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Concept of "Jiva (Soul)" in Jaina Philosophy
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liberation, because of there being the absence of such qualities in it, Soul becomes devoid of qualities (nirguna) in one respect just like the Self (Purusa) of the SamkhyaYoga. That is to say, in the liberated condition?? Soul, having been bereft of qualities with the marks of origination and destruction by all means, becomes attributeless substance like the Self (Purusa) of the Samkhya-Yoga. Similarly, according to the NyāyaVaišeşika philosophy, the liberated Soul becomes ākāśa-kalpa. But between these two systems, the difference is this much only that ākaša, being a non-corporeal even, is accepted as material (bhautika),78 while Soul is non-corporeal and non-material. There is no iota of difference between the emancipated soul and ākāśa (space or ether) from the point of view of the absence of inherent consciousness and the qualities like buddhi (intelligence), etc., or of their modes. Ākāśa is one single whole, while the liberated Soul is infinite in number. This numerical difference comes into thought.
The Nyāya-Vaišeșika system has the remarkable similarity and dissimilarity with the Jaina and Sāṁkhya-Yoga Philosophies in regard to many other aspects of the nature of Soul. Jaina metaphysics accepts the natural doership and enjoyership in Soul; so do the Nyāya-Vaišeşika admit such capacities in it. But the doership and enjoyership of Soul of the former system continue even in its perfect liberated condition, while such is not the case with the latter.74 So long there is the body, the origination and destruction of the qualities like knowledge (or intelligence), desire, etc., take place in Soul, there exist the doership and enjoyership in it up to the end 78, but there does not remain any trace of them in its liberated state. Similarly, Soul as conceived in the Nyāya-Vaišeşika becomes identical with the Self (Puruşa) of the Sāmkhya-Yoga in its liberated condition.
The concept of the doership and enjoyership in Soul of the Nyāya-Vaišeșika is of different kind. It accepts the Soul-Substance as unchangeable permanent (kūtasthanitya); hence the doership and enjoyership of any kind can not be explained to take place in it directly. For this reason, this philosophy brings about such doership and enjoyership in it by accepting the origination and destruction of the qualities in it. It says: “When there is the inherence of the qualities like knowledge, desire, effort, etc., in the soul, then it is the doer and enjoyer."76 But in the absence of these qualities by all means in the liberated condition of Soul, there does not exist any perceptible or conceivable doership and enjoyership in it. Nevertheless, such usage was made from the point of view of the past.
Like the Jaina system the Nyāya-Vaišeşika, even having accepted the doership and enjoyership of Soul, can explain its kūțastha-nit yatā (unchangeable permanence), for, according to its views, the qualities like knowledge, etc. are by all means distinct from it (Soul-Substance). Therefore, there take place origination and destruction of its qualities, even then this system brings about its absolute permanence conceived by its own theory because of the view of distinction of the quality and its substratum. The Samkhya tradition does not accept the existence of any kind of qualities in the Self for explaining its absolute permanence. And there where comes up the question of change
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