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Notes
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The answer to this objection is that this would be valid only if the qualified object, which is optionally proved, were to be experienced in toto. Once an object has been experienced in toto, there is no question of its denial. The question is then how do we experience the optionally proved qualified object. One answer can be that optionally proved qualified object is experienced as qualified by words etc. Now in such cases, the inference would have the limited purpose of removing any doubt about the qualifications etc. or of removing any perverted knowledge about the existence of the qualification. This type of inference is conditional and has only a limited purpose. Therefore, this position also can be only partially acceptable.
The correct position, therefore, is that the non-existent object is experienced only in parts, which are existent.
P. 15. L. 6-8. To take another example, an absolutely external object is not capable of performing any action, because there is no simultaneity or order'; here the qualified objectabsolutely eternal object-is not accepted by the Jainas themselves, who infer and yet the Jainas make absolutely eternal object as qualified object for the sake of argument, because it is easier to prove the non-existence of an absolutely eternal object in this way. The argument would proceed in this way: in an absolutely eternal object, there is no order or simultaneity and when there is no order or simultaneity, there is no capability of performance of any action and in the absence of capability of any action, the existence of an absolutely eternal object cannot be proved. It may, however, be pointed out here that Yasovijaya has positively said (The Text, p. 14, 1. 13-14) earlier that in the case of an optionally proved qualified object, the probandum is limited to existence, and non-existence whereas in the inference, under discussion, this rule appears to have been violated inasmuch as the qualified object (absolutely eternal object) is optionally proved and yet the probandum is neither existence nor non-existence but absence of capability of performing any action.
P.15.L.11. The three parts of inference meant for the self (or alternatively two parts) have already been discussed in the text in para 41 on page 13. The Jainas hold
