaM svato hyetat 75 na hetuphalabhAvAdiH 43 nAstitvaM pratiSedhyena 18 nityatvaikAntapakSe'pi 37 nityaM tat pratyabhijJAnAt 56 niyamyate'rtho vAkyena 109 nirapekSA nayA mithyA 108 neti cetra yathA kArya 21 payovrato na dadhyatti 60 pariNAmavizeSAcca 71 pariNAmapraktRptizca 39 pApaM dhruvaM pare duHkhAt 92 puNyapApakriyA na syAt 40 puNyapApAsravo yukto 95 puNyaM dhruvaM svato duHkhAt 93 pUrvA vA'jJAnanAzo vA 102 pRthaktve na pRthaktvaM syAt 28 pRthaktvaikAntapakSe'pi 28 pauruSAccedamoghaM syAt 89 pauruSAdeva siddhizcet 89 prakriyAM bhaGginImenAM 23

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100 pratyabhijJAnAdyabhAvAnna 41 pradhvaMsasya ca dharmasya 10 pramANakArakairvyaktaM 38 pramANagocarau santau 36 pramANAbhAsamevAtaH 79 prayojanAdibhedAcca 72 prAgeva kArakAbhAvaH 37 pretyabhAvazca tatsarvaM 29 buddhipUrvavyapekSAyAm 91 buddhizabdapramANatvaM 87 buddhizabdArthasaMjJAstAH 85 badhyate tadvayApetaM 51 bandhamokSau ca teSAM na 40 bahiraGgArthataikAnte 81 bahiSprameyApekSAyAM 83 bodhavAkyaM pramANaM na 12 bhAgitvAd vA'sya naivatvaM 62 bhAvaprameyApekSAyAM 83 bhAvaikAnte padArthAnAm 9 bhedAbhedavivakSAyAm 34 bhedaH sAkSAdasAkSAcca 105 bhrAntAveva pramAbhrAntau 86 mAyAdibhrAntisaMjJAzca 84 mAyAviSvapi dRzyante 1 mithyAsamUho mithyA cet 108 mukhyArthaH saMvRtirna syAt 44 mopAdAnaniyamo bhUt 42 yatipatirajo yasyAdhRSyAn 115 yadi sat sarvathA kArya 39 yadyasat sarvathA kArya 42 yadyApekSikasiddhi: syAt 73 CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY vaktaryanApte yaddheto: 78 vaktRzrotRpramAtRRNAM 86 vastvevAvastutAM yAti 48 vAkyeSvanekAntadyotI 103 vAksvabhAvo'nyavAgartha 111 vidyA'vidyAdvayaM na syAd 25 vidheyapratiSedhyAtmA 19 vidheyamIpsitArthAGgaM 113 virUpakAryArambhAya 53 virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM 13, 32, 55, 70, ___74,77, 82, 90, 94, 97 vivakSA cAvivakSA ca 35 vizuddhisaGklezAGgaM cet 95 vizeSaNatvAd vaidhayaM 18 vizeSaNatvAt sAdharmyaM 17 vItarAgo munirvidvAn 93 vyetyudeti vizeSAt te 57 zuddhayazuddhI punaH zaktI 100 zeSabhaGgAzca netavyA 20 zokapramodamAdhyasthyaM 59 sato vizeSaNasyAtra 35 satyAnRtavyavasthaivaM 87 sa tvamevAsi nirdoSo 6 satsAmAnyAt tu sarvaikyaM 34 sadAtmanA ca bhinnaM cet 30 sadeva sarvaM ko necchet 15 sadharmaNaiva sAdhyasya 106 santAnAntaravannaikaH 43 santAnaH samudAyazca 29 saptabhaGganayApekSo 104 samAnadezatA na syAt 63

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101 . INDEX OF HALF-VERSES samyagmithyopadezArtha 114 sarvathA'nabhisambandhaH 66 sarvAtmakamanAdyantam 9 sarvAtmakaM tadekaM syAt 11 sarvAntAzcedavaktavyAH 49 sarveSAmAptatA nAsti 3 sarveSAM kAryasiddhiH syAt 81 saMjJAsaMkhyAvizeSAcca 72 saMjJinaH pratiSedho na 27 saMvRtizcenmRSaivaiSA 49 sAdhanAdI tayorvyaktI 100 sAdhyadharmo yathA hetuH 19 sAdhyasAdhanavijJapteH 80 sAmAnyatadvadanyatvaM 61 sAmAnyavAg vizeSe cet 112 sAmAnyaM samavAyazca 65 sAmAnyAbhAvatasteSAM 31 sAmAnyArthA giro'nyeSAM 31 siddhaM cedAgamAt sarvaM 76 siddhaM ceddhetutaH sarvaM 76 sUkSmAntaritadUrArthAH 5 skandhasantatayazcaiva 54 sthityutpattivyayAsteSAM 54 syAdvAdakevalajJAne 105 syAdvAdapravibhaktArtha 106 syAdvAdo sarvathaikAnta 104 syAnnipAto'rthayogitvAt 103 hinastyanabhisandhAtR 51 hetunA ced vinA siddhiH 26 hetoradvaitasiddhizced 26

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SANSKRIT-SANSKRITI GRANTHAMALA " GENERAL EDITOR NAGIN J. SHAH Publications 1. A Study of Jayanata Bhatta's Nyayamanjari, Rs. 90=00 A Mature Sanskrit Work on INDIAN LOGIC Part I by Nagin J. Shah (1993) 2. Jaina-Darsan anc Sankhya-Yoga-mam Jnana-Darsana- Rs. 150=00 Vicarana (Gujarati) by J. D. Sheth (1994) 3. A Study of Jayanta Bhatta's Nyayamanjari on Rs. 225500 INDIAN LOGIC Part II by Nagin J. Shah (1995) 4. A Study of Jayanta Bhatta's Nyayamanjari on Rs. 198=00 INDIAN LOGIC Part III by Nagin J. Shah (1997) 5. Bharatiya Tattvajnana - Kelalika samasya (Gujarati) Rs. 99=00 by Nagin J. Shah (1998) 6. Essays in Indian Philosophy by Nagin J. Shah (1998) Rs. 120=00 7. Samantabhadra's Aptamimamsa - Critique of An Rs. 108=00 Authority (along with English translation, notes and Akalanka's Sanskrit Commentary Astasati) by Nagin J. Shah (1999) About A study of Nyayamanjari "The book under review is a mature contribution of a mature scholar." Prof. V. N. Jha, Director, Centre of Advanced Studies in Sanskrit, Poona University, in Annals of Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, LXXVI. "This is just an illustration of how interesting and revealing is the study which Dr. Shah has presented not only from a logical but also from a cultural point of view. Dr. Shah has presented an important text in its wide ranging context with full mastery. He is at home in the different philosophical schools discussed, and his mastery of the language and tradition of Nyaya and Buddhism enables him to create before the reader a fascinating panorama of ancient philosophical discussion. ... His work will undoubtedly remain a standard work of reference for a long time to come." - Prof. G.C. Pande, former Vicechancellor Universities of Rajasthan and Allahabad, in Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay Volume 72 (1997). "Dr. Shah has meticulously followed each and every point presented in NM. It is indeed a comprehensive study of NM for the first time and provides a fascinating reading." - Prof. Vasant P in Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda, Vol. 45 Nos 3-4

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