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P. 1. L. 1. Cf. Daśavaikālika, 1. 1., devā vi tań nammsasti jassa dhamme sayā mano
'Even the gods bow down to him whose mind is always engaged in dhamma'.
P. 1. L. 2. For the partial point of view (naya) see supra p. 71. For the different ways of putting a thing see supra p. 77.
P.4. L. 4. A glance at the definition of pramāņa, given by differant Jaina logicians and collected by Pandita Sukhalalaji in his notes on Pramāņa mīmāmsā and also by Pandita Kailash Chandraji in his Jaina-nyāya (p. 45), would clarify that Yasovijaya has borrowed his definition directly from Vadidevasūri (Pramānanayatattvalokālankāra 1. 2.) Siddhasena (Nyāyāvatāra, 1)and Samantabhadra (Apta mimāṁsā, 63) who say that pramāṇa is illuminator (abhāsi and ābhā saka) of the self and the others. Tasovijaya, following, Vadidevas üri replaced the word'illuminator' by definitive cognition (vyavasāyr).
Following the Mimāṁsakas and the Buddhists, Bhatta Akalanka (Aştaśatī, Astasāhasri, p. 175) and Mānikyanandi (Parzkşāmukha, 1.1) lay down the condition that the pramāņa should reveal an object, hitherto unknown (apūrvārtha). Tasovijaya has followed the majority of the Jaina logicians in this connection and has not made any reference to the condition. He was of course conscious of this condition as is clear from his text p. 6 line 7.
Siddhasena, quoted above, says that pramāņa should be immune from contradictions (bādhavarjitam). He is followed by Akalanka, quoted above. Tasovijaya shows his awareness of of this condition when he observes that recollection is also an organ of knowledge, because it is coherent like perception etc: (Text, p. 9 line 1).
P. 1. L. 4. The Naiyāyikas hold that knowledge does not cognise itself. It has to be cognised by another knowledge called anuvyavasāya. The Jainas, like the Buddhists and the Vedāntists accept the self-illuminating nature of the knowledge. Therefore, the word 'self' in the definition is significant.
