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: Śramana, Vol 58, No. 2-3/April-September 2007
Further, the Mīmāmsakas devote much of their attention to meet the objections against the theory of self-sufficiency of verbal cognition and the eternal character of the word and to formulating their own arguments in support of their position. But if the word and its meaning are eternal, there is always a chance of one's having mistaken notions about both. So there is no independent authority in human words. The Veda is free from any such defect since it is regarded as authorless, self-sufficient and eternal. The Jainas do not believe either in self-sufficiency of verbal cognition or in eternal character of the Vedas, nor do they regard it as the only authoritative source of knowledge of Dharma. They attribute the knowledge of Dharma to their Tirthankaras, who are omniscient and detached from the world. Hence they have found a substitute for Vedas. It is one of the main reasons that the Mīmāṁsakas oppose tooth and nail the entire doctrine of omniscient
Mimāṁsaka's objections
Mīmāmsakas, through various arguments establish that there can be no omniscient being at all. Their argument can be grouped in two parts. In the first place, they contend that there is no pramāṇa or reason to support the theory of omniscience and secondly they show that omniscience is some thing impossible.
As regards the first line of their arguments, the Mīmāmsakas say that Pratyakṣa (direct perception), Anumäna (inference), Upamāna (analogy), Agama (authoritative sayings) and Arthāpatti (implication) are the five sources of valid knowledge. Bhatta adds Abhāva (nonexistence) as the sixth source of knowledge. Mīmāṁsakas say that none of these Pramāņas establish the existence of an omniscient being. As Pratyakṣa is generally a sensuous perception, it implies senseobject contact during the present time and in the case of Kevalajñāna, this is lacking. Though the question of sense-object-relation is not found always valid because things are sometimes, beyond the power of senses. Such invisible things like atoms, things or persons remote in time or things far beyond (like the Meru hill) became unknown as the object of direct perception. Here we may be reminded
