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much of difference between the two; the inference-for-others being always the follower of inference-for-the-self.
P. 13. L. 24-25. When the probandum is to be explained with reference to necessary concomitance, the quality alone is the probandum, whereas from the point of view of inference, the subject together with the quality is probandum. If we do not accept this distinction and insist on the subject together with its quality as probandum, no necessary concomitance would be possible when we speak of the smoke and the fire in the necessary concomitance 'where there is smoke, there is fire', where there is no reference to the thesis, mountain.' Compare Pramānanayatattvā lokalankāra (3.19).
P. 14. L. 2-3. The idea is that the thesis consists of the two-the qualified and the quality. We may take them together as one thesis or may mention them separately as two constituents of one thesis.
P. 14. L. 8-10. The inference 'an omniscient exists because there are no definite proofs to prove the contrary in the inference' is used by the Jainas to prove the existence of omniscient to the Mimāṁsakas, who do not believe in the existence of omniscient. Now the qualified object, omniscient, is accepted for the sake of argument; it may prove to be existing or otherwise only after the inference has been conclusively decided. This type of qualified object is said to be option ally proved. The Naiyāyikas, who do not mention this type of qualified object, would change the form of the inference to 'somebody is omnicient thereby making ‘somebody' the qualified object. As regards the second inference 'the horns-of-thedonkey do not exist, Yasovijaya also accepts, following ViBhā (1574), that here it is the existence of horns in the donkey which is denied, because the non-existent, the horns-of-thedonkey, cannot be denied.
P. 14. L. 16-18. The objection of the Buddhists of making existence the probandum is of a fundamental nature. The Buddhists accept only the particular object which is momentary, without parts and independent of each other, as the only reality. They do not accept the general (Sāmānya). When we say that the existence is the probandum, the question arises that whether we want to prove the particular existence or the
