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120
Jain-Tarka-Bhāsā
P. 13. L. 12-16. It has been said above that the probandum are those objects which are either doubted or grasped contradictorily. Now in this para it is explained that a contradictorily grasped object may also become a probandum The reason is simple. It is not necessary that only a person full of deubts may enter into a debate; it is equally possible that even an ignorant or a perverted person may do so. Now if the opponent is in doubt, the probandum would be a doubtful object but if he is ignorant or perverted, the probandum would be a contradictorily grasped object. It is also not necessary that a debate be always aimed at the attainment of knowledge. Sometimes, the debates may be aimed at victory. In such cases one of the disputants is perverted and is proud. In such cases also the probandum is not doubted but contradictorily grasped.
P. 13. L. 17-23. Both the parties in a debate must agree that the probandum is not refuted by any other organ of knowledge or otherwise there is no point in proceeding with the inference at all. As far as the quality of desirability goes, the probandum is desirable to the person, who uses the inference. In the autocommentary on Pramāṇanayatattvālokālankāra, Syädvādaratnākara (p. 538), an inference is quoted to prove the point. This inference is repeated in the text also. The Sankhya uses an inference for the Buddhist to prove the existence of soul : 'eyes etc. are meant for others'. Now, how do we interpret the term, 'for others'? If, 'for others' is not taken to mean 'soul', it may mean anything which is not eyes etc.
The Buddhists also accept that the eyes etc. are not meant for themselves but for something which is a collection. This would mean the agreement of the two and consequently the futility of the inference. The Buddhists on the contrary do not accept this inference and point out the fallacy of incoherence etc. in it. This implies that they also accept that here the probandum is the soul. This goes to prove our point that the probandum should be such as is desirable to one who uses the inference.
All this discussion is relevent in cases of inferences-forothers. Here, however, the context is that of inferences-for-theself. Yet the problem has been discussed because there is not
