Aspect of Jainology Part 3 Pandita Dalsukh Malvaniya

Author(s): M A Dhaky, Sagarmal Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith

Page 493

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D. D. Daye
drstāntal regardless of what the recipient "understands" about the “understood" concomitance of a particular PA (3.3.1.4, 5 and 3.3.2.4, 5).
I now offer two translations and comments regarding drstāntal about which shall argue in my discussion of the justification of dņstāntal as “warrant”. The fallacy of the absence of a conditional formulation of concomitance (3.3.1. (4)) “Ananvaya" is the name of the fallacy of a statement of (positive) concomitance which lacks the conditional form.
“A fallacious warrant (dsstāntal) is where a statement of (positive) concomitance (which expresses) the co-existence of both the property-to-be-proved and the property of the means of proof, lacks explicit illustration; hence, it is well-known that (the properties of) being causally generated and impermanence reside in a pot." Note that this fallacy ("resemblance” (ābhāsa) of a legitimate PA) is an extension of a legitimate PA, as in Model I. However the explicit statement of the conditional warrant is missing, "whatever is causally, that is impermanent generated.” Thus the explicit presence of the conditional warrant, not just the statement of the similar exemplification nor merely the juxtaposition of the properties, is a necessary condition for a legitimate PA. If the statement of the drstanta! is necessary, what then, is its metalogical function, its logical role? My emic conclusion is that it may be described as an implicit emic rule disguised as an alleged universally quantified law of concomitance.
In the other three fallacies of the drstānta (3.3.1.1-3), excluding the fifth fallacy of an improperly) reversed warrant, the justification of fallaciousness focusses not upon the conditional warrant (drstāntal) but upon the presence and/or absence of the justifier (hetu) and thesis properties (pakşa=sādhya) in the similar exemplification (sapaksa). Thus the fallaciousness of the conditional warrant (drstāntal) is quite different than the fallaciousness of the first three fallacious uses of the term “drstānta?." This emphasis upon the presence or absence of the alleged concomitant properties in the exemplifications and the metalogical procedures of ignoring the etic potential role of the drstānta', is a particular feature of the (metalogical) mode of argumentation in this text. Hence, this focus upon the specific exemplification(s) and not on the warrant constitutes more evidence for the non-deductive nature of the PA and its emic metalogical theories and procedures. Consider the contrary: a) if there were an emphasis on the warrant and b) if the PA were asserted with the thesis last, preceded by the justification and the warrant, and c) if there were replacement or transformational rules for the rearrangement of the latter two (hetul and drstānta) and d) if there were explicit valid inference rules to which the nyāya logician could then appeal, to check, and against which to justify the PA at issue as in true deductive validity rules, then and only then, would we be able to make the case for and deductively argue that the PA is deductive, and in specific cases sound and vaild.