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P. 2.L.7—The earlier Jaina scriptures mention five types of knowledge, which are classified here—as also elsewhere in the later Jaina philosophical works-into two types of cognition.
P. 2.L.13-Any knowledge born with the help of an instrument—like senses or mind—which is different from the soul, was originally held to be indirect, but as all the non-Jaina systems considered it to be direct, Jinabhadra (ViBhā, 95), who is here followed by Yaśovijaya, fell in line with other systems by according such knowledge the status of empirically direct knowledge. The original concept of direct knowledge was included in the concept of transcendentally direct knowledge. For reasons of such adjustment, see Dr. Nathmal Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, pp. 28-29.
P. 2.L.15--Anīndriya means quasi-sensuous-- Cf line 20 below.
P. 2.L.17—Non-existent (asiddha) means that which does not exist in the thesis, inconclusive (anaikāntika) means that which exists in the heterologous also, and contradictory (viruddha) means that which co-exists with the absence of probandum Cf. Pramāṇasangraha, p. 111.
P. 2.L.20-Eyes, etc. include ear, eyes, smell, taste and touch-Nandīsūtra, 2-5.
P. 2.L.21–For a detailed discussion on whether mind is a sense or not, see Dr. Nathmal Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, pp. 31-32.
P. 2.L.23-28. Dr Radhakrishnan's following remarks make the difference of the sensuous cognition ( matijñāna ) and scriptual knowledge ( śrutajñāna ) clear : "Mati is ordinary cognition, obtained by normal means of sense perception... Sruta or testimony is knowledge derived through signs, symbols or words. While matijñāna gives us knowledge by acquaintance, this gives only knowledge by description"-Indian Philosophy Vol. I, pp. 294-95.
The matter, however, is not so simple. The difference between the two was clear as long as śrutajñāna actually stood for the scriptural knowledge. It was so only in the earlier
