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On the Translation of ihe Basic Nyāya Terms
169
But we do not find a, b, c, and d exhibited in the PA and its metalogical theories and procedures or modes of argumentation. To pursue these questions further, iet us consider the last fallacious warrant, the illicitly reversed expression of concomitance (viparitanvaya).
Also relevant to our discussion is the fallacy of a reversed warrant (Viparitanvaya): An example of a fallaciously reversed warrant (3.3.1.(5)) follows : “A fallacious warrant (drstānta) which is illicitly reversed is, for example, where one states "whatever is impermanent, that is well known to be causa lly generated” when one should say (vāktavye) "whatever is causally generated, that is well known to be impermanent.”
Note that the preferred warrant here is the reversed order of the missing warrant of the last fallacious warrant 3.3.11(4); the latter fallacious warrant lacked “whatever if impermanent, that is causally generated” which is the fallacious instance quoted in this fifth of the fallacious warrants through similarity (sādharmya). Thus the PA model implicit here is different than the only other fallacious warrant (drstānta').
It is also clear that in neither "reversed" (viparita) fallacy (3.3.1.(5) or 3.3.2.(5)) is there any justification or evidence explicitly offered in the NP text as to why the warrant must be explicitly expressed. The reader is reminded that normative recommendation concerning the correct order of the conditional warrant does not constitute evidence for the issue of why the warrant is needed. While the text then offers no explicit evidence for the answer to this extremely important metalogical question, the reasons are not difficult for supply; it is the necessary requirement of the explicit expression of the relation of concomitance (vyāpti).
Given the textual evidence just cited we now turn to make the case for the translation of “warrant” for drstānta. First, there is the implicit but obvious and simple normative rule that one should not utilize fallacious PA expressions; to omit the proper expression of the conditional drstāntal is to commit a fallacy (as in 3.3.1.4, 5). Thus one should not omit the conditional dņstāntal regardless of how deceptively "clear" the PA seems without it. To do so is to commit an explicit emic fallacy; and to merely mention or simply conjoin the two properties in exposition is also to commit an emic fallacy (3.3.1.4).
Second, the correct order of the conditional drstāntal can be accurately described as the naming of the justifier (hetu?-dharma) as the antecedent of the conditional drstānta' and the property-to-be-justified (sādhya=paksa'-dharma) as the consequent. This is found in the legitimate PA (Model 1) where "causal generation” (krtakatva) is the name of the antecedent property and "impermanence" (anitya) is the name of the consequent of the conditional. The antecedent property “causal generation" is the justifier (hetu°). This is purportedly concomitant with the consequent property named . in the drstānta'; this property (anitya) is the thesis-property (paksa) which is the property-to-be-justified (sādhya). This asymetrical relation of causally generated things and impermanent things is expressed in the conditional drstänta?, the absence
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