Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai

Page 24

Introduction
What then is the Object of our sensation? It is something absolutely particular (FASETT). It contains nothing which is supplied by our faculties of memory or imagination. But what does a Word indicate? A Word, “Tree" for instance, tells us, the Object indicated by it is one among numerous such Objects which we previously perceived and to which we have given the general appellation "Tree". A Word is thus embodied generalisation: that is, a concept which has no real existence. A Word which is thus an embodiment of a general idea cannot signify a real Object, as it presents itself to our Prat yaksa or direct apprehension.
A Word according to the Buddhists, is not really related to its so-called Object but is simply conceived to be attached to it.
THE VAŠEȘIKA VIEW
The Vaiseșika school on the contrary point out that it is undeniable that a Word signifies its Object. A Buddhist uses the argument which consists in words to establish his doctrine of the unsubstantiality of sounds. But if Words have no power to signify their Objects, then the Buddhist argument itself becomes unsubstantial. The Vaiśeșika, however, maintains that the apprehension of an Object from hearing its Sound (i.e. corresponding Word) is really Anumāna, mediate or inferential knowledge. The understanding of an Object from hearing its corresponding Word is dependent on one's previously knowing the significance of the Word. A man who has not the previous knowledge about the significance of the Word, "Tree", would not be able to understand the Object, “Tree”, from hearing the word "Tree". A man according to the Vaiseșika philosopher does thus understand an Object from hearing its corresponding Word, not directly, of course,---but mediately through his previous knowledge about the significance of the Word.
THE NYAYA VIEW
The thinkers of the Nyāya school also reject the Buddhist