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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[V4
in the house also; and in this manner the subject matter being the same, there would be an inconsistency between existence somewhere and non-existence in the House.”—This, however, cannot be right. Non-existence in the house is known defini. tely and for certain, while ( even in the manner shown ) the notion of existence in the house (as implied by existence somewhere) would be only doubtful and implied, and as such this could never set aside the former definite cognition. And though the definitely ascertained non-existence in the House sets aside the implied and doubtful existence in the House, it cannot set aside the man's existence; nor can it remove the doubt ( regarding the possibility of existence in the house implied in the general notion of existence somewhere ). What is set aside by the Caitra's non-existence in relation to the House is his existence in the House; as the latter is incompatible with it; but it cannot set aside his existence in general; because there is no incompatibility with this. From all this it follows that, when on the basis of non-existence in the House, as the only ascertained reason ( Middle term ). we deduce the man's existence outside,—it is a case of Inference.
This same reason disposes of also another definition of ‘Presumption' as consisting in the removal of the inconsistency between two valid cognitions by relegating them to distinct spheres;' because, as a matter fact, there is no inconsistency between what is restricted ( non-existence in the House ) and what is not restricted ( existence somewhere).
Other examples of Presumption may be shown, as above, to be included under Inference.
From all this it follows that as a means of cognition, Presumption is not distinct from Inference,
