Book Title: Jaina Tarka Bhasha
Author(s): Dayanand Bhargava
Publisher: Motilal Barasidas Pvt Ltd

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Page 113
________________ ( 91 ) pramāṇas, other than pure knowledge, is a spirit of appropriation, avoidance or indifference whereas the indirect resultant of pure knowledge is only a spirit of indifference (VI. 4-5). Here the Jainas show a better understanding of the problem by stating the resultant of the pure knowledge separately, while the Naiyāyikas do not do so. The argument that the resultant of pramāṇa in the form of the spirit of appropriation, etc., should be different from the pramāņa itself, does not hold good (VI. 7) because both, the pramāṇa and its resultant, belong to the one and the same cogniser (VI. 8). Therefore, the difference between the two is only partial (VI. 6). As far as the direct resultant, viz., the removal of ignorance is concerned, it is obviously identical with pramāna, which is knowledge (VI. 12). Thus, this is one way of proving that the pramāṇa and its resultant are partly identical and partly different. Even the direct resultant is not absolutely identical with the pramāņa, because the latter is the instrument whereas the former is its effect and the two cannot be obsolutely identical (V1. 15). Vādi Devas üri (VI. 16) accepts that the resultant is the knowledge of the self as well as the non-self. This is the view of the traditional Jaina logicians. Yasovijaya, however, does not follow the Jaina tradition but adopts the view of the Vijñānavādî Buddhists in accepting the knowledge of the self only as the resultant. Pandita Sukhalalaji has suggested that the knowledge of the self is, in reality, the resultant; the knowledge of the non-self is automatically implied therein [Commentary on the Text, p. 32). The way for Yasovijaya has already been paved by Akalanka who held that each succeeding member of determinate perception, speculation, perceptual judgment, retention, memory recognition, reasoning and inference is the resultant of each antecedent member (Laghiyastrayī,1.6). If we accept this, each member, except the first and the last, would be pramāna as well as resultant and thus the identity-cum-difference between the two is established. This position was further strengthened, às shown above, by Vadi Devas ūri. rasovijaya took the advantage of this background and interpreted the identity-cum

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