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Concept of Omniscience in Jainism
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in full detail. In Digambara works Nemicandra's Gommatasāra (Jivaprakarana and Karma-kānda), Dravya-samgraha, Labhi-sāra; Amrtacandra's Puruşārtha-siddhyupāya are the prominent work dealing with the problem of omniscience. Rājamalla in Pañcădhyāyi', Hemacandra in Pramānamimāṁsā, Sāntisūri in Nyāyāvatāravārtika vịtti; Māņikyanandī in Parikṣāmukha; Vādībha Simgh in Syādvädsiddhi: Yogindu in Pramāņa-parīksă and Yogasāra; Dharmabhūşaņa in Nyāya-dîpika; Yasovijaya in Jñana-bindu-prakarana and Jainatarka-bhāṣā; Mallişeņa in Syādvād-mañjarī; Guņabhadra in Ātmānusāsana have made valuable contribution to the study of the problem of omniscience. Arguments against Omniscience:
The problem of omniscience has been the most fundamental problem of Jainism. It is vitally associated with their Titharikaras 4. Naturally, vast literature has been developed around this subject. It has encountered opposition from the avowedly heterodox Cārvāks on the one hand and the staunch orthodox Mīmāṁsakas on the other. The Buddhists opposition is more or less centered on their emphasis on the knowledge of duty. The Cārvāks and the skeptics and agnostics have objected the idea of omniscience mainly on epistemological grounds. On the other hand, Mimāmsakas object the idea of omniscience either of god or of man, partly on metaphysics but mainly on religious grounds. Kumārila one of the two main philosophers of Mīmāmsā rejecting the possibility of omniscience says that ‘is there really existed a person knowing all things, through all the six means of knowledge, how could such a person be denied, However, if such a person be assumed to know all things by a single means of knowledge, i. e. perception, such a person would doubtlessly perceive taste and all other objects, by means of sense organs alone. Kumārila's main objection has been to show that in matters of Dharma, Veda is the sole authority. He further argues that when there are many omniscient persons preaching mutually contradictory doctrines- the grounds of reliability being the same in all,- which one of these should be accepted or rejected. If Buddha is omniscient, then what is proof for Kapila not being so?