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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
whole (159—165); The question which of the two; realism and idealism, possesses the final truth and its answer (165); The Jaina position in logic and the realistic philosophers (165—166); The contention of the Naiyāyika who believes in the opposition of being and non-being like the idealist and the Jaina reply (166–170); The position of Prabhåkara and the Jaina solution (170—172); Jaina's dismissal of the fundamental accusation of contradiction entails the collapse of all other charges (173); The Jaina non-absolutism and its critics (174); The Sänkhya doctrine of identity of substance in the midst of its changing modes, the universal-cum-particulars of the Naiyāyikas, the perceptual cognition of variegated colour in a carpet of the Buddhist - are confessions of unity of the plurality; The Cårvāka and the Mimāṁsist also endorse the Jajna logical standpoint (174-176).
VII RELATIONS
177-211 (I) Identity and difference - the presupposition of relation (177–178); Denial of relation — the Fluxist, the Vedantist and Bradley; the charge that unreality of relation would make causal relation unreal does not affect the Buddhist; relation of terms only a subjective construction according to Dharmakirti and Kant alike (178-181); Reciprocity of services the conditio sine qua non of objective relation – (1814-191); Jaina conception of relation (191–195); The difficulty about the cognition of relation and the Jaina reply -- perception of concomitance in agreement and difference the organ of the knowledge of causality (194—198). (II) The problem of inherence; the nature of inherence - proof of inherence and the source of its knowledge — difficulties regarding inherence and the Vaišeșika answer (198—206); The Jaina position (206-211).
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