Jaina Tarka Bhasha

Author(s): Dayanand Bhargava
Publisher: Motilal Barasidas Pvt Ltd

Page 75

33
The Organ of Knowledge vations, he grasps the concomitance by direct perception with the help of five non-observations ; for it is said:
(1) No knowledge of smoke, (2) knowledge of fire, (3) knowledge of smoke and (4) no knowledge of fire and (5) smoke, thus by direct perception and by nonobservation by these five there is the adjustment (of the knowledge of the concomitance); this is wrong; even the two types of direct perception-observation and non-observation--can perceive an object which is at hand and cannot have any imagination (of the past or the future) and therefore, is not capable of observing all objects mediated by distance etc.
*33. As regards the view point of the Naiyāyikas who hold that reasoning is the reference to determinant concomitant when there is a doubt about determinate concomitant and this is like a particular observation only helpful in the organ of knowledge at the time of the opponents or is only just its concurrent as remover of the doubt of the opponent and is not in itself an organ of knowledge; this is not so; because reasoning is in itself an organ of knowledge in the form of grasping the concomitance and giving definitive knowledge of the self and others, and the logic, as assumed by the opponents also sometimes being a part of this thinking or as being the remover of the doubt of one who wants to conclude perversely or even independently, being a remover of the doubt in general, is used. In this way, the validity of reasoning asserted by Dharmabhūşaņa as remover of ignorance is justified inasmuch as it is the remover of false knowledge conclu ing in the definitive knowledge of the self, on which (definitive knowledge) depend the usage of the knowledge of the objects in knowledge; it is the resulta nt in general.
[15. The defiinition of the inference for one self, after classifying inference into two]
*31. Inference is the knowledge of probandum from probane. It is of two varieties : for oneself and for others. The inference for oneself is the probandum caused by the recollection of the relationship and the knowledge of the probane, e.g. the knowledge, that the mountain contains fire', arising in a