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-V47]
TRANSLATION
23
(47) Similarly 'Presumption also is not a distinct Means of Cognition. For instance, the Presumption' in- example of 'Presumption that has been cited cluded under ' Inference by the Ancients is the case where on finding that Caitra, who is alive, is not in the house, there is presumption of his being somewhere outside. As a matter of fact, however, this also is a case of Inference. In the case of our own body we easily recognise the premiss that 'when a finite object is not present in one place, it is present in another place, and also that when a finite object is present in one place, it is not present in another place';-when, therefore, we find that the living Caitra is not in the house,and from this Minor Premiss (taken along with the former Premiss) we deduce the conclusion that he must be some. where outside the house,-this is a clear case of Inference. The presence of Caitra somewhere in the world cannot set aside his absence in the house; and when it is not so set aside this absence in the house cannot fail to be a valid reason for his presence outside the house. [So that the Inference would not be open to the Fallacy of the 'Unknown']. Nor again does Caitra's absence in the house set aside his existence entirely; and only if it were so set aside would this existence be unable to establish itself outside the house. [So on this ground also the Inference is not fallacious]. To explainIs Caitra's non-existence in the house inconsistant with his existence itself? Or only with his existence in the house? -It cannot be the former, because there can be no inconsistency between existence somewhere and non-existence in the house; for the simple reason that the two things are entirely different. It might be argued that-"When it is asserted that he must be somewhere, his existence in some place in general being asserted (without any particular place being specified).-in as much as the House also would be included under place in general, the assertion might imply existence
