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136
Jaina-Tarka-Bhāṣā
and existing in a part of the subject.
P. 19. L. 1-2. The two types of the 'immaterial cause can be illustrated as follows: (1) sound is audible, because it has the class-essence of sound (Here the audibility of sound is very well known). (2) Fire is cold, because it is a substance (Here the probandum 'coldness' is contradicted by perception). The first of these is an example of fallacious thesis, known as pratita-sādhyadharmaviśeşana. We have already noted in the text above (para 38, page 13) that the probandum should not be already known. The second is the example of pratyakşa-niräkrtasādhya-dharma-visesana.
The argument against any other fallacy, except the three mentioned above, is this that the necessary concomitance can remain unknown either through indecision or through error or through doubt. If it is through indecision, it is unproved; if it is through error, it is contradictory; if it is through doubt, it is inconclusive. So the question of accepting any other fallacy does not arise.
P. 19. L. 3-4. What is called as 'mis-timed' here, is generally known as 'obstructed' (bādhita) and is accepted in a case ‘where the negation of the thing to be proved is established by another (stronger) proof'. (Tarkasangraha, p. 48). It is the same as the second variety of the 'immaterial', illustrated above; it, therefore, needs no separate refutation.
P. 19. L. 4-5. What is called as 'inconclusive' here is generally known as satpratipakșa amongst the Naiyāyikas and is accepted in a case 'wherein there is another reason proving the negation of the thing to be proved' (Tarkasangraha, p. 43). Its example is : 'sound is eternal, because it is audible like any other sound; and sound is non-eternal, because it is a creation like jar.' It may be pointed out that in the case of an inconclusive cause, the counter-argument is of equal force; if it becomes stronger, it becomes a case of obstructed (bādhita).
Now it is clear that if two contradictory reasons of equal force were to be given, the necessary concomitance, on which the inference stands, would stand unproved and hence, it would be included in the unproved type of fallacious cause.
P. 19. L. 7-9. The objection that the scriptures are not
