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accidents have been eliminated; and that with which the Middle Term is so concomitant is the 'more extensive Major Term. The terms Middle Term' and 'Major Term which are really denotative of the objects (of Cognition) stand for the Cognition of those objects. Thus then, taking the case of the Inference, of Fire on the hill from the presence of Smoke, this Inference is led up to by the Cognition of the fact that the Smoke is 'less extensive than the Fire which is more extensive;'i. e. 'Wherever there is Smoke there is Fire [i. e. Smoke is invariably concomitant with Fire]-The term 'lingi' (which has been taken above as standing for the Major Term) has to be repeated and taken in the sense of that in which the 'Linga' (Middle Term) is present; that is, the cognition that the Middle Term (Smoke) is present in the Minor Term (Hill). -Thus then the definition of Inference in general comes to this-Inference is that Cognition which is led up to by (a) the Cognition of invariable concomitance between the Major Term and the Middle Term (i. e. the Major Premiss) and (b) the Cognition of the Presence of the Middle Term in the Minor Term (i. e. the Minor Premiss).
Definition of particular forms of Inference
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(36) The author recalls the particular forms of Inference described under another philosophical system (Nyāya)-- Inference has been declared to be of three kinds'; i. e. Inference that has been just defined in its general form has three special forms, called (1) Purvavat, A priori, (2) 'S'eṣavat,' A posteriori, and (3) Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, based on general observation.
First division of Inference into Vita and Avita
T. 2
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(37) First of all, Inference is of two kinds-Vita and Avita; that which functions through an affirmation is the Vita-affirmative; and that which functions through negation Is the Avita, Negative.
