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Jaina-Tarka-Bhāşă
of 'unproved-for-either', because when something is held to be unproved for either of the two, the disputant and the opponent, it becomes the duty of the one party, who maintains it to be proved, to prove it to the other party also. If he gives a proof, it becomes proved for both and if he cannot give a proof, it remains unproved for both. In either case the fallacy of unproved-for-either cannot be proved. The argument that it can be said to be 'unproved-for-either' as long as the other party advances a proof to prove it, is not valid, because nobody can declare a jewel as artificial (ratnābhāsa) unless it is proved to be so. The idea is that no object under discussion or examination, can be said to be false unless the result of the discussion or examination is known. That object can, at the best, be said to be unproved only secondarily. An object becomes primarily unproved only when it is proved to be so conclusively.
Another objection against holding, “unproved-for-either' as fallacy would be that if we accept it, the disputant would be defeated without any difficulty, as the opponent can conveniently say that the cause, advanced by the disputant, is unproved for him and as such is fallacious. The disputant cannot get rid of this difficulty by proving the cause, challanged by the opponent, as when once the fallacy has been shown, the disputant gets defeated and he cannot continue the arguments any more. The answer in that “unproved-for-either' is a fallacy and it does not lead to an easy defeat of the disputant as shown above. The fallacy'unproved-for-either' leads to the defeat not just by the opponent declaring it to be so, but only either when the convinced disputant, even though himself adopting a correct probane, is unable to prove it to the opponent on account of forgetfulness about the arguments in its support, and at the same time does not accept that the probane is unproved or when the disputant advances a cause, which he himself does not hold to be correct and yet advances it only because the opponent accepts it.
The essence of this discussion is that the cause becomes fallacious if one party, which advances it, cannot prove it on account of forgetfulness even though it is itself convinced of its correctness. The cause is, obviously, fallacious if its correct
