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Dharmakirti's Attitude Toward Omniscience
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that stray from the reality of the four truths. That mind that understands the reality of the four truths in combination with a separation from infinite stains is known as omniscient. Also...there is a mind that understands the selflessness of dharmaz in combination with the destruction of infinite (instances of grasping at a self of dharmas. That mind is omniscient.61 rGyal tshab admits that this argument is incidental” to DharmakIrti's discussion, although he obviously believes that it is implicit in it. Thus, just as authoritativeness regarding what is to be attained and avoided by those who strive for freedom was taken to mean authoritativeness regarding everything in the universe, so too the understanding of selflesness is assumed necessarily to be gained in relation to every single dharma there is and one who has a "complete" understanding of selflessness to be omniscient in the most universal sense. 52
Curiously, neither rGyal tshab (nor Prajñakaragupta before him) sees as a proof of universal omniscience that section in the "pramāṇasiddhi" chapter that is most conducive to it, the elaborate proof of the existence of past and future lives, followed by a demonstration of the possibility of the infinite development of assorted mental qualities.53 The importance of this passage has not been lost on later dGe lugs pa and other Tibetan teachers, who cite it frequently as the proof of the possibility of omniscience.54 Dharmaksrti asserts that the proof of the Buddha's authoritativeness is his unlimited compassion, 55 but unlimited compassion only can be proved if there are many rebirths through which one can develop it. This necessitates a demonstration of the possibility of past and future lives, which hinges, in turn, on demonstrating that the mind does not have the body as its cause, but, ratber, arises as part of a homogeneous causal series. Even the proof that mind and body are substantially different is insufficient to demonstrate the possibility of infinite mental development, because even though there be past and future lives, it is entirely possible that mental qualities only can be increased to a certain point because, like jumping ability, they require repeated effort and have an unstable, physical basis. Dharmakirti argues that jumping ability is an inappropriate example for comparison, precisely because jumping ability has an unstable physical basis, the body, and does require repeated exertion. Mental qualities, on the other hand, exist in a continuum of a different sort. They arise within the context of a meditatively-induced mental stability, and therefore have a cumulative effect. Further, when developed to a certain point, they become natural, and therefore require minimalif any-exertion on the part of the meditator. Given countless lives and the increasing effortlessness that goes with an increasingly stable mental basis, there is no reason why mental qualities cannot be developed to the highest possible degree. Dharmakirti, of course, is arguing specifically for the possibility of infinitely developing compassion, but there is no reason why the argument cannot be applied to other
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