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Towards World Peace on the Wheels of 'Anekāntavāda...
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it's own. The term substance or dravya is used for the thing that possesses varying characteristics viz. attributes and modes. The attributes are the permanent and inseparable qualities of a substance whereas the modes are the changing and accidental qualities of a substance. Now, in keeping with this doctrine of the many-ness of reality or Anekantavāda, Jaina philosophers define Reality as unityand-difference or difference-and-unity. If we look at a substance from the point of view of substance, it is factual, enduring and one whereas if we view it from the point of view of modes, it is illusory, impermanent and many. To commit to any one-sided and conditional observation and analysis as the absolute is to commit the fallacy of one-sidedness or Ekāntavāda. Jaina philosophy takes into account the fact of the many-ness of reality and hence does not fall prey to the narrow perspective resulting from a partial or one-sided view.
The logical and epistemological side of the Jaina concept of reality (the metaphysical side of which is the doctrine of Anekāntavāda) is Syadvāda or the doctrine of relativity of knowledge. The doctrine explains that, since reality is infinitely complex and thus indeterminable by ordinary mortal means, human judgments are necessarily relative, conditional as also restricted. Thus word 'Syat' denoting the relativeness and doubtlessness must precede all our judgments. Different views, beliefs, judgments and the like expressions of human mind are all made from different standpoints. Confirmation assumes repudiation and repudiation assumes confirmation. The infinitely complex reality is real as also unreal, enduring as also illusory, universal as also particular, one as also many3.
With regard to the above, the Jains talk of three kinds of judgments. The first of these is a case where a person commits a partial truth for the absolute truth and persists in his claim. The second is the situation where a person makes a partially true statement with no reference to the absolute or relative nature of his utterance or belief. The third condition is that whence a person states something
