New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

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Jaina Logic of Agama Period 7
branches-Hinayana and Mahāyāna, the latter again being divided into two-idealism and nihilism. According to the Buddhist idealists, the cognitum, as different from the cognition, is not real. It is only imaginary and illusive like the dream or the will-o'-thewisp. Sankara Vedanta also holds a similar view. Among the Western thinkers, Hume and Berkeley have also denied the existence of anything other than the stream of experience. All the philosophers of the idealistic persuasion have denied the real existence of things of the world.
Definition of Nyaya (Logic)
The existence of things is self-evident. The knower may know it or not, but it makes no difference in their existence. They become known when the knower knows them, and if such knowledge is right or is the determinant of the object, it is called the valid organ of knowledge. The definition of the science of logic has been formulated on this basis. According to Vātsyāyana, the author of the Nyāya Bhāṣya, the term nyaya stands for an examination of reality by means of a valid organ of knowledge (pramāņa)." According to Umāsvāti the knowledge of the real is obtained through pramāņa (a comprehensive organ of knowledge) and naya (a partial organ of knowledge). In the light of this aphorism in the system of Jaina Logic the term nyāya should be defined as pramāṇanayairarthadhigamo nyāyaḥ. Nyaya is the knowledge of the real by means of pramāņa and naya. In other words the ascertainment or exami:nation of the nature of reality by means of pramāņa and naya is nyaya. Uddyotakara, the author of the Nyayavārtika, defines nyaya as the knowledge of reality through the action of an instrument of knowledge." In the Jaina tradition the term yukti (reasoning) is more prevalent than the term nyaya. It is held by Yativṛṣabha that to the person who does not examine objects by means of pramāṇa, naya and nikṣepa, the right appears as wrong and the wrong as right."4
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The meaning of the term pramāņa is right knowledge. The term naya stands for the intention or purpose of the knower who knows a particular aspect of the object. The term nikṣepa means the way of knowing the object in respect of the aspect presented. The ascertainment of the meaning of the object, arrived at by reasoning through pramāņa, naya and nikṣepa is nyaya. This nyaya, according to Yativṛṣabha, has been handed down from generation to generation. The expression 'syat' is the representative of Jaina nyaya according to Acarya Samantabhadra. Absolute