Book Title: Sramana 2007 04
Author(s): Shreeprakash Pandey, Vijay Kumar
Publisher: Parshvanath Vidhyashram Varanasi

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Page 216
________________ Towards World Peace on the Wheels of 'Anekāntavāda... : 211 7. Syādasti ca năsti ca avaktavyam ( relatively, a thing is real, unreal as well as indescribable) Thus viewed from the point of view of one's own substance, form, time as also space a thing is real as also existent. Viewed from the point of view of other substance, form, time and space a thing is unreal and non-existent." Viewed from varying perspectives, a thing is real as also unreal. A thing is indescribable for it admits of different interpretations from different standpoints simultaneously. The last three predications are the combination of above four predications. The Vedantins, who believe that reality is unchanging and differenceless, and the Buddhists, who regard reality as changing, are both right - though each from his own perspective. Also, neither complete destruction nor absolute origination is possible for what is cannot be turned into nothing and what does not exist cannot be made to exist. The stuff or the dravya of which the things are made continues whereas the forms, modes or paryāya undergo origination and decay. Thus, neither absolute permanence nor absolute impermanence is the truth. The truth lies in permanence-cumimpermanence, existence-and-nonexistence. Everything is real from the standpoint of it's own qualities and unreal from the standpoint of an alien nature or set of qualities. A soul is eternal from the standpoint of a substance and non-eternal from the standpoint of modes. Judgements may be neither purely affirmative nor purely negative. In effect, they may be both (at the same time) provided the thing-- under consideration is viewed, on the one hand, from the point of view of it's own substance, nature etc. and, on the other, from the point of view of another substance, nature etc. The fourth step of Syāvāda presupposes the distinction between 'absolute and relative'. It admits only of relatively indescribable nature of things and does not talk of objects as absolutely indescribable. Thus, the Jains believe that the thing which is absolutely indescribable

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