Sambodhi 1982 Vol 11

Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, H C Bhayani, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 12

A Note of Visesa
at one and the same character. The very characteristic of the particulari. ties is to prove the distinctness and individuality of the eternal substances. Hence, in such case of losing the special-characteristic (Rūpahāni), it is ordained that the class-character should not be imagined. 6
Particularity is self-differentiating or Svatovyāvartaka, because, in absence of such a feature, each particularity should have required as a condition another distinguishing feature, which again in turn would have given chance for, as infinitum, another distinguishing feature. This absurdity of endless chain of imagination is removed by making the particularities svatovyāvartakas. 7
One thing becomes clear on going deep into the problem of viseşa that this is a hypothetical category invented by the Vaišeşikas. The Naiyāyika Raghunātha Siromaņi, much to the chagrin of the synthetic NyāyaVaiseșika system, severely criticises the theory of particularity.8 Raghunatha's objections are not quite unfounded. He holds the opinion that if a category called particularity should be logically imagined to know the individuality of each eternal substance, and, if each particularity is self-differentiated, why should not they imagine all these characteristics directly in the eternal substances themselves ? More-over the Visesa concept involves the prolix imagination, but contrary to it, Raghunatha's suggestion settles the issue directly and precisely. And to both the sides, the help of hypothesis is equally indispensable.9 It is worth mentioning here that Mr. Harsh Narayana tries to find some relation between separate ness and viseșa, and separateness as a basic idea for the Visesa concept, and ho adds "that the category differential might well have been born as a result of a process of carrying the attribute separateness to its logical extremo". 10 This is only another way to reach the same destination and does not make any difference.
Usually the logical imagination does not rest assured until a safe end is reached. The Viseşa concept too is such an end of logical extreme. From the point of realistic classification, the Vaisesika have failed here to prove their mettle; because another objection crops up naturally regarding visesa as a category. Višeşas are not be classified under a separate category because they exist in eternal substances inhecently. Therefore they are qualities or guņas. To it the Vaiseşikas may reply that qualities have a class-character or jāti and consequently the special characteristic of the višeşas will be lost. This may be ruled out on the basis that the self-differentiating character is imposed by imagination on the vise şas as a category; in the same way, let the very self-differentiating characrte