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Notes
119
comitance is valid with reference to subject only, the association of the subject with the probandum will be known just at the time of grasping the concomitance itself. This objection is answered by saying that if it were so, the very exercise of inference would be futile because the knowledge desired by the inference would be attained at the time of the cognition of concomitance.
P. 13.L.1-6. Nyayakumudacandra (p. 442 ), gives some details about the invalid inference where the thesis is hindered or where the reason is inconclusive. In the first case, it would be observed that there is no logical impossibility of the one in the absence of the other (avinābhāva) and therefore, the question of any valid concomitance does not arise. In the second case of inconclusive reason, the counter-argument would contradict the argument only when it is stronger. But the fact that it is stronger cannot be proved, when the conditions laid down for a valid cause are fulfilled in both the cases. It would, therefore, lead to the fallacy of interdependence (anyonyasraya); the inference would be inconclusive if the counter-argument is stronger and the counter-argument would prove to be stronger if the inference is inconclusive.
The definition of the Naiyayikas it too narrow (avyāpta) because, as explained above, there are examples of valid inference, where the conditions, laid down by the Naiyayikas are not fulfilled and it is also over-lapping (ativyāpta) because there are examples where the five-fold conditions are fulfilled and yet the inference is not valid. The example as given in the text is as follows: 'He is black, because he is his son': The other sons of the same persons are known to be black and hence this inference. This inference is held to be invalid even by the Naiyayikas on account of the presence of condition (upadhi) and is therefore, an example of non-existent concomitance (vyāpyatvasiddha).
P. 13. L. 9-11. The definition of probandum has been taken verbatum from Pramāṇanayatatṭvālokālankāra (3. 15). The purpose of each epithet as given in this definition has also been almost taken verbatum from that very book (3. 15-17). The paras 39 and 40, however, offer additional explanation regarding this definition.
