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Notes
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about it or in explaining it to others, is known as sentient substance-symbol. The body of person who is not engaged in the conscious activity is the semi-sentient substance-symbol. If the person is not engaged in the conscious activity at present, his body is the knower's semi-sentient substancesymbol. If the person concerned does not know at present but would know in future, his body is known as would be semi-sentient substance-symbol. The Karmic material (consisting of karma or no-karma) which is also connected with the person is known as the third semi-sentient substance-symbol (Nyāyakumudacandra, pp. 806-807).
P. 25. Para 6. The basic idea is that the four symbols are partly identical and partly different. The replacement symbol differs from name and substance inasmuch as one behaves with the replacement-symbol as it were real whereas one does not do so with the name-symbol and substancesymbol. The substance-symbol, on the other hand, has the capacity to assume reality, which the name-symbol and replacement-symbol do not have. Compare ViBhā, 53-54.
P. 26. para 7. The doubt raised in this para and the answers offered are taken from Vi Bha 55-72. The Jaina philosophy accepts all of them removing mutual contradiction, if any, whereas the non-7 aina systems insist on one of the other aspects (ViBhā, 72).
P. 27. para 8. The name-symbol is said to be accepted by the point of view of substance. The reason is that naming of an object is not possible if we view it from the modal point because the modes change every moment and if we keep the modes in view it is not possible to give any name to it.
The difference of opinion expressed in line 15 has already been given in the text p. 21, line 20.
The replacement-symbol is also to be accepted by substantial point of view only because it does not take into account the shape and identifies one object with the other which is not possible in case of mode.
As regards the substance-symbol, it is obviously to be accepted by the substantial point of view, because it presumes unity amongst the modes of past, present and future.
It is only the real which is to be accepted by the modal points of view.
