Aspect of Jainology Part 3 Pandita Dalsukh Malvaniya

Author(s): M A Dhaky, Sagarmal Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith

Page 434

Concept of "Jiva (Soul)” in Jaina Philosophy
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opposite doctrine of Asat (Non-Existence); some did both; some established the theory of anubhava (experience or realization). Similarly, many groups, holding Reality as permanent, non-permanent, both (permanent and non-permanent), not-both and one, many, both one and many), not-both, etc., were continuing. It appeared to Nāgārjuna that it was not proper to fall in the line of these groups in accordance with the middle path of Buddha. This thought led him to the direction of Reality (tattva) which was free from these catuṣkoțis (groups or points of disputation). And consequently he established Sünyavāda (the doctrine of essencelessness or voidness of all appearances) out of this deliberation. 'Sünya' means dharma-nairātmya or niņsvabhāvatā. It was not the middle path to be bound in any Dharmin (substratum) or Dharma (element) and in this or that side. That which is Transcendental Reality is free from points of disputation or groups (catuskoțis) and is only apprehensible by knowledge. For this reason, even while determining sünyavāda, he maintained madhyamapratipada or the doctrine of spiritual elevation also.
After this came at last the Yogācāra school to which it appeared as such that Šūnyavāda did not make a determination of any Reality by bhāvātmaka (thoughtful or emotional) or methodical way. Consequentiy, nama-tattva of Buddha, which centred on consciousness; also became as void (śünyavat) in the views of the people. Certainly, such a thought led the Yogācärins to the side of the doctrine of consciousness. They established nama, citta, cetanā, or ātmā (mind, consciousness or soul), whatever one calls them, as the only vij napti (consciousness or beginningless root ideas or instinct of mind). The speciality of this theory from the first four doctrines as discussed above is this that the early Buddhists, having accepted the actual existence of the external matter apprehended by pure sensation or the senses (vijnanabahya-indriyagrāhya-bhūtabhautika-tattva), used to think on the problem, while the Vijñānavādins-old and new, did not admit the separate existence of such external matters and said that the corporeal reality (mūrtatattva) which the Buddhist and other than the Buddhists called 'Rüpa' (Matter) is one aspect of nature of consciousness itself (vijnana) only, but it appears to be different froin consciousness due to ignorance (avidya) desire (vāsanā) and hypocrisy (samvrti). In this way the Buddhist tradition regarding the nature of Soul at last became established in the Vijñānavāda of the Yogācāra School, after having crossed many stages, and Dharmakirti, śāntarakṣita, and Kamalasila made successful attempts to make it comprehensible by the intellect.o 1
Whatever branch of the Buddhist Philosophy may be the real distinction of the issues of citta (Citta-santāna) of its own doctrine or of Jiva (Soul) by the difference of body is desirable to it. The Vijñānādvaitavādins, who did not accept anything other than consciousness as real, also followed the postulation of the distinction of Soul by the difference body,'% having accepted the real mutual distinction of the issues of consciousness. This postulation was one general characteristic of the Sramanic tradition.
In regard to the dimension of Citta, Vijñāna-santati or Jiva, the Buddhist tradition did not bring forward any real thought by which it can certainly be said in this