________________
Notes
115
P. 11.L.20-25. The Naiyayikas maintain that reasoning is only helpful in removing doubts about concomitance and is not independent organ of knowledge (Cintāmaņi, Anumāna Khaṇḍa, p. 210). Fire is inferred from smoke, here smoke is determinate concomitant (Vyapya) and fire is determinant concomitant (Vyapaka). If there is any doubt about the universality of the concomitance it is asserted that where determinant concomitant is absent determinate concomitant is also absent. This is known as aharya knowledge which has no subject of
its own.
The purpose of the reasoning according to the Naiyayikas is two-fold it is helpful in the organ of the knowledge at the time of the doubt raised by the opponent, or to be brief, it removes the doubt of the opponent.
In either case it is only helpful in the organ of knowledge. The position is clarified by means of an example. Suppose, there is doubt about an object as to whether it is man or the trunk of a tree. When we settle this doubt we have two types of decisions :
I. This is the trunk of the tree.
II. This is not man.
According to the Jainas, this is for the second decision that we require reasoning. According to the Naiyayikas even this second decision can be arrived at by perception which cognises the absence (abhava) also through contact of the qualifications through the contact of the qualified.
The Jainas accept reasoning as an independent organ of knowledge because it fulfils all the conditions laid down at the beginning of our text in para I. The form of reasoning as accepted by the Naiyayikas is also useful in three ways: I. When there is doubt about the universality of the
concomitance.
II. When an opponent, who wants to arrive at perverse conclusion, raises doubt.
III. When there is doubt independent of the conditions laid down in number I and II above.
P. 11. L. 25-27. A doubt arises as to how the position of Dharmabhusana, who maintained reason as remover of ignorance, could be reconciled with that of the Naiyayikas who main
