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metaphysics, this system admits it as all-pervasive just as the Samkhya-Yoga regards it.& 8 The Nyāya-Vaišeşika, having denied the idea of madhyama-parimana or contraction and expansion of Soul, accepts it as unchangeable permanent (küțastha-nitya) 67 from the point of view of substance like the Samkhya-Yoga, otherwise in that case it would have been non-eternal. Nevertheless, the Nyāya-Vaišesika agrees with Jaina Philosophy in regard to the relation of quality and substance (guņa.guņi or dharmadharmi) having fallen apart from the Samkhya-Yoga system in this respect, which accepts cetana (Self) as partless and devoid of any kind of quality (guna) or characteristic (dharma). It accepts Soul as the substratum of many qualities.68 In spite of there being its agreement with Jaina metaphysics in this respect, the NyāyaVaiseșika appears to differ from the former in other respects.
The Jaina Philosophy, having accepted inseparable capacities like inherent eternal consciousness, bliss, energy, etc., in soul, admits theit ever newer modes at every moment, whereas the Nyāva-Vaišeșika system does not admit such inseparable inherent eternal capacities like consciousness (cetanā), etc. in the Soul-Substance; nevertheless, it accepts knowledge, bliss, pain, desire, hatred, effort, merit, and demerit, etc., as the qualities possessed by Soul.60
The existence of these qualities continues up to the relation (i. e. existence) of the body and they are produced and destroyed. 70 These nine qualities of the SoulSubstance, namely intelligence, bliss and others conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiseșika are of the status of the modes of the inherent capacity of Soul as formulated in Jaina Philosophy. Nevertheless, the basic difference between these two systems is that, according to the latter, the pure mode or transformation of the capacities like inherent consciousness (or sentiency) bliss, energy, etc., in the Soul-Substance or the continuous whole of their modes in it is taking place even in such state of its liberation when released from the body (videha-muktāvastha) also, though there may not be the physical relation, connection or activity (śarira-yoga), whereas from the NyāyaVaišeşika point of view there is no possibility of any such pure or impure, momentary or permanent qualities like intelligence (buddhi), etc., in the Soul-Substance at the state of liberation from the body or the separation from the body, 71 because this philosophy does not accept the capacities like inherent consciousness, etc., in it like Jaina metaphysics. Here, though the Nyāya-Vaišeșika Philosophy agrees with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga on one point, it differs from the latter on the others
The Sāmkhya-Yoga system accepts the Self as absolutely partless (niramśa) and unchangeable, permanent in itself (kūțastha-nitya) anl self-manifested consciousness (svayam-prakāśa-cetana-rūpa). Hence, just as this philosophy regards it is devoid of any kind of relation of qualities like buddhi (intelligence), etc. in the worldly condition, so it is in the liberated state, whereas the Nyāya-Vaiseșika philosophy does not accept Soul as natural consciousness; nevertheless, it conceives Soul as endowed with the qualities like buddhi (intelligence), etc. in the physical condition. But at the time of
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