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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[V46
denotative of the animal similar to the cow' [ which has been regarded as the cognition resulting from Analogy ).—this is purely inferential; the inference being in the following. form
When experienced persons use a certain term in reference to a particular thing, it should be regarded as denoting it,—specially, when there is no function other than Direct Denotation, (through which the term could be applicable to that thing )'; -as is found in the well-known case of the term 'cow' applied to the animal genus 'cow '; ( Major Premiss ).
The term gavaya is used ( by experienced persons ) in reference to the animal similar to the cow :-(Minor Premiss).
• Therefore, the term gavaya must be regarded as denotative of that animal.' (Conclusion )
This cognition is purely inferential.
Lastly, the notion that the animal before our eyes is similar to the cow':-this is purely perceptional. Thus then, when the cow is remembered, and its remembrance is seen in the gavaya, this is perception pure and simple ; certainly the resemblance or similarity in the cow is not something different from that in the gavaya ; for it is regarded to be a case of 'Resemblance' only when the conglomeration of the component parts of the body of one animal is found to be almost the same as that in the body of another; and this same conglomeration can be one only ; so that when it has been perceived in the gavaya, it must be the same in the cow also.—Thus then, ( every notion involved in what has been regarded as Analogical Cognition being found to be either verbal or inferential or perceptional ), there is nothing left which could be regarded as the objective of a fourth means of cognition in the shape of ' Analogy'. We conclude therefrom, that 'Analogy' is not a distinct means of Cognition
