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Jaina-Tarka-Bhāzā
argument of Jayanta (Nyayamañjarī, p. 461) in his mind. Jayanta has conceived of a mental perception responsible for recognition. There is, in fact, no difference between the procedure laid down by Jayanta on the one hand and by the Jaina logician on the other; the difference is only that of name.
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P. 9 L. 27-30. The Naiyayikas hold that the senses do come into contact with the qualified object in the case of recognition, hence it is a case of direct perception, the qualification of the qualified also being known through the help of recollection. Now, this contention is also wrong; for in experiences such as 'he is like this' the qualified object (he) does not come into contact with the senses, though this is also a case of recognition. Here also it is doubtful whether experiences like 'he is like this' should really be called recognition. The Naiyayikas are correct if we accept what the common man understands from recognition. The definition of recognition, as given by the Jaina logicians, includes much more than what the prevalent meaning of the term indicates.
P. 10. L. 3-6. Even the Mimämsakas and Naiyayikas, who hold recognition to be vaild, do not extend the scope of recognition to be cognition of similarity or to be the cognition qualified by similarity. These two are, according to them, the subject of analogy, which is an independent organ of knowledge. The similarity is perceived directly and the cow is the subject of recollection, yet the qualified gavaya is the subject of analogy.
P. 10 L. 8-10. The Jainas hold any synthetic knowledge caused by experience and recollection to be recognition. The cognition, based on analogy, according to the Mimāmsakas, is also a synthetic knowledge caused by experience and recollection and as such is perfectly within the limits of recognition, as conceived by the Jainas. The objection-if we were to accept an independent organ of knowledge for such cognitions as 'gavaya is like cow', we have to accept another organ of knowledge for such cognitions as 'a buffalo is different from the cow' is not valid. In fact Tasovijaya missed the point that those who believed in analogy as an independent organ of knowledge, include dissimilarity also as the subject of analogy. Not only this, they include the knowledge of an object, quali
