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Śramaņa, Vol 58, No. 2-3/April-September 2007
either incomplete or complete. The incomplete transcendental perception is either clairvoyance or telepathy. Neither of these, however, opposes the possibility of omniscience, in as much as they deal with things having 'form' and 'mental substance' respectively. Need not to say that the complete transcendental perception that is omniscience itself cannot be said to oppose the possibility of omniscience. Coming to the practical perception, we may say that neither of its two modes viz. the sensuous and the non-sensuous opposes the possibility of omniscience. The non-sensuous perception consists in pleasurable or painful feelings, arising from within the soul itself. None of these proves the impossibility of omniscience. Anumāna cannot establish the non-existence of omniscient beings rather it, in trying to do that posits the possibility of the omniscience. It cannot be argued that Sabda or scriptural authority is opposed to the possibility of omniscience. If the scripture that opposes the omniscience were Apauruşeya (not man made), it would be wrong, because this type of scripture is not possible. On the other hand if it is Pauruşeya (man made), Jainas say that in order that such a scripture may be authoritative, it must be revealed by a being who is omniscient (in which case the possibility of omniscience is proved by the scripture itself: if it is not revealed by such an absolutely wise and omniscient being, we cannot accept its doctrines. Arthapatti proves a fact by offering an explanation, which could not be put forward by the other Pramāņas. Analogy deals with similarity and similar. None of these obviously has anything to offer against the possibility of omniscience. The Abhava Pramāņa deals with the fact of the non-existence. But as Anumana can establish the positive existence of an omniscient being, it cannot be the business of the Abhava- Pramāņa to establish the impossibility of omniscience.
Objections regarding the nature of Omniscience:
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In order to refute the doctrine of omniscience, the Mimāmsakas start with the analysis of the possible meaning of the 'omniscience'. They ask whether the omniscience means the knowledge of everything or merely that of important and essential things of the universe. Jainas cannot accept the second alternative, because unless one knows
