Sambodhi 1982 Vol 11

Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, H C Bhayani, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 11

R. D. Hegde
thoit constituent elements are different and thus, their separateness (prthaktva) is very clear. But in case of the eternal substances, for example, between two atoms, the difference can not be discerned because their separateness does not come under the perview of sense-perception. Eternal Substances are the partless infinite simal substances. Thus, to solve the problem of the cognizance of their separateness, the Vaiếtsika thinkers recog. nise particularity which is supposed to differentiate the eternal subsiances from each other. 1
Each eternal substance is different from any other eternal substance, because otherwise they should be alike, and, consequently the creation of variously different composite substances might be impossible. The eternal substances are ultimate and they have no further constituent elements. Therefore, naturally, the features of the ultimate substances too must be of ultimate characters, and, such an ultimate character. is, according to Kaņāda, called Višeşa or the distinguishing particularity. The composite substances are distinguished by their constituent elements and the eternal substances by their particularities, 2
As the eternal substances are innumerable, so are the Visesas3. Vjśesas inherently exist in their substrata, because inherence exists o. ly between the parts and the wholes, class-characters and individuals, qualities and substances, actions and the actuated, and, eternal substances and particulari. ties. 4 Particularity greatly differs from generality. Just a contrast may make the particularity appear more clearly than it is when seen alone. Generality is a class-character and inclusive, but particularity, quite opposed to generality, is exclusive and not the general character of any class. Secondly, generality exists in all substances, qualities and actions, but particularity only in eternal substances.
Particularity functions simultaneously in two ways, firstly in differentiating each eternal substance from the other, and secondly, in differentiating itself from any other particularity. Therefore, they are aptly known as svatovyāvartakas or the self-differontiating. Sketching their character, Karikāvalı explains that particularities are antya or the ultimate because they function even when all other means of differentiation fails.
It should not be argued that particularities have their class-character called višeşatvajāti, as they inhere in all the eternal substances. This contention leads to helpless confusion. To make it up, the Vajśeşika thinkers contend that if the class-character of Vise şas is acceded, all the different particularities lose their individuality and unite in one, which ultimately circies te in thi! all eternal substances are virtually