Indian Antiquary Vol 51

Author(s): Richard Carnac Temple, Devadatta Ramkrishna Bhandarkar
Publisher: Swati Publications

Page 189

SEPTEMBER, 1922]
A NEW VIEW OF SHER SHAH SUR
181
turned on Mahmûd Shâh in the East. He did nothing much in that year, but in 1536, finding himself held up on the then only route to Gaur at Teliagarhi, he led his army by another way, at that time entirely unknown, through the hilly jungle tract of the Jharkhand. It was a great feat, showing fine leadership and enterprise and imagination, performed again later on in 1659 by Mir Jumla, but with infinitely more resources at his disposal. Sher Khân had his reward and appeared unexpectedly before Gaur, but without siege artillery. Mahmud Shah, however, still held the cards-he could easily have withstood a long siege; his allies, the Portuguese, now landed on the coast in force, held the Ganges, and the rains were approaching in three or four months, making a return through the Jharkhand impossible at that season. Sher Khân on the whole was not in a favourable position after all, but the moral effect of his two victories over the Bengali forces and his sudden appearance before Gaur overawed Mahmûd Shâh, who, discarding Martim Affonso de Mello's advice, bought off Sher Khân for a very large sum, used the very following year to raise a new army against him, and also a valuable tract of land useful for future attack on him. Sher Khân was now no longer a 'new man,' but the most powerful Afghân chief in India-the Hazrat-i-'âlî. He was about fifty years of age.
The campaign against Bahadur Shah of Gujarât went well for Humâyân, and the situation thus created not only kept Sher Khân quiet in 1536 in regard to Bengal, but made him successfully conciliate Humâyân through the kind offices of Hindû Bêg, the successor of his old friend Junêd Barlas of Jaunpur.
Early in 1537 Bahadur Shah was drowned at sea and Humâyûn returned to Agra. Meanwhile, Mahmûd Shâh had been negotiating for help from the Portuguese. All this placed Sher Khân in a difficulty. He felt obliged to proceed against Mahmûd Shâh before effective help could reach him, and he had to be careful of himself in Bihâr with Humâyân at Agra. He decided to attack Mahmûd Shâh in the autumn of 1537 on the pretext of an impossible demand for tribute, but this was no worse than Mahmûd Shah's simultaneous action in securing aggressive help from the Portuguese. Both sides in fact tore up their treaty. The campaign, however, was a barren one, as Humâyân had now become hostile to Sher Khân and Bihar was in danger. So Sher Khân did not get further than an investment of Gaur and the frustrating of the Portuguese assistance. Also, he now had Humâyân not only as an active enemy, but as a formidable one, because he had acquired the service of Rûmî Khân, the famous commander of Bahadur Shah's artillery, together with his guns.
Sher Khân was consequently in a critical position. Humâyûn had started for Chunar and might join Mahmûd Shâh, and the Portuguese were in force at Chittagong. He had also to leave his son, Jalâl Khân Sûr, with Khawas Khân to look after Gaur. He met the situation with his accustomed foresight and skill. He laid a trap for Humâyân by an obstinate though useless defence of Chunâr under Ghâzî Sûr and Sultan Sarwânî, to gain time to conquer Bengal. Humâyûn duly fell into the trap of sitting down in front of Chunâr, the reduction of which could not really hurt Sher Khân, and wasted his time over it, which his wily opponent left him in peace to do.
Sher Khân's proceedings, as reported by the chroniclers, now became thoroughly Oriental, and indeed Indian. He wanted to capture the great fortress of Rohtâs as a city of refuge for the wives and families of the Afghans, and is said to have got it, firstly by bribing Churamân, the Brahman Deputy of the Raja, to influence his master to let the families in, which he did