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Jaina-Tarka-Bhâșa
(7) other qualities do not have contact with the object in the same way as existence has contact with it and (8) the word, existence, which here indicates the object which has existence cannot signify the object which is possessed of qualities other than existence.
The text in para 65 follows Syadvadmañjari (pp. 193-194).
CHAPTER 2
ON THE PARTIAL POINT OF VIEW
P. 21. L. 14-15. This chapter deals with the nature of the partial point of view as cogniser of a part of an object but not overlooking the other parts of it. Amộtacandra Sūri says that the Jaina doctrine of naya gives prominence to a particular aspect leaving aside the other aspect, thereby churning the nectar of reality first as a milkmaid draws part of the rope of the churning rod by one hand loosening the other part to get butter out of curd (Puru sārthasiddhyupāya, 225).
Naya has been defined as the intention of the knower. (Nyāyakumudacandra, p. 606).
The fallacious partial point of view has been explained in the text itself (pp. 24-25).
P. 21. L. 15-16. The ślokavārtlika (1. 6) argues, “if the part of the sea only be looked upon as the sea, the remaining part of the sea would be a non-sea or the sea becomes a conglomerate of countless seas and there would be none who knows the sea fully.” So a part of an object is neither the object nor a non-object. It is interesting to note that Malayagiri (Avaśyakaniryukti, p. 369A) holds that all partial points of view are false because the partial point of view which takes into account the other partial points of view into account, is really an organ of knowledge. So the partial point of view is only that which takes into account the part of the object. This point of view of Malayagiri is exceptional and is not accepted by logicians. Yasovijaya falls in line with the general view when he defines false point of view.
