Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai

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Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics
theory and assert that a Word and its Object are certainly related. The relation between the Word and its Object is called by the Naiyāyikas Samaya or Sarketa-otherwise called the Vāçya-vāçaka-sambandha. The Nyāya thinkers mean to say that the relationship between a Word and its Object is such that the former is the Vāçaka, i.e. what signifies and the latter is its Vāçya or what is signified. But while agreeing with the Vaiseșika thinkers thus far, the Nyāya philosophers differ from them by pointing out that the Sabda-jñāna or understanding an Object from hearing its corresponding Word is not an inferential knowledge, as alleged by the Vaiseșikas. No person who knows the meaning of a Word would take time in going through a mediate course or syllogistic process to understand the Object signified by it. The Sabda-jñāna is neither perception nor inference; it is a special mode of knowledge according to the Naiyāyika's. Thus the Naiyāyikas differ from the Buddhists in asserting that a Word does signify a real Object. At the same time they would agree with them that the relation between a Word and its Object is never that of identity or of cause and effect. The theory of the Nyāya school is. that a Word expresses its Object, not because they are identical in nature nor because the one originates from the other, but because the Creator fixed particular meanings. for particular Words and the Knowledge of these meanings of Words thus fixed by the Creator has been handed down to us through sages and seers of ancient times.
THE BASIC NATURE OF SOUND. THE BUDDHIST, THE NYĀYAVAIŠEŞIKA, THE SANKHYA AND THE MIMĀMSĀ Views
So far as the nature of Sound is concerned, the Buddhists look upon it as purely unsubstantial. The Nyāya and the Vaiseșika schools also regard it as a temporary phenomena. but call it a Guņa or attribute of a material substance: Ākāśa. The philosophers of the Sāṁkhya school seem to go a step farther. They are not prepared to look upon Sound as wholly unsbustantial or temporary phenomenon. They would not even be satisfied with the position that it is an