Aspect of Jainology Part 3 Pandita Dalsukh Malvaniya

Author(s): M A Dhaky, Sagarmal Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith

Page 492

On the Translation of the Bosic Nyāya Terms
167
is so with drstāntal and my point is that most scholars have discounted the metalogical function of the dpstānta' (conditional) and have emphasized the dộstanta? function of referring to the descriptive exemplifications (sapaksa, vipaksa) of concomitance. This latter emphasis is quite in accord with the emic PA process of the justification of the legitimacy of a specific PA; however, while such scholars so emphasize in the drstānta, they usually project other non-emic assumptions onto the PA, for example, formal deductive validity. We shall examine ten textual sources of evidence in the NP regarding my case for “warrant."
The text employs drstānta? in only six cases among ten in the fallacies of the concordant drstānta (sādharmya) (3.3.3.1-3) and the discordant dņstānta (vaidharmya) (3.3.2.1-3). The remaining four cases of drstāntal (3.3.1.4,5 and 3.3.2.4,5) explicitly require both the conditional statement, dřstāntal with the conditional expression of drstānta' in the proper order (3.3.1.5 and 3.3.2.5). This completes the distribution of drstāntal-2 in the ten sādharmya and vaidharmya fallacies. The discordant drstanta (vaidharmya, 3.3.2.1-3) and drstānta', the conditional (yat... tat) as in the last two fallacies (3.3.2.4, 5) is repeated as in the concordant section (3.3.1.1-5). Thus for a PA drstānta not to be fallacious, one must explicitly state the drstanta in correct conditional form.
Now we shall turn first to the drstānta? because this side of the equivocation is the usual referent when the term “drstānta" is employed emically. The following is a translation of drstānta? where the focus is upon the similar exemplification (sapaksa) rather than on the conditional dņstāntal, thus it is an example of dņstānta.
Sadhana-dharma-asiddha. “A fallacious warrant is one in which the property (dharma (=hetu?) of the means of proof (sādhana) is not established (asiddha)” as in the following:
“The property-to-be-proved, permanence, resides in the exemplification, atom, but the property of the means of proof, corporeality, does not exist in the exemplification, atoms, because atoms are corporeal" (3.3.1(1)).
This instance of the fallacy of the drstāntadoes not focus on the conditional warrant but focuses on 1) the exemplification sapaksa as the dual loci (dharmin) of two properties and 2) the presence of the sādhya-dharma and the absence of the sādhana-dharma in the exemplification. Tachikwa notes this, but he fails to recognize the (fallacious) significance of the explicit informal fallacy of equivocation which has occurred here with the concordant (sādharmya) "dřstanta".
The first three fallacies (ābhāsa(s)) (in 3.3.1.1-3) are about drstānta-as-sapaksa; the last two (3.3.1.4, 5) are about the conditional statements (yat.. tat) drstānta, the pattern of three drstāntais repeated with discordant drstanta (vaidharmya, 3.3.2.1-3 and 3.3.2.4, 5). Drstāntal denotes the conditional warrant; dộstanta denotes the exemplifications as dharmins. However, it is well to note that to omit drstāntal is to violate a necessary condition of a legitimate PA; that is, it is fallacious to so omit