Jaina Concept of Omniscience

Author(s): Ramjee Singh
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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THE NON-BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCE
mology, as presented by Madhavācārya3 and some others emphasising " the purely distinctive or negative character of the Lokāyata-epistomology"4 is incorrect. It has been claimed that “though the Lokāyata-emphasis is on the primacy of sense-perception, it accepts reason also.”5 But without attemp. ting a final verdict on this controversial question, even if we accept that some Cārvākas accept inference also as a source of knowledge. we can call them empiricists in the broad sense of the term. But even if we discard their epistemology, we can infer their view on omniscience from their metaphysical positions.
The Cārvākas deny the existence of the disembodied soul, God, Paraloka (other world ) Karmaphala (fruits of karma) etc. Now, since the individual soul or God form the substratum of omniscient knowledge, there is no question of their accepting the theory of omniscience. Vidyānandi, in a recent published work, criticising the Cārvākas says that on the basis of perception alone, no one can prove the non-existence of the omniscient being.
(C) The Indian Sceptics and Agnostics The Indian sceptics are called Ajñā navā lins. They are identified with Sañjaya and his School, Jocobi has freely translated 'Ajñānikas' as agnostic (a term coined by Huxley in 1859). But although the two terms are, etymologically or morphologically, the sam, we shall huve to distinguish between them. Viśvakarmin defined an agaostic or sceptic as one who is enwraped in misty cloud ( nehāreni prariti) and
3 Madhavācārya, Sarva Darśanı Sangrahi, trans. E. B. Cowell and
R. E. Gough (London, Kegan Paul, Popular ed., 1914), p. 42. 4 D. P. Chattopadhyāya., Lokāyata (Bombhy, People's Publishing House,
1949), p. 30. 5 Ibid. Ch I. Section 8. 6 Vidyanandi, Satyaśāsana Parikṣā, ed. Jaina G. C. (Vācānasi, Bhartiya
Jñāna Pitha, 1964), Section 22, p. 19.