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120
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
(LVT1257–
Further, God, being the Lord of the Universe, has all that He requires and, as such, in the creating of the world, He can have no selfish motive; nor can His action be said to be due solely to benevolence or pity; for pity consists in a desire for the removal of others' pains; but before creation, the Spirits would be without bodies, organs and objects as such, without pain; for the removal of what then would God's compassion be roused? And if the pain subsequent to creation be held to be the cause of creation, then we should be in the inextri. cable nooze of interdependence'. creation due to pity, and pity due to creation and again, if God were moved to creation by pity, then He would create only happy mortals, not mortals with variegated experiences. And if the diversity of men's experiences be attributed to their past deedo, then what is the necessity of postulating intelligent controller of such deeds? The mere absence of the control of ait intelligent agent would inean ( according to the opponent that the deeds of men could not have any activity, which would mean that their effects, in the shape of men's bodies, organs and objects could not be produced, -and the result of this would be that there would be no pain; so that the removal of pains would be very easy! (and there would be no ground for God's compassion).
(257) As regards the action of the insentient Nature, on None of the
the other hand, it is due neither to selfishness above objections nor to pity; and thus in this case, none of the apply to the case above incongruilies arise, the only motive of of Nature
Nature is the fulfilment of another's purpose. Thus, therefore, the instance cited in the Kurikā is quite appropriate.
(258) It has been said "as if for its own purpose;" The author proceeds to explain this:" -
