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Un the Transiation of the Basic Nyāya Terms
165 specific property ( the hetuo dharma ) of the justification-member (hetu) ( for hetu: 2.1-4; hetu? : 2.2, 2.3 ); hetu” refers to a property (dharma).
I suggest 'justifier' for hetu? rather than ‘mark' or 'reason'. First, it is better because hetu' refers to the ascriptive statement, not the property (dharma ) which is either empirically observable ( rare in the NP ) or is mutually presupposed within the context of the competitive darśana(s) (philosophical schools ) context. If this property ( dharma ) ( hetu) is emically acceptable, by observation or, as is more likely, by finding no contradiction in it's assertion with one's darśana philosophy, and if the concomitance elicited in the warrant (drstānal ) is acceptable, then the acceptance of both (hetu' and hetu? ) is at least a necessary condition for concluding that the thesis-member (paksa') is legitimate. A rule of logical debate ( vāda ) is that both or all parties to the evaluation of the PA must accept the justifier-property (hetu). The metaphysical limitations presupposed by many of the opposing darśanas regarding the latter rule make such evaluation processes of PAs non-deductive but not nonformal.
Mr. Tachikawa translates the property, hetu” as 'mark', one-half of the concomitance of the two properties. I take it here that he is also alluding to the common term 'linga' (mark ), as found in the Nyāya Sūtra and also in the Nyāya Sūtra Bhāșya of the darśana. While it is true that in the orthodox (āstika) Nyāya darśana'consideration' or 'reflection (parāmarśa) on the mark ( linga) of the hetul may be the sufficient condition for noting the concomitance of the two properties postulated in the PA and thus the legitimacy of a paksal-pratijñā, no such discussion of parāmarsa is found in either the Nyāyapraveśa or the Nyāyamukha.
I would suggest “justification' for 'hetu?, (the ascription ) and justifier' for Chetu, the observable or assumed darśana-restricted property. Such translations reflect the important distinction between hetul and hetu”, whereas ‘mark,' reason,' predicate', 'middle term', or 'probans', do not so distinguish. Such words as ‘mark' obviously overemphasizes 'hetu?, 'while obscuring the ascriptive 'hetul.' In a modern context where many scholars have all-too readily supplied dummy subjects to make hetul into a proposition, which it is not (ityāha ), it is important to make this distinction explicit. : “Warrant" (drstānta', 2.1, 2.3). Although the word 'concomitance' or 'pervasion' ( vyāpti ) as is commonly found in the later tradition, is absent in the NP, clearly the concept of two concomitant properties is operative; this relation we find expressed in the dpstānta. There are three major components of the drstānta statement. First there is the “yat. . .tat," conditional proposition stating the concomitance of two properties, drstāntal; second there is dpstānta", the similar exemplification' (sapaksa ) and third, the dissimilar exemplification' ( vipaksa ). All three are referred to simply as the 'drstānta' in the text. The whole drstanta functions in this text as the expression of an exemplified warrant, which when juxtaposed with the protometalogical rule (trirūpahetu ) and when satisfied, serves as a necessary condition
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