Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai

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Reals in the faina Metaphysics
exposition of this apparently real consists in a ruthless exposure of its nature as unsubstantial nothing, his explanation would not be less correct or acceptable on that account. The Buddhist and the Vedāntist support their positions by recognised rules and procedure of argumentation and their logic appeals to many, to whom their presentations of the objects of experience as essentially unsubstantial seem to be the only consistent explanations. The Sūnyavāda and the Kevalūdvaita are thus as good systems of philosophy as any other.
THE JAINA SYSTEM
Even now to many, as to us thirty years ago, the fainas appear to be a queer sort of people who are remarkable for their fastidious and ostentatious practice of non-violence. That the Jainas had a glorious tradition, a rich literature of which any people, ancient or modern, would be proud, is even now not known to those, to whom it is now high time that it should be known. About 25 years ago I came to be acquainted with the fact of the existence of a vast Jaina literature, covering almost all the branches of human knowledge. For the first time, then, I came to know that the Jainas had a theory of the universe, a philosophy of theirs. A little introduction into the study of the Jaina philosophy convinced me that it has a glorious place in the systems of Indian philosophy. Later, and a bit deeper study has confirmed my view and I shall try in these lectures to indicate briefly the Jaina theories about the Reals, side by side, with the similar theories of other schools.
THE LOGICAL AND THE CHRONOLOGICAL STANDPOINTS
In this connection we feel it necessary to guard our readers against a misconception about our business in these lectures. Here and there, we shall state a particular theory in juxta-position with another theory or theories about the same matter. We shall describe, for example, the Jaina doctrine about a subject, as it is opposed to, say, the Mimānsā theory, or as it is similar, say, to the Nyāya contention.