Indian Logic Part 02

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

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inference. While discussing the Nyāyasūtra definition of inference Jayanta offers two sets of interpretations of the terms, viz. pūrvavat, śeşavat and sāmānyatodrsta occurring in the definition and standing for the three types of inference.
The third section is devoted to the exposition of upamāna (analogy). According to the Naiyāyika a case of upamāna arises when an expert tells a novice that such and such an unfamiliar thing is similar to such and such a familiar thing and the latter later on coming across this unfamiliar thing recognizes it as similar to that familiar thing and says to himself : "So this is what the word concerned stands for." Jayanta criticises the Mimāṁsaka's view of upamāna. According to the Mimāmsaka a case of upamāna arises when an expert tells a novice that such and such an unfamiliar thing is similar to such and such a familiar thing and the latter later on coming across this unfamiliar thing recalls that that familiar thing is similar to this unfamiliar thing now encountered. Jayanta contends that this is a case of simple memory.
The second chapter (a study of the third Ahnika) first deals with verbal testimony. Jayanta states and explains the Nyāyasūtra definition of verbal testimony which runs as follows: 'Verbal testimony (sabda) is the teaching (upadeśa) of an authoritative person (āpta).' In the course of his discussion he makes two pertinent refutations, both directed against the Buddhist. Thus it is first argued that the Buddhist is wrong to maintain that verbal testimony is a case of inference, then that he is wrong to maintain that a word has nothing to do with things real. In connection with the question as to how verbal testimony is a pramāna, the Mimāmsakas have raised the question as to whether the validity of a cognition is intrinsic or extrinsic. So, Jayanta next begins his discussion of this question. The Mimāṁsā thesis that all cognition is mtrinsically valid is defended by the Kumārilite and the Prabhākarite in two very different ways; so Jayanta first presents and criticises its Kumārilite version and then the Prabhākarite version. While presenting his own case the Prabhakarite criticises rival theories which somehow or other grant the possibility of a false cognition and elaborates his own theory which grants no such possibility. Jayanta's criticism of both the versions is sustained, penetrating and brilliant. He strongly demonstrates that no cognition whatsoever has a right to be declared valid without being tested through the application of the criterion of successful practice. Having completed his discussion of